

SEPTEMBER 1961

Commentary

IS NEW YORK CITY UNGOVERNABLE?

Nathan Glazer

THE "NORMALIZATION" OF ISRAEL

Mati Meged

FOREIGN POLICY & THE AMERICAN MIND

Robert A. Nisbet

ENGLISH POETRY TODAY

A. Alvarez

NEGRO MILITANTS, JEWISH LIBERALS, AND THE UNIONS

Tom Brooks

THE NEW MAP OF CHRISTIANITY

David Danzig

Public Affairs

DEATH IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Hans J. Morgenthau

In the Community

FERTILITY, SOCIALISM, SOCIAL ACTION

Milton Himmelfarb

Observations

TOYNBEE'S EPISTLE TO THE JEWS

Jacob B. Agus

THE N.Y. DAILY NEWS

Murray Kempton

Books in Review

John Gross

Isaac Bashevis Singer

Joseph Kraft

Irving Feldman

Elisha Greifer


C. Peter Magrath

Ezra Spicehandler

George Lichtheim

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

60c



The Lord bless thee, and keep thee:
The Lord make his face shine upon thee,
and be gracious unto thee:
The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee,
and give thee peace.

NUMBERS VI: 24, 25, 26

Happy New Year  Motor Company

The American Road, Dearborn, Michigan

*Central European Shofar—Ram's Horn
Circa XVIII Century. S. Strauss Collection
Jewish Museum, New York City*

A STATEMENT OF AIMS

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture.

The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own; and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
LOUIS CAPLAN, *President*

THE COMMENTARY PUBLICATION COMMITTEE

RALPH E. SAMUEL, *Chairman*

CHARLES D. BREITEL	RICHARD C. ERNST	ALBERT FURTH
MAURICE GLINERT	J. M. KAPLAN	SYDNEY M. KAYE
EDWARD KUHN, JR.	LEWIS J. LAVENTHOL	HAROLD MANHEIM
DAVID SHER	HARRY STEINER	ALAN M. STROOCK
		BEN TOUSTER

Largest,
fastest to

ISRAEL

LISBON • NAPLES • MESSINA • PIRAEUS • CYPRUS EN ROUTE

"OLYMPIA"

23,000 tons • 21 knots



Luxurious Tourist and First Class travel on the magnificent flagship "OLYMPIA"—enjoyed by thousands of passengers to Israel and on Mediterranean and Caribbean Cruises. 22 public rooms, air conditioned dining, theatre and lounges. Spacious sun and sports decks, 2 swimming pools. Superb service and cuisine. On all sailings to Israel a full *Kosher kitchen* will be operated under the supervision of a Mashgiach. Rabbi . . . Synagogue.

From New York to HAIFA. All these luxuries and many others as little as

Half-round trip **\$23⁶⁰**
Tourist Thrift Season* per day

September 22*†

†Following day from Boston.

See your TRAVEL AGENT

GREEK LINE

10 Bridge Street, New York 4, N. Y.

Free to WRITERS

seeking a book publisher

Two fact-filled, illustrated brochures tell how to publish your book, get 40% royalties, national advertising, publicity and promotion. Free editorial appraisal. Write Dept. C.

Exposition Press, 386 Park Ave., S., N.Y. 16



L'Phone Tova

GROSSINGER'S
GROSSINGER, N.Y.

*Change of
Address*

For a change of address, allow 4 weeks. Please send your old, as well as your new, address.

Commentary

165 EAST 56th STREET
NEW YORK 22, N.Y.

Commentary

SEPTEMBER 1961
NUMBER 3
VOLUME 32

Is New York City Ungovernable?	185	NATHAN GLAZER
Foreign Policy & the American Mind	194	ROBERT A. NISBET
The "Normalization" of Israel	204	MATT MEGED
Negro Militants, Jewish Liberals & the Unions	209	TOM BROOKS
English Poetry Today	217	A. ALVAREZ
The New Map of Christianity	224	DAVID DANZIG
Public Affairs		
Death in the Nuclear Age	231	HANS J. MORGENTHAU
In the Community		
Fertility, Social Action, Socialism	235	MILTON HIMMELFARB
Observations		
Toynbee's Epistle to the Jews	239	JACOB B. AGUS
The N.Y. <i>Daily News</i>	242	MURRAY KEMPTON
Letters from Readers	246	
Books in Review		
Curtains, by Kenneth Tynan	255	JOHN GROSS
Great Western Mystics, by David Baumgardt; Nine Gates to the Chassidic Mysteries, by Jiri Langer	258	ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER
The Transformation of Russian Society, edited by Cyril E. Black	261	ELISHA GREIFER
Dawn, by Elie Wiesel	262	IRVING FELDMAN
Firsthand Report, by Sherman Adams	264	JOSEPH KRAFT
Ahad Ha-Am—Asher Ginzberg, by Leon Simon	266	EZRA SPICEHANDLER
Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law, by Herbert Wechsler	268	C. PETER MAGRATH
Contemporary Europe, by H. Stuart Hughes	270	GEORGE LICHTHEIM

Editor: NORMAN PODHORETZ

General Manager: FRANCES GREEN

Managing Editor

SHERY ABEL

Advertising

DOROTHY PUTNEY

Associate Editors

HARRIS DIENSTFREY

THEODORE SOLOTAROFF

Contributing Editors

MILTON HIMMELFARB

GEORGE LICHTHEIM

Editorial Assistant

BRENDA BROWN

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee • Single copy 60¢; \$7 a year; 2 years \$12; 3 years \$17 • No extra Canadian or foreign postage charge • Editorial & Business offices: 165 East 56th Street, New York 22 • Printed at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pa. by Business Press, Inc. • Second class postage paid at Lancaster • Copyright 1961 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions • Indexed in Readers' Guide & Public Affairs Information Service • Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by return postage.

See Europe, Greece and Israel for only \$21 a day!

S.S. ATLANTIC sails from New York Oct. 6 on a 34-day Sunlane Cruise... 3 days at Haifa for tours in Israel... fares begin as low as \$690*!

At any popular sun resort, you can spend \$21 a day for only a hotel room. Meals and other expenses are extra. And you see only one place.

But on this special Thrift Sunlane Cruise... aboard the splendid, seagoing hotel, S.S. ATLANTIC... you can visit and sightsee in LISBON, NAPLES, ATHENS, PALMA, GIBRALTAR... and stop 3 days at HAIFA so you can take special low-cost tours of modern and ancient ISRAEL!

Aboard ship, you'll find every American comfort. Your air-conditioned stateroom

has its own private bath with tub or shower. You can enjoy the sun decks, or take a dip in the open-air pool... see a first-run movie, or be entertained in one of the ATLANTIC's handsome lounges.

On all American Export Lines ships, good food is of great importance. You will appreciate the ATLANTIC's regular American and Continental cuisine. For those who wish it, authentic Kosher meals will also be available.

Sail from New York or Florida. The cruise leaves New York City Oct. 6 and Port Everglades, Fla., on Oct. 8... returning to New York on Nov. 9, 1961.

For more details about this fabulous cruise, see your travel agent. Or write to American Export Lines, Dept. J, 39 Broadway, New York 6, N. Y.

*\$715, if you prefer to stay aboard ship during the Israel visit.



S.S. ATLANTIC

AMERICAN EXPORT LINES

39 BROADWAY, NEW YORK 6, N. Y.

*The heritage of the
ancient Hebrews
and its meaning to
modern man*

The Way of Israel

BIBLICAL FAITH AND ETHICS
By **JAMES MUILENBURG**
*Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the
Cognate Languages,
Union Theological Seminary*



A new volume in
**RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES**
planned and edited by
**RUTH NANDA
ANSHEN**

Professor Muilenburg believes that in the unique life of ancient Israel there is an important message for modern man offering him a way out of the ethical dilemmas of the atomic age. In *The Way of Israel* he explores this theme in a series of sensitive, scholarly chapters.

\$3.75 at all bookstores

HARPER & BROTHERS, N. Y. 16



WORLD-WIDE BANKING SERVICES

80 BRANCHES IN ISRAEL
Extensive Network of
Affiliates and Correspondents

TOTAL ASSETS EXCEED IL 325,000,000

Soon... A New York City Branch
511 Fifth Avenue, at 43rd Street

REPRESENTATIVE'S OFFICE
61 BROADWAY • NEW YORK 6, N.Y. • WH 3-3860

ISRAEL Discount Bank Ltd.

IS NEW YORK CITY UNGOVERNABLE?

NATHAN GLAZER

ANYONE STUDYING the city of New York (as I have done for the past year or so) is likely to run across certain facts that cast a rather strange light on the present confusion in its politics. For example:

(1) In 1940, in the seventh year of the administration of a reform Mayor, Fiorello H. LaGuardia, the Board of Education was responsible for educating about 1,060,000 children, and employed about 37,600 teachers, supervisors, and assorted specialized personnel for the job. In 1960, in the seventh year of the administration of Democratic Mayor Robert F. Wagner, the Board of Education was responsible for educating about 980,000 children, and employed about 45,700 teachers, supervisors, and assorted specialized personnel for the job. Thus a 7 per cent decrease in the number of children to be taught has been associated with a 22 per cent increase in the number of people staffing and running the schools.

(2) In 1946 (the first year of William O'Dwyer's Democratic administration), the Police Department had 20,171 employees listed in the city budget; in 1961,

it had 27,239 employees—an increase of 35 per cent. During the same period, the population of the city grew by no more than 3 or 4 per cent.

(3) Since 1946, more than 90,000 low-rent housing units have been built in the city. Between 1950 and 1960, there was a net increase of 255,000 in the number of dwelling units available in the city—enough to house anywhere from half a million to a million more people than lived in New York in 1950. Yet during those ten years the population of the city declined by 110,000.

These facts are perhaps not so surprising in themselves. But consider, in connection with the first, the widespread conviction in New York that the Board of Education is doing an inadequate job both with the children of the poor and with the children of the well-to-do. The poor are often in a state of resentment and anger over the schools, and the well-to-do often withdraw their children from the public schools, if they can manage it. Consider, in connection with the second fact, that the state of law enforcement in New York is generally considered to be worse in some respects than it was about fifteen years ago. Most citizens are convinced, for example, that Central Park is far more dangerous today, and find it hard to believe that East Harlem slum dwellers once used to sleep out in the Park on hot summer nights. (The Park is now emptied at midnight.) And consider, in connection with the third fact, that vast

NATHAN GLAZER's new book *The Social Basis of American Communism* has just been issued by Harcourt, Brace & World, and the book on the major ethnic groups in New York City on which he is currently working will be published next year. Readers will recall Mr. Glazer's article "Is 'Integration' Possible in New York City Schools?" in the September 1960 COMMENTARY and "The Peace Movement in America—1961" which appeared last April.

numbers of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and others live under incredibly cramped conditions, that scandals involving illegally overcrowded buildings continually erupt, that the Welfare Department (because it cannot find any place else to house its clients) is forced to patronize expensive and filthy tenements that stuff families of six and eight and more into a single room.

In other words, despite enormous increases in the number of teachers, policemen, and housing units, it is precisely in these areas (one could mention others too) that conditions are felt to have gotten completely out of hand over the last fifteen years.

We might add a fourth mystery—that while the city is being torn apart politically by a conflict between Mayor Wagner (seeking re-election to a third term with the support of a Reform Democratic faction) and the regular Democratic party leaders (principally Carmine De Sapio of Manhattan, Charles Buckley of the Bronx, and Joseph Sharkey of Brooklyn, who have put up their own slate headed by Arthur Levitt), it is impossible to discover any difference between the two groups on these or any other questions which might be raised about New York. Indeed, even the most devoted reader of the *New York Times* would have to make an extraordinary effort to discover just what the issue was on which Mayor Wagner split with Carmine De Sapio, after living in harmony with him for many years. Having made the effort, I recall that it was a dispute over the choice of a successor to Manhattan Borough President Hulan Jack earlier this year. But this issue was probably far less important in causing the break than Wagner's desire to be re-elected. In order to be re-elected, Wagner knew that he would have to perform the political miracle of persuading an electorate which believed that the schools were doing a poor job, that the level of public safety was declining, and that the housing situation, after an expenditure of a few billion dollars, was apparently little im-

proved—that he had not *really* been Mayor for the past eight years. For if he had *really* been the Mayor, should he not have been held responsible?

THIS MIRACLE WAS all the more necessary to Wagner because the Reform movement in the Democratic party of Manhattan had made surprising headway and now posed a real threat. It had elected its first Congressman, William Fitts Ryan, in 1960, along with a number of state legislators, and it was showing signs of extending effectively to Brooklyn and the Bronx. Since the Reformers had dissociated themselves completely from the regular Democratic party, they might well have inherited in 1961 the votes of a restive electorate, ready to believe that Tammany and the machine were to be blamed for everything that seemed wrong with the city. In 1950, disgusted with the vast amount of corruption made possible by only five years of Democratic administration, the people of the city voted for such an unlikely reform candidate as Vincent Impellitteri, simply because he labeled himself an "Independent." In 1961, with the schools collapsing, the police ineffective, and the housing problem almost as bad as ever, might they not have voted for a really competent candidate, backed by the big names of Senator Herbert H. Lehman and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt?

However, most of the leaders of the Reform movement were apparently as little concerned with analyzing the problems of the city and considering better policies as were the Mayor and the Democratic leaders. The Reform movement had arisen in the first place because the liberal wing of the Democratic party in New York State was outraged at the power of the party leaders to name state-wide candidates, and because it conceived of a State Democratic party in the hands of the liberals—who had provided its most attractive and effective candidates—as a strong support for the liberal wing of the national Democratic party. The problems of New

York City as such played no role in the origins of the Reform Democratic movement, though they did serve as the basis on which thousands of young, energetic people were drawn to it.

The Reform movement concentrated all its fire on that perennially attractive target, Tammany, its assumption being that with Tammany destroyed and the machine party leaders replaced by Reform party leaders, all would be well. Indeed, those people in the Reform movement who asked, "But what will we *do* when we get rid of De Sapio and company?" were considered politically naive and perhaps even suspect. And since the Reform movement did not raise any question of program or policy (aside, perhaps, from more intensive harrying of the slum landlords), it was easy for the Mayor to join them—he, too, could get his membership card as a Reformer simply by attacking De Sapio.

As for the Liberal party, it was apparently incapable of the effort of political intelligence necessary to create a reform coalition that might improve the administration of the city—and also supported the new Reformer, Mayor Wagner. On their side, the Republicans, observing all this confusion in the Democratic ranks, thought they had a chance of electing a candidate of their own without the help of the Liberals, and thus put forward a slate headed by State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz. City Controller Lawrence E. Gerosa, who was dropped by Wagner, also saw an opportunity in the confusion, and hoping perhaps to pull another Impellitteri trick, decided to run for Mayor himself.

By the time this article appears, Mayor Wagner will be engaged in the difficult task of arguing that he is not responsible for what has happened in the city during the past seven years, while his three main opponents will be engaged in the easy demagogic job of blaming him for everything and yet giving no indication whatever that they are capable of being even as competent a Mayor as he has been. It

seems worthwhile, therefore, to distance oneself a bit from this degrading spectacle and ask, or at least begin to consider, what is really wrong with New York? What is the Mayor's legitimate responsibility for the present condition of the city? What could he have done better? What could any Mayor do to improve the situation?

For the truth is that Mayor Wagner will certainly not go down in the history of New York as its worst Mayor, even if he does not go down as its best. When one compares him with James Walker, William O'Dwyer, and Vincent Impellitteri, one sees a man who has worked much harder at his job than the first, who is unmarred by the kind of contact with gangster and criminal elements that the second maintained, and who is far more competent and has made much better appointments than the third. Important structural changes in the administration of the city have also been effected during his two terms, changes that were difficult to carry through and that will improve the city in the future. The City Planning Commission has been strengthened and given a larger role in the running of the city, a new zoning ordinance has been carefully and successfully shepherded through years of study and hearings and will shortly go into effect, and a new city charter which (in accordance with the advice of the best analysts of the political problems of the city) proposes to increase the power of the Mayor and the City Council, and reduce the power of the Borough Presidents, will be presented to the voters in November.

WHAT THEN CAN the Mayor be held responsible for in the present situation? In attempting an answer to this question, one must be careful to avoid falling into the unconscious demagoguery involved in selecting outrageous examples (how easy they are to unearth in a city of almost 8,000,000!) while ignoring the scale of a city which permits it ten times as many teen-age killings, rapes, cases of graft, and the like, as a city the size of San

Francisco. A good deal of this demagoguery is evident in discussions of New York. And there is another danger: the easy assumption that all problems are manageable even before they erupt—that, for example, a race riot or a particularly bad slum are always clear proof of inadequate administration. After all, there are problems which would baffle even the best will and the best administration in the world. To point to only one illustration—the addition to New York of half a million Puerto Rican migrants and their children in a mere ten years made it inevitable that certain things would get out of hand before they could be brought under control again.

An equally dangerous though more sophisticated assumption to be avoided is that *no* solutions can be found to the problems of New York. This assumption is held by many people who are aware of the enormously complex interplay of forces in the city (which means, alas, that no single element runs it—neither the bosses, nor the bankers, nor the criminals, nor the experts, nor the elected officials, nor the people), and who therefore conclude that things can't be done much better than they are already being done.

Such, in the end, is the point of view of the massive scholarly work by Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City*,* which must certainly be the most sophisticated, knowledgeable, and exhaustive analysis of the political structure of a great city that has ever been published. The final judgment made by Sayre and Kaufman is even a positive one: "The most lasting impressions created by a systematic analysis of New York City's political and governmental system as a whole are of its democratic virtues: its qualities of openness, its commitments to bargaining and accommodation among participants, its opportunities for the exercise of leadership by an unmatched variety and number of the city's residents,

new and old. Defects accompany these virtues, and in some situations overshadow them, but the City of New York can confidently ask: what other large American city is as democratically and as well governed?"

Sayre and Kaufman do offer one major suggestion for improvement, one on which all students of the city and all candidates for Mayor agree: the Mayor must be stronger, so that a pluralism gone mad can be somewhat checked by the chief elected official of the city, who now shares his power with the Board of Estimate, the heads of departments, and the bureaucracies of city employees—all under the severe financial restrictions imposed by a Republican state legislature. I would guess that Sayre and Kaufman, as well as other expert students of the city, feel on balance that Mayor Wagner deserves a third term. Conscious of the almost impossible job thrust upon a Mayor of New York, they would probably back a man who has at least lived with these unmanageable and uncoordinated forces and knows something about how they operate. But before succumbing to this sophisticated and well-supported point of view, let us again contemplate the facts with which we began and consider whether it is really possible to do any better.

IT IS ALL TOO EASY to say that the trouble with the New York City Board of Education or the New York Police Department lies with bigness as such. The issue, however, is not the size of these institutions, but the level of their performance—more specifically the degree to which they handle the peculiar obstacles to performance that bigness brings.

There are many examples of such obstacles: the difficulties the people at the bottom of a many-layered organization experience in communicating their ideas and feelings to the people at the top; the tendency of those who exist for the sake of servicing clients to orient their work not according to the needs of the clients but

* Russell Sage Foundation, 815 pp., \$8.50.

according to the special characteristics of the organization; the tendency of the organization to react to problems and crises by defensiveness rather than self-examination; the tendency of those inside the organization to close themselves off from new developments on the outside; the slowness of the organization to adopt new measures or new points of view; and the way in which new measures are weakened as they get applied over a large and diffuse area, thus being prevented from making a sharp and clear impact.

Neither the Board of Education nor the Police Department has shown itself capable of overcoming these obstacles to an improved standard of performance. The regular response of both institutions to any problem is to ask for more money and personnel, to do (in the words of Sayre and Kaufman) "more and more of what has traditionally been done," instead of trying to think of something new and imaginative to do. Occasionally, when pressures from the outside are too great to resist, imaginative programs are developed—slowly, painfully, and often protestingly—within the huge bureaucracies. The Higher Horizons project, under which extra teachers are used to help children from lower-class homes, is one, and it has achieved results (though it is now suffering from the disease of being spread too thin over too many schools). Yet, with its budget of \$600 million think what the Board of Education might do! A mere one per cent of this budget would permit the Board to establish half a dozen experimental schools run by the very best people in the country who might come up with ideas and approaches that could eventually spread through the entire system.

The Board not only has a huge budget, it also has 900 schools to work with—another great resource that might be imaginatively exploited, especially in coping with the much-discussed problem of Spanish-speaking children. Surely, one or two of those 900 schools could be put under the Education Department of the Com-

monwealth of Puerto Rico to see what it might come up with; one or two might be run on a bi-lingual basis to see if that would produce better results (some very distinguished private schools are bi-lingual); a national contest could be conducted among school principals on how to run a school with a high proportion of Puerto Rican children, and the winner could be given one of the twenty or thirty brand-new schools that are opened in New York every year on which to try out his ideas. One could ask the headmasters of the best private schools in the city if they would be willing to take over and run a public school as an annex—all expenses paid, including enough for administrative help. One could hire Martin Mayer, who has just written the best book on education in some decades and who lives in New York, to prowl around the school system for a year and come up with ideas as to what might be done. One could go to those hundreds of aspiring young writers in the city living on their parents' money or on grants or on odd jobs and offer them a chance to spend a few hours a week teaching literature in the Junior High Schools and High Schools. It may be that none of these ideas would work. But surely with such funds as are available and with such a huge number of schools and teachers, a hundred new things could be going on that might well result in raising the level of the education offered by the public school system.

WHY ARE THEY not being done? The answer is that the Superintendent of Schools is bound by a volume of regulations and requirements that make it almost impossible for him (except by an infinite expense of time and energy and skill) to introduce any radical changes. These rules and regulations—ironically, set up in the first place to create a merit system to protect the city employee from unfair treatment and political manipulation—have now taken on a life of their own and become the major obstacle to

improving city services. Anything which affects, even in the slightest, the interests and prerogatives of the employees runs into fantastic resistance, for the first aim of the rules and regulations is to defend the city employee against outsiders. Of the hundreds of school principals in New York, *not one* comes from outside the system. According to Sayre and Kaufman: "The New York City educational system is apparently more tightly closed than any other in the United States. The membership of the Board of Examiners [which gives all the examinations on which advancement is based] is recruited from within the bureaucracy it serves. When this cherished practice was broken into in the one instance on record (in 1937), the appointment of the outsider (who had formerly been a member of the system) was contested in litigation carried to the Court of Appeals." What, one wonders, would happen to the State Department, the Ford Motor Company, or Harvard University, if they were similarly closed to anyone from outside the system?

As for the Police Department—fattened in the last fifteen years by an additional 7,000 employees with which to handle the safety problems of a declining population—the impregnability of this bureaucracy to outside influences is even greater than that of the Board of Education. "In the Police Department," Sayre and Kaufman write, "the closed system now extends by adopted custom up to the Commissioner. . . . Competitive exams (limited to members of the Department in the next lower rank) control all promotions through the rank of Captain (except for detectives) and all higher positions must be filled from the ranks of Captain." That some changes are necessary is obvious from the simple fact that the level of danger to life and property in the city is so high, despite the number of policemen available. Why, one wonders, is so much energy and time devoted by the police to the vindictive hounding of Greenwich Village coffee houses and bookstores

and to the entrapment of prostitutes and homosexuals when the public safety—which the citizenry of New York rightly considers the first order of police business—is inadequately attended to? The police command very little respect from the middle-class people of the city (let alone from the poorer people)—and this is owing not to any propaganda to which they have been subjected, or to a cultural background in which police are painted as corrupt and menacing, but simply to their direct experience with the police, an experience which suggests that the Department is more devoted to the protection and extension of its own prerogatives than to carrying out its primary duties with maximum efficiency. Here again we are dealing with a hardened and inflexible bureaucracy. I myself have no good ideas for improving the situation, but I find it incredible that with an annual budget of \$224 million, the Police Department cannot find ways of raising the standard of its performance.

IN EDUCATION AND POLICING no great issues of policy have been debated in the city, and I have expressed the perhaps utopian hope that better administration and the mere breaking-up of traditional ways of doing things might improve matters. When we come to housing, where responsibility is spread among a great variety of agencies, both public and private, we find a situation where great issues of policy do exist and in which it has been much easier for intelligence to operate and make itself felt. It is difficult to ask a Mayor to be heroic in smashing up against the solid walls of the Board of Education and the Police Department—even though LaGuardia was on occasion capable of doing precisely that. But in an area such as housing, in which many forces and bureaucracies interact, it is possible to offer leadership; there is room for maneuver; and most important, there are *policies* which are unquestionably better than those that all the postwar Mayors have

allowed the city's agencies to pursue.

When I use the word "mysteries" in referring to the situation in education, safety, and housing, I honestly mean that there are mysteries—things that I cannot explain, and for which I have seen no one else offer good explanations. Why is it that a huge increase in housing should be accompanied by such terrible crowding when no increase in the population has taken place? One possible answer is that prosperity permits children—whether married or unmarried—to leave home earlier to set up their own establishments, so that many more housing units are needed, even with a declining population. Another is that rent control, in existence for eighteen years, has made it economical for people to hold on to large apartments even when they no longer need them (though this is probably less true today than five years ago). These are partial answers which are not fully satisfying. One thing, however, is clear—that urban renewal programs and the building of low-income projects have gone hand in hand with the demolition of vast quantities of housing for the poor. Certainly such a procedure could not have been expected to remedy the desperate shortage of housing for the poor.

WE MAY POINT to one major line of policy that was never followed in the past (and is still not being followed in the present), but that would have produced a much better city than the New York of today. This was to channel *all* low-cost government-supported housing to open and under-used land. At a time when the slums were groaning under the weight of the vast numbers crowded into them, it was criminal to build low-cost housing projects on expensive, over-crowded slum land, for the effect of this policy was to spread the slums further as those who had been ejected crammed themselves into other housing. Around almost every project built in the heart of the slums was created a frightful

periphery of densely populated buildings, in which the problem elements who were denied admittance to the projects became ever more concentrated. In the early 40's, as the old slums that had high vacancy rates filled up because of the cessation of building and the rise of income, it became perfectly clear that postwar low-rent housing should be built on open or under-used land. Nathan Straus and Charles Abrams and others spelled this out clearly, arguing—unanswerably—that in a time of housing shortage one *increases* the total housing stock in the hope that the eventual thinning out of the slums and the concomitant drop in the value of slum properties would make it possible for private and public builders to replace them with new housing—and at a much lower cost than is required when they are packed with people and supplying good income to their owners.

This was not the simplest policy in the world to put into effect. There was the problem of overcoming the opposition to low-rent housing of people living in outlying areas and their elected representatives; there was the problem of persuading slum dwellers that life could be led on Staten Island as well as on Manhattan Island. But a Mayor, whatever the limitations of his formal grants of power—and in connection, for example, with the Board of Education they are severe—has the enormous power of publicity at his disposal. He is the elected representative of all the people, and he can use his position to cause great pressure to be brought on those who resist a policy that is clearly designed for the general good. He can use his position—or try—to make such policies good politics. Again LaGuardia was a great master of this art. One cannot criticize a Mayor for not being one of the greatest politicians of the age, but one can be critical of him for never even attempting to use the powers of his office to promote a policy that would unquestionably have benefited the whole city, as against a policy that was

bound to produce—and did produce—a grim mixture of unpleasant high-rise housing projects (they had to be high-rise to be built on the expensive land of Manhattan) and awful slums.

Indeed, the very obstacles in the way of this policy could have been turned to advantage. If residents of the outlying districts resisted housing projects, that should have inspired the Housing Authority to create communities so good that they would become real assets. I have never yet heard a good explanation of why the New York City projects are on the whole the worst designed in the nation. Certainly one reason is that they were built on such high-priced land. Another is that the country's largest housing authority probably also has erected the most impregnable bureaucratic barriers for any architect or urban planner to penetrate.

There is a good deal more to complain about in housing: the use by Robert Moses's Slum Clearance Commission of tens of millions of dollars of public money to subsidize some private builders to put up the same kind of structures that other builders were putting up a few blocks away without public money; the universal cowardice in connection with rent control, which prevented the distribution of space in accordance with need; the steady incompetence or corruption in enforcing housing laws, which made it possible for the slums to remain profitable; the dullness and unimaginativeness in the building and administration of low-rent housing projects, which turned a great social experiment into a shameful part of the city.

BUT CAN THE various Mayors who have held office since the 40's be held responsible for all this? Though they share responsibility with a multitude of independent and powerful agencies and administrators and elected officials, they did have it in their power to dramatize what had to be done, and to bring public

opinion to the point where it could force the special interests to accept the best and most reasonable policies. The fact that none of them ever used this power is a measure of their true responsibility.

I am convinced that with the hardening of the bureaucratic structures—not only in New York City, but everywhere in American life—our need is for disruptors of the organizations, men who can batter the bureaucracies and make them respond to the real problems rather than to their own internal pressures and pulls, men who can open things up and let in air and light. LaGuardia, who not only made remarkable appointments but was given to outrageous interventions into every branch of city government, understood this need. He was the kind of Mayor who felt that there was less to be feared in blowing things up, in swinging wild, than in operating through channels which were all too effective in muffling and absorbing originality and inventiveness.

Obviously I have been offering a very different conception of the roots of New York City's problems than that held by many qualified observers. Some of these observers, for instance, argue that the trouble derives primarily from the growth of a low-income population. As those capable of paying higher taxes move to the suburbs, while those who require a heavy outlay of city services move into the center, a great strain is placed on the capacity of government to keep up the standard of city services. This is true. Yet New York suffers from this phenomenon less than most big cities do, for New York is so large that a good part of its "suburban expansion" has occurred within the borders of the city itself—in the Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island. And on the other hand, New York's center is far more attractive to the wealthy than the centers of other American cities, and consequently it retains a stronger tax base there. Despite the supposed restriction of the tax base, the city government's budget has increased (in standard dollars)

about 70 per cent since the last LaGuardia administration. The newcomers do indeed require heavy services—but there is also a good deal more money available from the state and federal governments for these purposes than there used to be.

Another conception of the city's problems is held by the Reform Democrats, who insist that the machine is responsible for the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of city services. This claim, in my opinion, is based more on the desire of the Reformers to replace De Sapio and the other bosses (for the perfectly legitimate objective of increasing the strength of the liberal wing of the Democratic party) than on a serious analysis of the city's problems. I do not see that the machine has had any great impact on the operations of the Board of Education, whose employees are selected and protected by a mass of civil-service regulations that would be difficult for local political leaders to overstep. If the Mayor wishes to be independent of the machine in administering the police and other agencies, there is little the machine can do, whether or not he was nominated by it. The machine, indeed, is mostly interested in judgeships and in the few remaining nests of patronage, not high policy. It is interesting to recall, too, that under a Tammany Mayor (Gaynor), Raymond B. Fosdick, an independent lawyer who later became head of the Rockefeller Foundation, was the energetic Commissioner of Investigation, a post designed to root out graft and corruption; and that under LaGuardia, Paul Blanshard, a Socialist, held the same

office with distinction. If we have a Commissioner of Investigation today who seems to lag behind a variety of other agencies and offices engaged in the same job, the machine cannot be blamed, for the Commissioner of Investigation is appointed by and removable by the Mayor.

It would be ridiculous to absolve the machine of all responsibility for misgovernment in the city, but at the same time it is disingenuous for those who wish to destroy the machine to claim that its destruction is the key to the improvement of the city. The politicians did not prevent a new zoning ordinance or a stronger Planning Commission, nor would they have blocked a better Superintendent of Schools. They would have fought a different policy in selecting sites for public housing—and in doing so would have democratically represented the wishes of their constituents. In short, the whole matter is far more complicated than the Reform Democrats would have us believe.

ONE'S CONCLUSION must be that in this election—as in that of 1950—the people of New York are suffering from the narrow-mindedness and simple lack of political imagination of almost all the leaders of the major political factions. The governing of New York City requires men of the greatest gifts and the highest imagination. The political system—and in this I include reformers as well as machine men, Republicans as well as Democrats, the men of property as well as the labor leaders—seems incapable, except on rare occasions, of offering such men to the city's voters.

ROBERT A. NISBET

FOREIGN POLICY & THE AMERICAN MIND

IT IS ONLY too clear that behind the tactical and strategical problems of our relations with the rest of the world—not to emphasize the occasional humiliations—lie some major difficulties of perspective. They are most plainly political difficulties, but, as the authors of *The New Politics** suggest, they are also moral, rooted in our growing tendency to identify political matters with a transcendent moralism. As Stillman and Pfaff put it: “Everywhere diplomacy suffers from the degradation of language and the parallel failure to sense the reasonable limits of political action.”

The authors are right, of course, but one might ask how likely any government is to sense the limits of politics in foreign matters when its modern history reveals a constantly diminishing sense of these limits in domestic affairs. There is also the fact that the only diplomacy of limits we have any real knowledge of is the classical diplomacy of the 18th and 19th centuries. This was the diplomacy of professionals operating in a finite world, not a Faustian world of boundless ideological aspiration. Totalitarianism may have applied the *coup de grâce* to classical di-

plomacy, but it had been made moribund by democratic insistence upon open covenants and popular participation. I join Stillman and Pfaff in wishing for a return to the objectivity, the empiricism, the patience, and the sense of limits that classical diplomacy had, but it is an open question whether American foreign policy today can be kept any freer of ideological aspiration than has domestic politics.

It is a truth often uttered that war is an extension of foreign policy. In our day, unhappily, foreign policy is an extension of war, and it shares deeply in the modern character of war. The clear tendency of modern wars is to become ever more “popular,” ever more closely identified with widespread moral and political aspirations: freedom, democracy, rights, and social justice. What is true of war is true of cold war—an accepted way, be it noted, of referring to world diplomacy since 1946. Being an extension of war, rather than a pragmatic search for a limited balance of power, it can hardly help but take on some of the moralistic and absolutist attributes of modern warfare.

There is also our taste for the metaphysics of history. It is bad enough in foreign policy to confuse strategy and tactics; it is ruinous to confuse either with essence and eternity. Despite a frequently proclaimed American pragmatism, despite our scorn for Marxian dialectics and other

ROBERT A. NISBET here contributes the fourth in our series of re-appraisals—written from differing points of view—of the key problems that confront American foreign policy in the 60's. Mr. Nisbet, vice chancellor of the University of California, has written on politics for a wide range of journals, including COMMENTARY and the *National Review*.

* Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, *The New Politics: America and the End of the Post-war World* (Coward, McCann, 191 pp., \$4.00).

secular substitutes for religion, we have, as Tocqueville noted, a proneness ourselves to general ideas. And of all general ideas, Progress is the one with deepest roots in the American mind: Progress conceived as unalterable destiny with our own civilization as the essence. Just as we have often subordinated our domestic planning and legislation to an imagined track of national progress, so do many of us today subordinate foreign policy to a world view that has the development of American culture as its model. The American dream becomes a cosmic principle.

What else but transcendent moralism lies behind what George Kennan calls egocentric and embattled democracy: "It [democracy] soon becomes a victim of its own war propaganda. It then tends to attach to its own cause an absolute value which distorts its own vision on everything else. *Its* enemy becomes the embodiment of all evil. *Its* own side, on the other hand, is the center of all virtue. The contest comes to be viewed as having a final, apocalyptic quality. If *we* lose, all is lost; life will no longer be worth living; there will be nothing to be salvaged. If we win, then everything will be possible; all problems will become soluble. . . ."

In this way we carry our absolutist conception of history, our sense of destiny, into war and peacemaking. The enemy—whether German or Russian or, almost comically, Cuban—becomes not merely the ready scapegoat for all ordinary dislikes and frustrations; he becomes the symbol of total evil which the forces of good must mobilize to destroy completely.

Stillman and Pfaff call for a new politics, one that will be pluralist, pragmatic, and finite. Like Mr. Kennan (and John A. Lukacs, whom I shall also cite in this article), they have a profound sense of the variety and complexity of the political world abroad (in William James's usage, they are tough-minded, not tender-minded) and of the peril and tragedy that

lurk in efforts to reduce complex reality to schemes that are as oversimplified in intellectual terms as they are religious in moral fervor.

MORE SPECIFICALLY, what *The New Politics* is concerned with is the falsity and harm of the bi-polar view of the world that has characterized our foreign policy since about 1946. From this bi-polar view has come an ethnocentric classification of other nations, especially the new ones, into either an American or Russian sphere, with the grudging label "uncommitted" reserved for those that cannot be proved guilty. As a purely taxonomic device, this one would be perhaps no worse than most simple classifications if it were not for the fact that in following it we endow Russia with a strength in allies that it simply does not have. The point is, as Stillman and Pfaff repeatedly emphasize, there is *self-commitment*. And in the self-commitment of the new nations there is written a pluralism on the international landscape that is, if we would but recognize it, a kind of strength for the United States greater than arms and propaganda.

What happened in Yugoslavia might have given us a clue to the coming shape of things. Tito's defection made plain that national antagonisms are as possible within a common Communist orientation as they are within a generally democratic-capitalist civilization. The trouble is, we had, like the Marxists themselves, swallowed whole the myth that under Communism there can be no national hostilities. And having swallowed it, we look almost compulsively for Soviet control whenever a new form of militant collectivism comes into existence. Does a revolution break out today in the Middle East? It must be Russian inspired even as was yesterday's in Africa or Cuba. Does a new government accept financial aid from Russia, even as Russia accepted it from the United States in earlier years? It must be Russian dominated.

* *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin.*

For a while, we were in danger of making the same mistake about Communist China in its relation to Russia that we made about Yugoslavia, and only now are a few observers beginning to recognize that beneath the ideological top dressing, there lie fissures, the result of centuries of geopolitical conflict. To be sure, there are millions in this country who will not see the fissures, who will not wish to see them, and who will, at the lunatic edges, treat them, as they have the Russian-Yugoslav break, as but camouflage, covering conspiracy that is directed step by step in the Kremlin.

This is the reasoning that triumphantly concludes that "everywhere" Russian Communism advances in the world, never repelled, whether in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or Latin America. Stillman and Pfaff deal with this in impressive detail and conclude: "While Russia remains a dangerous opponent, the blunt truth is that, for all its noisy threats, it has made no demonstrable inroads on the world in a decade." John A. Lukacs makes the same point in his wise and learned *A History of the Cold War*,* and reminds us that we are dealing here with a habit of mind that in 1931 foresaw a Communist Germany or even a socialist America.

Nor is it essentially different today. Nasser, whom we once accused of subjection to Russia, is today putting Communists in prison by the hundreds; General Kassem, who did not shrink from alliance with Communists in his own struggle for power in Iraq, is now dealing with them in equally harsh terms. And in the tiny state of Kerala in India, the 1957 election of a Communist government has already been undone; in part by firm action by the President of India but also by an increasingly anti-Communist Congress party. As Stillman and Pfaff write: "The sympathy which the Communists commanded when they took office was squandered because the Com-

munists had inevitably behaved like Communists."

The truth is, Russia's aggrandizement has been confined to those areas where Soviet troops entered or where the threat of such entry was clear and unpreventable. Stated another way, it has been limited to those areas which have been for centuries within the orbit of the Russian nation. Communism itself, Lukacs writes, "remains unpopular, shunned, even despised throughout the Eastern European sphere of forcibly Communized nations." Despite a popular conviction that Communist subjugation means national brainwashing that robs men of the will to freedom, events since 1956 have proved that religious, racial, and national ideals do not collapse under the pressure of Communist dogma. How much more true this is likely to be of the nations, races, and tribes of Asia and Africa. In Africa we are learning—to some rationalist dismay—that skin color is mightier than the word and that blackness, not Marxism, is the motive power of a great deal of the attack on the West, an attack that will as easily envelop socialism as capitalism, for both doctrines are products of the West. The appeal of Russian Communism, it should never be forgotten, rests a great deal less on the dogmas derived from Marx that are exhumed in Russia on festival days than it does on the fascinating spectacle of a nation that came into being as the result of quick seizure of power and has maintained itself through the constant reinforcement of that power for nearly half a century.

AS MORE THAN a few disillusioned visitors to the new states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are reporting, it is not the gospel of abundance for the masses, much less popular liberties, that inspires many of the new rulers; it is the vision of power. And it is the Russian structure of power, not whatever may exist of Russian socialism, that magnetically attracts attention. What else but

* Doubleday, 288 pp., \$3.95.

power in massive doses can quickly weld a people divided racially, ethnically, and religiously; can make possible the "big leap" that alone holds promise of resolving the vicious circle of high population increase and low supplies of capital; and attract a proper degree of world attention? Since it is power, not freedom, that the intellectuals are largely interested in, it is, correspondingly, Russia, Yugoslavia, and, increasingly, Egypt, rather than the U. S. that they are prone to look to for inspiration and ideas.

Some American liberals have sneered at our holding before the new nations the picture of American free private enterprise as a model. I do not say they are wrong in their attitude. Given the conditions of population and poverty that exist, as well as the almost total absence of the institutions and values that a system of free private enterprise requires for its successful operation, the prescription might as well be Coca-Cola. But I find it equally preposterous to assume that what the same liberals generally propose—massive injections of goods and capital, social democracy with civil liberties, a kind of Rooseveltian New Deal—is of any greater relevance, given the same conditions and the deep compulsion to absolute power that exists, and probably must exist, in most of the new states. I wish all such persons—and also Stillman and Pfaff who have some Rostovian words in one short section on the value of "massive injections" of capital in a few nations of the world now at "take off"—would read the brilliant attack that Irving Kristol made in the *Yale Review* (June 1957) on this whole attitude.

SINCE CUBA is the most recent of the revolutionary new states, it is worth brief special attention. Cuba has about as much relation to a genuinely ideological country as a mob scene has to an army maneuver. The style of Cuba, Stillman and Pfaff correctly write, is "the style of hysteria." Lacking realizable

economic and political programs, insecure and constantly threatened by counter-revolution, Cuba, like most other revolutionary new states, is and undoubtedly will remain non-ideological. "The claimed ideologies are patches and tatters of Socialist technique, Marxist revolutionary cant, and Western progressivism." Until and unless Russia does seek to locate a missile or submarine base in Cuba, we but demean ourselves and inflate Castro by the attention we have chosen to give the whole matter. I agree completely with Lukacs's observation that were Hitler's Germany today the chief anti-American force in the world, instead of Khrushchev's Russia, Castro's nationalism would be pro-German and pro-fascist rather than pro-Russian and pro-Communist.

As to the probabilities of outright and serious Russian envelopment of Cuba, two points must be kept in mind. There is first the demonstrably repellent character that Russian Communism seems to have, at close hand, for the new nations. The examples of Iraq, Egypt, and even the Congo would suggest that nationalism or tribalism in heat does not suffer gladly the doctrinal rigidities of the imported Russian bureaucrats. Native intellectuals may dream, a few of them, of Rubashov; what they tend to get is Gletkin.

But more important is the sheer difficulty from the Russian point of view of directing and being responsible for outposts in the distant reaches of the world. Hungary in its relation to Russia is one thing. Cuba, several thousand miles away from the borders of Russia, is something else. Nations with as many commitments as Russia already has are not likely to wish to incur responsibilities they have not the military ability to enforce. Some wise words from George Kennan are much to the point here: "Many Americans seem unable to recognize . . . the difficulty of trying to exert power from any given national center, over areas greatly remote from that center. There are, believe me, limits to the effective

radius of political power from any center in the world." Suspension of disbelief is, however, an easy operation for most of us. The conspiracy theory is, of all philosophies of history, the one with the greatest appeal for a certain type of mind. Subtleties, powers, and insights that a child would hesitate to ascribe to Superman are granted readily to a flesh and blood enemy. Millions of Americans have no difficulty in believing in the existence of a single diabolical web of authority and belief, spun daily in the Kremlin, that reaches out to include hundreds of millions of individuals of diverse nationality, race, and religion. It is this kind of morbid, cataleptic thinking that complicates the formation of our foreign policy.

IN PRACTICAL TERMS, the bi-polar view of the world has led us to the policy of containment on a worldwide basis. As a temporary and strictly limited strategy, containment made sense in the period immediately after the war when Europe lay devastated and when victory-intoxicated Soviet Russia was a clear and present danger to Western Europe. As Lukacs puts it: "The original purpose of containment—at least in Kennan's concept—was to build up Western Europe and commit the United States in her defense so that after a while Russia's rulers would see how their aggressive behavior was leading them nowhere. Thereafter the growth of a gracefully prosperous Europe would modify the unnatural division of the continent into Russian and American military spheres, so that ultimately a mutual reduction of the more extreme Russian and American commitments and of some of their most advanced outposts could follow." These were, as Kennan advanced them in his classic article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, shrewd speculations; behind them lay not merely some solid geopolitical realities but the historic cultural and intellectual affinity of the U. S. with Western Europe.

What happened after 1950, however,

and largely as the result of Secretary Dulles's labors, was the expansion of a limited concept into one that literally enveloped the world, committing us to political and military problems of staggering magnitude. As Stillman and Pfaff write, "An American enterprise—begun to contest the aggressive expansion of another state—had grotesquely grown into what we envisaged as a struggle for the world itself." What followed, however, was not the marching of Soviet armies but the infinitely varied and complex eruptions of fanatic nationalism and guerilla warfare that containment had as little chance of coping with as the Maginot line had with the German Panzer divisions in 1940. The sad fact is that in a situation like that presently posed by Laos, containment is simply irrelevant, and, like all irrelevancies in a crisis, dangerous.

Containment on a worldwide scale had but one possible chance of success: the unique possession by the United States of a super-weapon so destructive that the mere threat of "massive retaliation" would suffice to support the policy. But today we do not have unique possession of any known super-weapon, and nuclear threats, except at the last extreme, are unimaginable.

Beyond this, I think we must agree with Lukacs that containment on a world scale has done as much, if not more, to change the character of the United States itself as did the entire Second World War. Here is a point that cannot be sufficiently emphasized. In financial and personnel terms, the change has been staggering. Lukacs notes that between 1948 (itself a crisis year—the Berlin Blockade) and 1958, a decade in which the Russians *did not conquer a single square mile* of new territory, the military budget went from \$14 billion to \$45 billion, almost two-thirds of the entire budget. At home the federal bureaucracy grew from about 3.3 million employees in 1948 to nearly 5 million by 1958 (not including the employees of the FBI, the CIA, and the vast

but not easily measurable increase in the persons indirectly employed by the government). The staff of the State Department, consisting of less than 8,000 people in 1948, multiplied fivefold, and this does not include the 14,000 employed by the United States Information Service.

We have every reason, alas, to be sure that even these fantastic increases are insufficient, for now we have in office, as the Democrats have made all too plain, a government dedicated to repair of the condition created by the "penny-pinching, budget-obsessed Republicans."

THERE ARE ALSO some grave social consequences of containment, and these too I summarize largely from Lukacs: a tremendous increase in bureaucracy and its powers and responsibilities; a proportionate increase in federal investigative and intelligence agencies; hundreds of American military colonies from Spain to Asia, whose members, like the Romans of the 1st century C.E., are learning to experience the corruptive delights of home-style accommodations abroad; an enormous public machine pressing billions of dollars of gifts upon people in five continents with sometimes dismaying consequences; thousands of American businesses organized frankly for the first time in history upon the expectation of permanent "defense" requirements, making mockery of the free private enterprise most of their owners ritualize, and washing almost completely away the line between public and private, military and civil; finally, and perhaps in the long run most tragically, the unabashed feeding by America's greatest universities and colleges in the trough of "research" and "defense" funds, the while arguing solemnly that academic freedom must be maintained at all costs. The question, in short, is not simply: Can the rest of the world endure American containment around the globe? It is also: Can America itself endure containment without losing completely its political

and cultural character?—a question that preoccupied President Eisenhower as he left office.

Actually, as Stillman and Pfaff point out to us, containment cannot really be justified any longer even in military terms. In the same way that gunpowder helped to dislocate the pattern of feudal society by separating war from the traditional sources of military power, so nuclear technology has had a fateful influence upon the balance of power in the mid-20th century. The authors quote a prescient remark of Raymond Aron in 1956: "The atom bomb, developed at a moment when two states were overwhelmingly more powerful than all others, has reinforced the bi-polar structure of the diplomatic field. On the other hand, once the bomb is at the disposal of every state, it will contribute to the dissolution of the structure." Aron's prophecy is indeed being realized. Few would take issue with Denis Healey's statement in the May issue of *COMMENTARY* that not fewer than thirty countries are capable of producing atomic weapons during the next ten years if they choose. And, let us make no mistake, many of them will choose. Membership in the nuclear club has both status and power values, each being more compelling in the contemporary world than economic values. In short, we have to look forward to a pluralism of nuclear technology as well as to a pluralism of politics.

To withdraw from containment is not, however, an easy matter, and Stillman and Pfaff do no more than hint at its true complexity. "A new American policy," they write, "would look toward the closing down of our overseas bases as rapidly as strict military interest permits. It would then review our alliances for their true political meaning." But does "true political meaning" here denote simply power and ultimate defensibility, or does it take also into account some of the moral commitments which have by now assumed profound symbolic value in the free

world? At what point does withdrawal from a foreign base invite charges of appeasement that may be crippling to the government in power and, worse, to a long-term strategy? Happily, apart from Formosa, there are no commitments in Southeast Asia or the Middle East that have the symbolic overtones of Berlin, but the recent emotionalism over Laos and South Vietnam suggests that the "spirit of Berlin" may overnight envelop another outpost, making real strategy impossible. We know what the response has been when such unchallengeably dedicated and informed minds as Churchill, Field Marshal Montgomery, and George Kennan, among others, have suggested disengagement, in one degree or another, from the position we inherited in Berlin.

AT THE BOTTOM of the whole matter is, of course, the picture we hold of the present character of Russia. Is the Kremlin to be seen fundamentally as the militant Holy City of world Communism, the source of all Communist dogma and doctrine, bent, as were the followers of Mohammed a thousand years ago, upon the forcible conversion of the infidel, and basically more interested in the world at large than in what lies within Russian borders? Or, in extreme opposition, is Russia to be seen as a powerful military collectivism, Communist in ideology, nationalist to the core, deeply suspicious of the West, but interested first, last, and always in her own security?

Those who hold the first conception have no difficulty in citing chapter and verse from writings of Lenin to buttress their case, even occasional utterances of Khrushchev himself at world gatherings of Communist party representatives. And there is the undeniable fact that the present leadership of Russia has a deep, almost religious faith in the eventual triumph of Communism as a way of life everywhere in the world. The issue between the two conceptions is complicated by the fact that Russia works constantly

through agents abroad. The question, however, remains: Are the Russian agents more like 17th-century Jesuits, primarily abroad to advance an ecumenical creed, and only incidentally to harass a specific government (and its Western supporters), or are they more like the agents that governments have immemorably sent abroad, concerned above all else with guarding and advancing the political interests of the nation they work for?

There are some, no doubt, who would say that the distinction is without a difference. But I cannot agree. I think that from the American (and Western) point of view the difference between the two conceptions is huge and the very cornerstone of the kind of foreign policy and national defense we build up. In dollar cost, it is the difference between feasible national budgets and budgets that, at present rate of increase, will in time destroy utterly the economic base of what we like to call the American Way. (May I observe in passing that this includes my community's symphony and opera groups as well as tail fins and Las Vegas?)

Those of the right who say that we can afford the financial costs of a military attack upon Communism wherever it rears its head in the world, provided only that we reduce expenditures for education and social security, are either fools or knaves. Those from the left who say that it is all simply a matter of rate of economic growth and central planning are either fools or collectivists. In human terms, to suppose that the United States can long maintain a political and military machine of containment dimensions without destroying the localism, pluralism, and free enterprise in all spheres that are the true basis of American freedom and creativity, is to suppose utter fantasy. The affinity between militarism and socialist collectivism is, and has been throughout history, a close one. Far closer, let me emphasize, than the affinity between collectivism and, say, the speeches and writings of socialist propagandists.

If we would see Russia in her true might, we must not see her as the Russia of Trotsky's dream—a vanguard whose only real justification for being lies in her role in the spread of international Communism—but the Russia forged by Stalin: Stalin the psychopathically xenophobic peasant, cunning, cruel beyond belief, but actuated basically by motives more nearly those of Peter the Great than those of the internationalist intellectuals whom Stalin came to hate and eventually kill off. For Stalin the goal was socialism, but it was socialism within the historic limits and aspirations of the Russian nation. As Lukacs points out, we might have drawn more clues to the real meaning of Stalin's behavior by reading "Herberstein rather than Marx, Custine rather than Lenin—just as the age-old Chinese pattern appears so much better from the actual history of such things as the Taiping Rebellion than from the dreary theoretical texts of Mao."

I THINK IT IS nationalism above all other forces—technology and socialism included—that has given the essential cast to events and changes of the 20th century. Nationalism has been the shaping force of the socialisms as well as the capitalisms and the democracies of the age, and we may perhaps modify the old aphorism to say that there is more similarity between two nationalisms one of which is socialist than there is between two socialisms one of which is nationalist. National socialism, united with military collectivism, this is the present reality, not the primitive, apostolic socialism that the 19th century envisaged and that cranks of right and left still look for in Russia.

None of this means that Russian leaders are either ideologically or militarily uninterested in developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Like all True Believers, Russian leaders assume that in the distant future other forms of society will be buried in the dustbin of history. Such burial, however, will be the consequence

not of a great military Armageddon but of indigenous social and economic factors, occasionally aided by Russian measures when these suit national strategy, but operating basically in the same fashion that human evolution itself operates. I quote Mr. Kennan again: "Central to the Soviet view of how socialism was to triumph on a world scale has always been the operation of social and political disorganization within the capitalist countries; and, while Moscow has always recognized that civil violence would have a legitimate place in the operation of these processes—while it has not hesitated in certain instances to promote or even to organize such civil violence; while it has even considered, in fact, that the use of the Soviet armies in a subsidiary capacity might be justified at one point or another as a means of hastening or completing an otherwise inevitable process—it has never regarded action by its own forces as the *main* agency for the spread of world revolution."

There is, I concede, a danger here that in our critical reaction to a demonology we may end up underrating the enemy as he exists in fact. This would be unfortunate, for the evidence shows that with the very recession, over a forty-year period, of the dedicated and evangelical messianism that was the Soviets' first inheritance from 19th-century socialism, there has developed the most powerful nation, excepting only the United States, in all history. It is a formidable nation, unscrupulous, ruthless, and despotic. But it is a nation, and we had better react accordingly.

Stillman and Pfaff remind us, in a striking chapter on Russia, that it has always been the fate of new ideologized societies to suffer "a tension between universalist claims and the circumstances of their birth. For revolution, myth to the contrary, is seldom the sign of the decay of a society, but only of the decay of a ruling class." This was true of the early Islamic state, and it was equally true of Jacobin

France. As a result of this tension, "the messianic claims conflict more and more markedly with the selfish demands of the society itself."

And the "ultimate fate of the ideology—which tends to be 'bigger,' more exalted, than the mundane behavior of the state which gave the ideology birth—is to cut loose from the ties of national interest and to take on a life of its own. And freed from the society of its origin, the ideology tends to galvanize neighboring societies. These take over elements associated with the revolution, but use these innovations for national purposes of their own." Thus the European nationalism that was the heritage of the French Revolution and the consequent and fateful unification of Italy and Germany; thus, today, the spectacle of Yugoslavia and Albania, and beyond any doubt, China tomorrow.

There are also the effects of rising economic abundance in Russia. Militance and purity of religious faith thrive best in conditions of poverty, as the experience of every successful religious order in history has suggested. The slow drip of economic abundance has taken and will continue to take its toll from remaining Soviet messianism. The Russian as consumer begins to come forward hand in hand with the Russian as organization man to supplant the Russian of primitive and poverty-sworn evangelical zeal. Passion, which is as necessary to messianism as it is to lust, is difficult to sustain in circumstances of bureaucracy when every gleam of inspiration calls for an original and eight copies and a chain of command more like Westinghouse than a revolutionary band. There is also boredom (one of the most neglected forces in social history); the kind of boredom that can produce alienation in the young from Soviet scripture and morality as easily as it does from our own.

ALL OF THIS does not mean either a growingly unstable Russia or a growingly democratic Russia. Philip Mosely's

important article in the April *Foreign Affairs* makes clear that the changing style of Russia—evidenced in civil and political, as well as economic ways—has, if anything, strengthened the stability of Russia and removed many of the tensions between ruler and ruled that were spreading cancerously in Stalin's final years. The pressure for political conformity is as great as ever, but the style is immeasurably different from what it was under Stalin, and style—as every boxer knows—is crucial.

We have to agree with Mr. Kennan that "despite the angularities of Mr. Khrushchev's personality" there are some deep and, for us, encouraging differences between the Russia of Stalin and that of Khrushchev. "The relaxation of the Iron Curtain has, to date, remained within modest limits. It obviously encounters deep inhibitions in the neo-Stalinist echelons of the regime. But I think it has gone so far that it would not be easy to bottle up again the intellectual and cultural life of this talented people as it was bottled up under Stalin."

As Russia is different today from what it was in 1946, so is the world. I do not say it is less dangerous; it may even be more dangerous. But it is different, and we had better deal with it in ways appropriate to politics and military force, not religion and moral conversion. At this writing, Outer Mongolia, and our possible recognition of it, has come to the fore. Will this be dealt with as a problem in political strategy, one to be resolved in light of its possible strengthening or weakening of our strategic position in relation to China and Russia, or will it instead be decided in light of passions generated by our moral dislike of Communism? If the latter, we will risk loss once again of strategic strength for the luxury of self-righteousness.

When I am told that Russia—or China—is dangerous to the United States and to the free world, I can understand this and agree. When it is suggested that the United States should suspend nuclear

testing, as an example to the rest of the world, I can understand this and emphatically disagree. But when I am told that the real danger to the United States is something called "world Communism" and that our foreign policy must begin with a "true understanding" of the moral nature of Communism and not rest until Communism has been stamped out everywhere, I am lost. Meaning has fled into a morass of irrelevancies, half-truths, and apocalyptic symbols.

Is "world Communism" the specific linkage of ideas and agents that flows from Soviet Russia, in competition not only with the United States and the West, but also, increasingly, with Yugoslavia, China, Albania, and a host of other nations—collectivist, Communist to be sure, but, in all probability, no more closely identified with Russia than capitalist England was with capitalist Germany in 1900? Or is "world Communism" simply a term of aggregation, referring to the disparate collectivism and national socialisms of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and, no doubt increasingly, Latin America? If it is this—and it is the nearest I can come to a referent for the term—then it is a little like referring to "world nationalism" or "world industrialism."

WRITING AS ONE who dislikes even mild forms of socialism, I can understand readily that Communism, wherever it is, and however isolated it may be, is an evil. But I do not know what this fact has to do with measures that can feasibly be taken by a national foreign policy and defense structure. I see measures that can meaningfully and feasibly be taken with respect to Russia, or to any other hostile and dangerous national socialism in the world, but I can no more imagine a foreign policy directed toward the destruction of "world Communism" than I can one directed toward world paganism. In an article in the *Yale Review* (Autumn 1956), Louis Halle has made a useful distinction between two

types of mind, the strategist and the ideologist: between those for whom foreign policy is a matter of appropriate and due protection of national interest, and those for whom it is a means of advancement of, or destruction of, moral causes. He rightly suggests that the rising ideological passion of sections of our people both on the left and on the right has constituted the prime political dilemma of administrations in Washington since 1949, causing a dangerous separation between government and people, and confronting the President with the unhappy choice of pursuing policies that, in his view, the national interest requires, or pursuing popular policies. Today he must confront particularly the ideologist of the right who invests each new foreign issue with intimations of Armageddon, who sees in the world around us not strategic problems posed by a dangerous military nationalism but, rather, ethical and metaphysical problems posed by an absolute Evil.

None of this means that we must turn away from moral principle, adopting an opportunistic strategy based solely upon power. I do not believe the American people could do this if they wanted to. Historically, there is too deep a strain of moral principle in our national make-up. But morality is a different thing from moralism, and it is a vastly different thing from that ontology which makes us see American political life as the image of universal Good, and our foreign policy as a kind of avenging sword for the destruction of the infidel.

This, Stillman and Pfaff wisely write, is the new *hubris*, the debasement of politics and the secularization of religion: "To wise men the difference between the area of practical action, the attainable, and the informing body of principles to which we privately adhere is a datum. This is not hypocrisy: politics, in this view, is not the art of the salvation of the soul; the element of hypocrisy enters when we deny the distinction between guiding principle and deed."

MATI MEGED

THE "NORMALIZATION" OF ISRAEL

DURING THE PAST YEAR, as the result of a number of crucial public controversies, Israelis have been forced to confront some of the basic contradictions underlying their political and social order. Such issues as the Lavon affair, the Eichmann trial, and Ben Gurion's *contretemps* with the Zionist movement—while in themselves responses to particular events—have also served to direct public attention to the deeper and broader conflicts from which they stem. Perhaps it has taken the prescribed number of thirteen years for Israel to come to maturity; perhaps Israeli intoxication with mere existence and survival is beginning to wear off. In any case, it seems clear that the great countervailing pressures at work in the society can no longer be overlooked and that Israelis are no longer willing to overlook them.

These contradictions, however far beneath the surface of Israeli life they have lain, operate palpably in matters touching on Israel's immediate security and stability. There is, for one thing, the problem of Israel's foreign policy, which must serve the needs of a sovereign nation-state and at the same time further the commitment to rescuing Jews wherever their safety is threatened. Related to the ques-

tion of foreign policy is that of the crucial role being played by the army and defense installation in Israeli life—something many people have come to regard as an inevitable threat to democracy. Then there is the problem of what those concerned about it call a growing "statism," by which they mean the ever greater concentration in government hands of functions heretofore performed by other public institutions, notably the Histadruth. And there is the problem of the relations between Israel and world Jewry—a problem known about and talked about for many years, of course, but brought vividly to the fore in connection with the Eichmann trial and the question it has posed as to the responsibility of Israel for world Jewry.

Each of these problems is related to every other, and all of them grow out of the peculiar nature of a society which must take upon itself and meet the obligations both of an ordinary political community and of a most extraordinary spiritual mission. And all of them can be traced, far back beyond the establishment of the state, to their origins in the founding of the Zionist movement. Zionism itself from the very beginning harbored a grave contradiction about the ends it was attempting to pursue. On the one side it was a movement created to "normalize" the Jewish people: the Jewish homeland was to be the place in which, after centuries of an anomalous existence, Jewishness would once more achieve a

MATI MEGED, a young Israeli novelist and short story writer, now divides his time between teaching and writing. His last previous contribution to COMMENTARY appeared in January, "The Jewish Intellectual in Israel," and his review of Gershom Scholem's *Sabbatai Zevi* appeared in our February 1960 number.

simple national status and be identified with a particular geographic territory. On the other side, Zionism projected a community that was to embody the Jews' historic passion for social justice: a Jewish state, by means of modern socialism and communalism, fulfilling the age-old messianic impulse. Both of these ends were absolutely necessary to the character of Zionism, and in the tension between them we can see outlined the structure of present-day Israel.

How was it, then, that the Yishuv and its leaders were able for so long to avoid facing the irrevocably dual nature of their society? An obvious explanation is that a society must achieve relative tranquillity before it can undertake any self-examination, that the many perils to the very physical existence of the Jewish community in Palestine—and later Israel—obscured all other problems. A more significant reason, however, can be found in the thinking of "veteran" Zionists, who until very recently continued to believe that the two aims of Zionism were complementary rather than contradictory and that the Jewish state could develop equally in both directions. It is important to keep in mind here that up until the last ten or fifteen years when Zionist rhetoric spoke of a Jewish "state" what was really meant by the term was nothing more than an autonomous *community*: the state itself, for those who demanded it (even for Ben Gurion, who has recently become the "prophet" of statehood), was to be merely the method by which the community protected its autonomy.

Another thing that must be remembered is that Zionists began with the belief that the majority of Jews would one day return and settle on the soil of their forefathers. As long as this belief could remain a sort of vague pious hope for the future—as long, that is, as it need not be confronted by the economic and geographic realities of a tiny, dependent country in the Middle East—it could seem to be

consonant with other Zionist aspirations. Nowadays in Israel one would find very few people still clinging to the idea of total Jewish immigration, and even for those few the present condition of the country must rule out such a possibility for the foreseeable future. Those who set out to pioneer the messianic community and the just life for all of Jewry have discovered, therefore, that what they have created is a state—a real state in a real world, whose existence no longer permits them any illusions about what they are doing.

A STATE, EVEN A real one, breeds myths and illusions of its own, less innocent, perhaps, than those of a utopian projection, but hardly less pervasive. In Israel the state itself has become a myth; and this myth has served as but a new strategy for obscuring the society's will to live in this world and in the next world simultaneously.

It is difficult to sort out the impulses behind Israeli state-worship. Partly they have to do with the need to assimilate a disproportionately large and powerful army to the existing social structure. If such an army is to be maintained—and given the present situation in the Middle East, it must be maintained at all costs—the morale of the population at large must be fitted in some way to the values of military achievement. Nor is it likely that a population composed so largely of the near-victims of Nazi slaughter and of Oriental Jews who suffered every sort of humiliation in the countries of their origin would feel anything but gratitude at the existence of a strong, efficient Jewish army. The much-touted chauvinism of Israeli youth, then, relates to an all-too-justifiable psychological need and serves a social one.

The fierce military pride of Israelis, however—and it is widespread and general—meets a powerful resistance within the same people: a resistance deriving from the enormous value placed by Is-

raelis on the pacific virtues, which is their inheritance as Jews. The longing for "normalization"—which, as we have seen, is one of the spiritual foundations of Israeli society—also works against the martial spirit: people who wish to go about creating a normal life cannot really accept the condition of being a "besieged camp." And indeed, the army itself has become an active agent in the peaceful development of the country. It helps to educate the more backward among the immigrants; it helps to establish new settlements, schools, youth groups, etc; it includes among its ranks special units—called the Nachal—consisting of people who spend part of their time as soldiers and part as settlers.

In such a conflict of attitude as that toward the army, the state-myth acts as mediator: the state, *qua* state, becomes the bearer of a messianic mission, and the army its instrument of redemption. Israelis can thus be militarist for the sake of being anti-militarist. Their image is the Hebrew Soldier, who is the fighting man of Israel at the same time that he symbolizes the continuity of the "glorious Jewish tradition." Needless to say, that tradition is the one handed down from Joshua, King David, and Bar-Kochba; and the new craze for archaeology, which has become a national hobby in Israel, grows out of the desire to be directly connected with the military heroes of the past. The schools, too, do a great deal to foster the myth among the young. Having failed to give their students a sense of their attachment to Jewish tradition of the past two thousand years, they are left to nourish them with fare that is at once more ancient and more modern. It is easy for children in Israel to identify themselves with the Biblical Hebrews, to take over their heroes, and thus to find in the soldier of today an image not only of strength but of national idealism.

In view of the fact that Israel is a small state like other small states (and in some ways like other small Levantine ones), and

that as a form of political organization there can be nothing uniquely Jewish about it, Israelis have been able to find a certain compensation in the idea of its having a messianic mission—its becoming a "light of the nations." Such an idea invests every economic or social advance with an extra weight of meaning; and in addition it provides the citizenry with a moral justification for their being so completely dependent on help from the outside world.

But as widespread and important as the belief in the special mission of Israel is, many Israelis are beginning to be aware of the dangerous political uses to which it can be put. During the Lavon affair, particularly, they saw how it was being used to silence any criticism of government policy, not only from the public at large but from the Knesset and within the cabinet itself. And they also saw—they could not avoid seeing—how this belief served to intensify the cult surrounding the person of Ben Gurion. Apart from concern about the potentially ugly effects of such myth-making on the political life of the country—and this sort of concern, after all, is roused everywhere in much the same way during a public scandal or crisis—it has by now taken hold of Israel's cultural fabric much too strongly to be countered effectively with angry talk.

ONE OF THE CURIOUS effects of "public" idealism is that it has taken a good deal of the urgency out of the private kind. This is most notable in the schools, particularly the high schools. By attaching themselves to ancient and contemporary heroes, the children are able to bypass not only all the centuries of Jewish existence in the Diaspora but the values of Zionism itself. They tend to forget that their country is not thirteen years old but seventy, that it came into being not only by military victory but through pioneering labor, that it exists today not only because it was able to defend itself against the enemy but because once there

was a group of people fired by the vision of a freer, and therefore more *Jewishly* creative, life. Whereas until 1948 the schools were an agency for the maintenance of the pioneer ethos—teaching students about the farmer, the kibbutz member, who struggled and sacrificed not only to redeem the Jewish people but to establish a just order on earth—they have now directly reversed their purpose. Textbooks refer, of course, to the achievements of the Zionist period, but mainly insofar as they were preliminaries to the establishment of the state. The spiritual values of pioneering are occasionally talked about, too, but this time as inhering in the state itself and no longer as the aspirations of individuals. The youth in high school, then, who thinks first of his own career, is free to pursue his degrees and appointments, knowing that his “ideals” rest safely with the state.

Now, the great mission of the State of Israel is an *emotion* rather than a program; it refers to some mystical destiny rather than to a specific utopian vision. No state—and certainly not beleaguered Israel—can invest its own institutions with a genuine missionary function; its obligation to the citizenry is to protect these institutions and keep them stable. So much is natural and proper. What is peculiar to the present situation in Israel, however, is that while it cannot itself embody ideal aspirations, the state, through the agency of its myth, inhibits the growth of any other forces in the society that might do so. Buried beneath the terminology of all the bitter discussions taking place these days—particularly in academic and intellectual circles—about the role of the army in public affairs, about the crises in the kibbutz and in education, lies this simple fact: that the impulses toward idealism and sacrifice on which the country was built are now being stymied by the lack of possibility for giving them institutional expression.

Here we have summed up the extraordinary situation in which a “normal”

state, fulfilling all its normal obligations to establish, maintain, and secure itself—which, under the circumstances, is cause enough for congratulation—cannot admit that it is doing just that and must therefore find the language of myth to describe itself.

THERE ARE, of course, historic as well as ideological reasons for this. Even from earliest Biblical times a man who called himself a Jew was supposed to regard himself as far more than a member of a tribal or national community. His kingdom was meant to be far more than those of the surrounding peoples: not an earthly dynasty but an instrument for securing God’s law on earth. Zionism, too, while declaring itself a secularist, nationalist movement, was at least in part merely a modern translation of this ancient Jewish tradition. And for a long time members of the Yishuv maintained a naive faith that they represented the culmination of all of Jewish history. Now they can no longer do so. Messianic movements always founder on the failure of their particular messiah to arrive. Far from finding themselves to be the realization of the promise of Jewish history, Israelis—like Jews everywhere—are perplexed about their relation to that history and its traditions. Far from finding themselves members of a community that represents, so to speak, an experiment in the Ideal, they are citizens of a small Middle Eastern country. That side of Zionism that strove to “normalize” them has succeeded beyond their expectations: not only are they settled on a land of their own, not only have they been distributed naturally throughout an economy, but they have also been given in full measure the opportunities of other countries to raise an army, wage war, fight political battles among themselves, and worry about the apathy and conformism of the young.

All this, however, does not settle the matter. The growing disaffection with

government rhetoric and policies—to be seen so often in the press and heard so much in private discussion these days—seems to express something deeper than the ordinary discontents of any national life. There are many signs—hard to pin down and to specify as they are—that the pre-state ethos of pioneering is coming once again to exert some force. One cannot prophesy what concrete forms a resurgence of the early idealism would take. Many of its old forms are no longer available, for the real economic and strategic needs of Israel must come first, and anything that might interfere with them cannot—and indeed must not—take hold of the public imagination. In addition, such a resurgence will not take place as a result of any abstract rediscovery of Jewish, or Zionist, traditions. It will stem from a general realization that because Israel is a small, dependent country surrounded by enemies, it cannot survive even physically unless it is able to command every last drop of all the energy and zeal that every one of its citizens is capable of exerting. A high public morale and deep private faith are urgent requirements for any country as precariously situated as Israel. The immediate problems of the country will perhaps in the long run call forth—as they have in the short run appeared to subdue—a commitment to the essence of Jewish life in the

Diaspora, which is precisely this: the responsibility of every Jew to the fate of the entire community.

Israelis are beginning to learn that far from mobilizing all available energy, the high-flown pompous talk about the messianic mission of their state has aided in the process of depleting it. Sacrifice, deferment of personal wishes, submission of personal ambition to the requirements of the general welfare—these are things that can only be achieved by a voluntary movement of the people. The government structure can make them pay taxes and obey laws, it cannot make heroes of them. Heroes they can only make of themselves.

One cannot wonder at the longing of people not to have to be heroes; one cannot wonder that the Yishuv looked to the establishment of their state as the opportunity to be like everyone else. However, it is the fate of Israelis—one may plainly say it is their *Jewish* fate—that they must continue to shoulder an extra weight of commitment and responsibility. Now that Israel is reaching “maturity,” more and more of her citizens are beginning to recognize this. Perhaps many of them will come to understand, if they do not already, that the only alternative to despair over their special burden is to take it upon themselves by choice—to make it their ideal—rather than merely submit to the force of necessity.

TOM BROOKS

NEGRO MILITANTS, JEWISH LIBERALS, AND THE UNIONS

MUCH OF THE civil rights progress that has been achieved in recent years can be attributed to the effective cooperation of Jewish and Negro anti-discrimination agencies. These groups, together with the support of key trade union officials, are largely responsible for the passage of fair employment legislation in eighteen states. They are the effective force behind the drive for open occupancy in housing; they have backed attempts to implement the U. S. Supreme Court's school desegregation decision; and they have given their time, money, and moral support to the students involved in the sit-in movement. Yet the fact is that the Negro-Jewish civil rights coalition now faces disruption, a dissolution that seems symptomatic of the worsening relations between white and Negro liberals in general. The winds of change sweeping Africa are also stirring the surfaces of Negro life in America; they are setting events in motion which seem to be taking the American Negro into increasingly militant and uncharted courses of action. What white liberals often regard as "progress," Negroes increasingly have come to reject as mere "tokenism," and correspondingly many white liberals have begun to regard Negro militancy as "racist" self-seeking.

TOM BROOKS is an associate editor of *Current* and was formerly associate labor editor of *Business Week*. Mr. Brooks, who writes frequently on the unions, contributed "The New Administration and Organized Labor" to our March issue.

The first cracks in the Negro-Jewish civil rights coalition appeared after the formation of the Negro American Labor Council, an organization of Negro trade unionists founded two years ago by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and sole Negro member of the AFL-CIO executive council. The NALC has emerged as a most outspoken critic of "token" progress in race relations within the labor movement,* while several Jewish trade union leaders, and two important Jewish labor agencies—the Jewish Labor Committee, and the American Jewish Committee's National Labor Service—more and more have been placed in the position of defending the official line of organized labor: that the unions have made substantial progress in civil rights, job equality, and related issues. Thus, to the comfort and cheer of many conservative elements within the unions, the creation of the NALC has served to divide longtime allies in the struggle for civil rights.

On July 18–19, 1959, seventy-five Negro trade unionists met in New York City at the request of A. Philip Randolph to discuss the problems which confront Negroes in the labor movement and those which face the Negro union

* It is perhaps not without symbolic significance that after a packed NALC-sponsored rally in Washington, D.C., last February, Randolph called for a minute of silent prayer for Patrice Lumumba.

leaders within the Negro community. In the course of his long career, Randolph had made several previous attempts to build a mass organization rooted in the Negro working class, the most notable of which was the famed March on Washington Movement that resulted in an executive order from President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 to establish the wartime FEPC. He was unsuccessful, however—along with Frank Crosswaith and others—in developing a more permanent organization under the name of the Negro Labor Committee, the principal difficulty being the lack in that period of a sizable and firm base of Negro union members. But as Herbert Northrup, among others, has shown,* large numbers of Negroes entered unions through the World War II labor shortages and the postwar economic boom. The result is that today any Negro labor organization has, as a potential base, some 1.5 million Negroes who are now members of the AFL-CIO. Moreover, a growing number of Negroes hold posts in labor organizations, both large and small, and participate regularly in union conventions.

IRONICALLY—IN THE LIGHT of subsequent events—the “committee of seventy-five” summoned in 1959 by Randolph decided that what the present situation required was a permanent organization patterned after the Jewish Labor Committee. The NALC would speak for organized labor in the Negro community just as the Jewish Labor Committee did in the Jewish community; and in carrying on its fight for equality within the labor movement, the new organization would ally itself, as its Jewish counterpart had done, with other civil rights organizations. The “committee of seventy-five” called for a founding convention in a declaration which foreshadowed the tone and style of the NALC, established some ten months after this first meeting:

* See “Race Discrimination in Trade Unions,” COMMENTARY, August 1946.

We resent Jim Crow locals; we deplore the freeze-out against Negroes in labor apprenticeship and training programs; we disclaim the lack of upgrading and promotional opportunities for Negroes; we repudiate the lockout against Negroes by some unions; we, above all, reject “tokenism,” that thin veneer of acceptance masquerading as democracy. Since hundreds of thousands of Negroes are the victims of this hypocrisy, we ourselves must seek the cure, in terms of hundreds of thousands, in the dimensions of a mass organization.

Randolph’s reasons for helping to establish the Negro American Labor Council are, as he presents them, clear-cut and logical. He argues that since the trade unions are essentially urban organizations and since Negroes are moving to cities in large numbers, it thus follows that “labor’s future is tied up with the future of the Negro.” Randolph emphasizes that AFL-CIO president George Meany “is not a racist,” yet Meany “hasn’t a sense of the urgency of the question that is necessary in the 20th century.” Randolph doubts, in fact, if anyone “except a Negro” can have that sense. The new organization over which Randolph presides is, then, “a response to the basic need of the Negro masses to have a voice of their own.” And, as Randolph firmly adds, “the voice of black labor is not going to be consonant with those [voices] that come from non-Negro sources, or from Negroes themselves, that are non-labor.”

There is another side to the activities of the NALC. Randolph believes that his group represents the last chance of preserving the influence of organized labor in Negro affairs. “The Negro community possesses two principal mass organizations other than the political machine,” James Z. Wilson notes in his important new book, *Negro Politics*, “the labor unions and the churches.” In recent years, however, the unions have come under attack because of their discriminatory practices, and organized labor has

come to be viewed less as an instrument of Negro militancy than as a proper object of it. Under these circumstances, the officers of the NALC, as veteran trade unionists, think that their organization can save labor's standing within the Negro community.

INSO FAR AS the NALC was created by Negro union staffers—and not by Negro workers or by rank and file union members—it might be called a “middle-class” organization. However, the most serious economic consideration behind its existence is the plight of the Negro worker.

Economists are given to treating unemployment in the United States as troublesome “pockets” of an expanding economy. But to Negro workers, these “pockets” are a sea of quicksand sucking them down to extinction. According to official Labor Department figures, non-whites comprise a full 20 per cent of all the currently unemployed. This figure includes Puerto Ricans as well as Negroes, but the Department's statistics for the past winter also show that the Negro unemployment rate is almost twice as high as the rate of white unemployment—13.8 per cent as against 7 per cent for whites. Further, an Urban League survey of unemployment among Negroes in 50 cities reveals that the “percentage of the Negro work force unemployed is frequently twice to three times that of the total unemployment rate.” Thus in Chicago, where the total unemployment rate is 5.7 per cent, the percentage of Negro jobless is 17.3; in Louisville, Kentucky, the total rate is 8.3 per cent while the corresponding figure for Negroes is 39.8 per cent; in Pittsburgh, the figures are 11.6 as against 24 per cent; in New York City, 6.4 as against 10 per cent. These statistics also suggest why current unemployment is viewed with much less urgency by the white American community than by the Negro: in St. Louis, there are 35,000 unemployed Negroes

out of a total of 72,700 jobless; in Gary, Indiana—more strikingly—18,000 out of a total of 20,200; in Detroit, 112,000 out of a total of 185,000.

But even when he has a job, the black worker's position is far from enviable. In 1958 the median wage of the Negro male worker was only 59 per cent as much as that of the white worker—\$2,652 as against \$4,569. (Randolph comments wryly: “When a Negro worker goes into the market as a consumer he cannot presume to pay only 58 per cent for comparable goods and services . . . purchased by white workers. The fact is, Negroes pay relatively much higher prices.”) Similarly, white women averaged \$2,364 a year, while Negro women—who, it should be added, are more often the breadwinners of the family—only earned \$1,055.

Various staff members of the Urban League all believe discrimination to be the main cause of Negro unemployment, and they all feel that trade unions have a lot to answer for in this regard. Shelton Granger, executive director of the League's Cleveland branch, puts it succinctly: “Rate of unemployment high. Rate of discrimination higher. Major offenders are banks, insurance companies, retail outlets, and building trades unions.” Marvin E. Jones, vocational services secretary of the Baltimore Urban League, insists that “until unions and employers cease to discriminate by race, thus presenting the opportunity for Negroes to participate in apprenticeable trades, management training programs, etc., permanent relief is inevitable for the unskilled worker.”

Though this last point may be overstated, the fact remains that the position of the Negro worker is steadily deteriorating. In manufacturing, Negroes have been confined by and large to the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Often these were dirty jobs that white workers did not want; yet now, because of the drop in the number of manufacturing jobs

(due, in turn, to the recession and the encroachment of automation), competition for all kinds of work—including semi- and unskilled jobs—is considerably more intense than it has been for some time. In this situation, the Negro competes at a great disadvantage.

Take, for example, the building trades—one of the few areas where the work force is expanding. Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg recently advocated that the AFL-CIO's Building and Construction Trades Department develop a stepped-up apprenticeship training program. He pointed out that if "we are to fulfill our needs in the construction field during the next ten years, we will have to produce about 2.3 million additional skilled craftsmen." Here, assuredly, is a potential field of employment for Negro workers. Yet under present practices they are all but barred from it. The NAACP estimates that less than one per cent of the apprentices in the construction industry throughout the United States are Negro; even in the relatively liberal state of New York, the proportion of Negroes in the building trades' apprenticeship programs during the last ten years has gone up—exactly—from 1.5 to 2 per cent. Julian Thomas, Urban League director of industrial relations, reports that in 17 out of 32 major cities, the League did not find a single Negro apprentice. There was one Negro apprentice electrician in each of four cities and one plumbing apprentice in five. Throughout the 32 cities surveyed, the Urban League found a total of roughly 100 Negro apprentices—among all fields. "It's difficult," says Thomas, "to encourage a Negro youngster to take an interest in apprenticeship training when it takes us three years to get one Negro electrician hired in the nation's capital." Roy Wilkins of the NAACP has remarked that "given a continuation of present rates of advance, it will take Negroes 138 years, or until the Year 2094, to secure equal participation in skilled-craft training and employ-

ment." But Thomas adds: "Unless we get that training, we're in for becoming permanent wards of the richest country in the world."

THE MERGER OF the AFL and the CIO in 1955 achieved very little to alleviate these conditions—or so many Negroes believe. "We have not realized," says Dr. James M. Nabritt, Jr., president of Howard University, "in this combination of the AFL and the CIO—what we had hoped for in the labor movement." Randolph expresses the feelings of many Negroes when he says that "unless the AFL-CIO can be shaken loose from the position it now holds, Negro youth has no future."

The question is: Can the NALC do the job? Perhaps this question is best answered by illustrating the power which the NALC seems able to wield. Secretary Goldberg, in February of this year, accepted an invitation to speak at a Washington, D. C., conference sponsored by the NALC. The day he was scheduled to speak turned out to be an extremely busy one for the Secretary, so he suggested that William Wirtz, his under-secretary (and a former law partner of Adlai Stevenson), would be happy to substitute. NALC leaders, however, said that they would have the Secretary of Labor or no one. Goldberg showed up. President Kennedy was also careful enough of the sensibilities involved to send the conference his greetings (although by normal political standards, such as attendance, the meeting was not a success). In contrast, the AFL-CIO not only did not send greetings or a representative, but pointedly refused to send even an observer from its Civil Rights Department.

It cannot be said, however, that the NALC has won widespread support among Negro workers; its growth so far has failed to match the expectations of Randolph and his followers. The organization claims a membership of 7-10,000,

and a run-down of the various unions to which NALC vice presidents belong—most of them are paid functionaries—indicates that these members are drawn from the Auto Workers; the Steelworkers; International Union of Electrical Workers; Hotel & Restaurant; Retail Clerks; District 65 of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union; the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; the Longshoremen; and the Teamsters. NALC chapters have been established in most of the major industrial centers of the North—Chicago, New York, Pittsburgh, Youngstown. These chapters function in a variety of ways, which again serves to illustrate certain of the NALC's strengths and weaknesses.

The Detroit chapter (called the Trade Union Leadership Council) is, with 2,000 members, the largest and most active group in the NALC. It is almost exclusively political and, as one might expect, largely concerned with the affairs of the United Auto Workers. One of the TULC critics declares: "When a slate for union offices is drawn up, especially in the UAW, it's just about got to be cleared with the TULC. But there hasn't been any action aimed at discrimination or any effort made to bust through barriers erected by the building trades to Negro employment." The Chicago NALC, a chapter of some 700 which is less fully oriented toward the activity of a single union, has tried mainly "to get a few Negro youngsters out of the vocational schools trained in building-trade skills." Training is obtained "outside" the building trades' regularly endorsed Washburn School for Apprentices; Negro non-union skilled tradesmen do the teaching. Then, "if youngsters are rejected because of color, we build up the record, mobilize public opinion, and prepare the way for a break-in—we hope." The New York City group—another chapter that draws from a wide variety of unions—engages mainly in fund-raising activities.

The NALC has by-passed the usual

union structure to recruit members and to ask for support. It cannot, or feels that it cannot, appeal to union executive organs for support, financial or otherwise, as both the Jewish civil rights agencies and the NAACP do. It has turned instead to the Negro churches—with what response it is difficult to determine. One thing, however, is clear: the NALC cannot as yet mount the kind of community-wide offensive against job discrimination that a group of ministers recently did in Philadelphia by conducting selective boycotts to force companies to open up hiring and upgrade Negro workers.

WHY HAS THE NALC failed to achieve the status and power that its founders were so confident it could have? According to one active member of the organization, it has been "bugged" from the start by "confusion as to its role." (The labor secretary of the NAACP, for example, vigorously performs many of the functions that might be thought to be the special province of a group like the NALC.) Randolph, however, argues that the trouble stems from a "lack of funds to carry on a nation-wide systematic organizing campaign" and from the intimidation of Negro unionists by white labor leaders. Still others believe that the fault has been the lack of guidance from the national office, the absence of program and direction. One white opponent of the NALC says that it "doesn't fight cases, doesn't try to break in, and doesn't send in complaints [to the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department]."

Many other criticisms have been made of the NALC. On the one hand, its leaders have been called "Uncle Toms": one labor leader asserts that "the NALC is a creature of functionaries appointed by white elected leaders to placate, or to serve as channels to, Negro members." And on the other hand, George Meany has told Randolph (at the February AFL-CIO executive council meeting): "You've been doing a job outside the labor move-

ment, not in cooperation with us.”* It has also been charged that the NALC is a racist caucus and that one of its prime goals is the election and appointment of Negroes to union posts; if its leaders succeed in building a powerful and militant mass organization, presumably they will be able to maintain their position of power within the rapidly changing Negro community.

The NALC's answer to its critics is perhaps best summarized by Herbert Hill, labor secretary of the NAACP, who has worked closely with the new organization since its inception. Hill argues that the NALC “had a choice of degenerating into an apologist for the labor movement within the Negro community, or of pursuing a vigorous role. . . . It did not want to compete with other organizations to give more awards to George Meany.” It is this vigor, Hill feels, that is resented by AFL-CIO leaders and by the spokesmen of the Jewish Labor Committee and the National Labor Service of the American Jewish Committee.

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN the NALC on the one side, and these two Jewish labor agencies on the other, has many ramifications. The JLC was originally founded in 1934—long after Jews had won recognition for their important role in the building of the American labor movement—and first served as a rescue-relief operation to aid Jewish trade union-

ists and socialists in escaping from Nazism and Stalinism. From the beginning the JLC has eschewed internal union politics altogether (except, possibly, in predominantly Jewish unions); and only after World War II did it become really active in the field of civil rights. Like other Jewish defense agencies, the JLC operates “on the assumption that the problem of bigotry and inequality is indivisible.” Its technique is to place its staff people in key cities where they organize local labor committees to combat discrimination. Today the JLC has ten field representatives heading various state and city labor council anti-discrimination efforts. William Becker, for example, the JLC official in San Francisco, is generally credited with being the prime mover in California's adoption of a state FEP law two years ago.

The American Jewish Committee's National Labor Service also avoids internal union politics but operates in a slightly different fashion from the JLC. It was, for example, instrumental in getting both the AFL and CIO to develop their own full-time civil rights departments. The AJC's National Labor Service also performs an educational function, providing unions with civil rights literature and advice. In time the JLC and the National Labor Service—despite their protests to the contrary—came to be considered by many white unionists as the voice of pro-Negro labor within the AFL-CIO. One source of the current conflict between the NALC and these two Jewish agencies can be found in this confusion.

But a more immediate cause was an accident of history: the appointment of Charles Zimmerman, the JLC's chief civil rights spokesman, as chairman of the AFL-CIO civil rights committee just at a time when Negro militancy was on the rise. One Jewish civil rights professional explains this particular development in the following way: “Among professionals in inter-group relations, the Jews are the longest in the field, the most skilled and most experienced. Negro professionals re-

* The fear of “dual unionism” explains a number of reactions to the NALC. In general, the American trade union movement is highly ethnicized; many jobs, even whole industries, are thought to be the provinces of different ethnic groups—e.g., the needle trades “belong” to the Jews and transportation to the Irish. Conscious of these divisions, trade union leaders fear further fractionalism. Many devout Catholic trade unionists, for example, are completely opposed to the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, which acts as a caucus within unions. As Patrick E. Gorman, secretary-treasurer of the Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, puts it: “There should be just one labor movement. . . . The Negroes shouldn't be getting together in any organization like this [NALC].”

sent this. Negroes have developed their own leadership and they don't want whites—Jews or anybody else—to be in the forefront of the civil rights fight.”

Deep bitterness now exists on both sides. Negro unionists have criticized the AFL-CIO civil rights department for inviting leaders of the JLC and the director of the AJC's National Labor Service, Harry Fleischman, to participate in trade union civil rights conferences, while not inviting either the NALC or the NAACP. In the past, Fleischman, Zimmerman (who recently resigned from his post with the AFL-CIO after serving four years), and Emmanuel Muravchik (field director of the JLC's anti-discrimination department) have worked closely with Randolph on civil rights matters; and JLC staff members in some instances even helped to organize NALC chapters. But this cooperation broke down within the NALC's first year. “The JLC,” says one NALC activist, “is too eager to see progress where it ain't.” He cites a press release, based on a JLC survey, hailing 1960 as a year of race relations progress within the unions: “There was no survey, and not much progress.” He believes—and he is not alone in this belief—that the two Jewish agencies are more interested in protecting their relationship with AFL-CIO's top leaders than they are in furthering civil rights within the labor movement.

Many Jewish trade unionists are antagonized—and somewhat puzzled—by the point frequently made in NALC statements that only Negroes are entitled and able to speak for the Negroes. This puts off many Jewish unionists who otherwise might be sympathetic to the NALC. “They'll tell *me* about discrimination?” asks a Jewish trade union leader. Yet the Jewish Labor Committee is most frequently cited by NALC spokesmen as a comparable organization and as a justification for the Negro's right to organize a committee of his own.

Though many outside observers believe that both the JLC and the AJC's Na-

tional Labor Service have defended labor's record of progress in combating discrimination much more vigorously than is necessary, Muravchik and Fleischman argue that more can be done to promote the cause of civil rights in the unions by combining praise with criticism. This attitude exposes them to attack; Herbert Hill, for example, calls them “apologists for racism.”* Fleischman replies that Hill's approach “discourages good guys from pushing civil rights. Why do it at all if all you're going to get is blame for tokenism anyway? They ought to get credit for things done. I don't see this as a ‘whitewash’ of labor racists.”

ONE WONDERS IF this growing antagonism between the Jewish and Negro labor camps is a precursor of strained relations between the larger Jewish and Negro defense agencies and ultimately between the two minority communities in general. The deterioration in Negro-Jewish relations can be found in many areas beyond the narrow confines of labor's civil rights circle. Negro ghettos are spilling over into older Jewish neighborhoods; Negro small businessmen are competing with Jewish businessmen for the same customers; aspiring Negro politicians are striving against Jewish politicians for leadership in minority group areas. Though conflict seems inevitable and natural as the urban scene changes, some Jews have been guilty of the racial bias that has been newly precipitated in the white community (even among people who were previously convinced of their freedom from it) by aggressive Negro demands for full equality; and there has also been a revival of anti-Semitism among Negroes, enough to cause some of the Negro press to cater to it occasionally. It may well be that what James Baldwin has called the Negro's “naked and unanswerable hatred of all whites” will come in this difficult period to center on the Jew.

* COMMENTARY, December 1959.

Whatever its ramifications, the split between the Jewish and Negro elements in labor is likely to widen until the position of the Negro worker dramatically improves. Such improvement depends, of course, upon a number of external factors. One is the effectiveness of the Kennedy administration in enforcing the no-discrimination clause in government contracts. In this connection, the immediate response of the administration to NAACP demands for investigation into discrimination at the Marietta, Georgia, plant of Republic Aviation is clearly a good sign. But even administration support will not be adequate unless drastic action alleviates "chronic" unemployment and prevents discriminatory unemployment generally. There is also a pressing need on the part of organized labor for strong and imaginative action against discrimination—particularly against barriers in the building trades. George Meany's offer personally to recruit qualified Negro apprentices in order to break discrimination among the Washington, D.C., construction unions was a gesture in this direction; but so far it has proved to be no more than that.

Another social consequence of continued discrimination is certain: the further spread of the black nationalism bewailed

by white and Negro civil rights spokesmen alike. Randolph attacks the chauvinist aspects of black nationalism in nearly all of his speeches. But his statements also emphasize the conditions which give rise to such chauvinism. "The basic remedy for black nationalism—which can become a danger to social peace, as white nationalism is a danger to social peace—is the abolition of white nationalism which expresses itself in lynchings, mob law, disenfranchisement, segregation and discrimination." Randolph does not believe that Negro trade unionists are under the influence of the black Muslims (the current extreme exponents of black nationalism within the Negro community), but it is clear that the movement already wields its strongest appeal among the unorganized and voiceless Negro masses. There are signs that the Muslims have already begun to exert strong pressure on the NALC and its leadership. This pressure in turn partly explains the intensity of the NALC's attack against the unions: for in any confrontation with the Muslims, the NALC will be at a great disadvantage until such time as it can defend trade unionism without having to apologize for the adverse effect of some union practices on Negro life in America.

A. ALVAREZ

ENGLISH POETRY TODAY

IN 1932 THE CRITIC F. R. Leavis proclaimed that T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound had between them brought about a significant reorientation of literature. Twenty years later he took most of it back again, blaming the anti-critical workings of the London literary circuit and the decay of an educated reading public. He may have been perfectly justified in crediting the metropolitan literateurs with setting up so many false gods. But the relative failure of talent is another matter entirely. So is the manner in which so much of the talent that has arrived has been misused. The London old-boy circuit may often be stupid, conceited, and parasitic, but I don't believe that it is a deliberate conspiracy against good work.

I once suggested (in *Stewards of Excellence*, 1958) that the experimental techniques of Eliot and the rest never really took on in England because they were an essentially American concern: attempts to forge a distinctively American language for poetry. Certainly, since Eliot removed himself into another, remote sphere of influence by proclaiming himself "Anglo-Catholic in religion, royalist in politics, and classicist in literature," the whole movement of English verse has been to

correct the balance experimentation had so unpredictably disturbed. Sometime in the 20's Thomas Hardy remarked to Robert Graves that "*vers libre* could come to nothing in England. 'All we can do is to write on the old themes in the old styles, but try to do a little better than those who went before us.'" Since about 1930 the machinery of modern English poetry seems to have been controlled by a series of negative feed-backs designed to produce precisely the effect Hardy wanted.

The final justification of experimentalism lay, of course, beyond mere technique. The great moderns experimented not just to make it new formally, but to open poetry up to new areas of experience. The kind of insights which had already been substantiated by the novelists—by Melville, Dostoevsky, Lawrence, and even at times, by Hardy himself—seemed about due to appear in poetry. The negative feed-backs came into action to stop this happening.

The literary historians perhaps would see the process differently; and the English scene is peculiarly amenable to literary history: it is savage with gang-warfare which, at a distance, can be dignified as disagreements between schools of verse. So maybe a little potted, though rather partial, literary history would be in place.

The 30's poets reacted against those of the 20's by asserting that they had no time to be difficult or inward or experimental; the political situation was too

A. ALVAREZ, the well-known British literary critic, has contributed articles and poems to a variety of journals both here and in England. This essay, which marks his first appearance in COMMENTARY, will introduce an anthology of modern British poetry, *The New Poetry*, to be published by Penguin Books later this year.

urgent. W. H. Auden gave them the go-ahead because he combined the extraordinary technical skill in traditional forms with an extraordinary feel for the most contemporary of contemporary idiom. When he began, it must really have looked as though he were about to do something quite new in English. In a poem like "Sir, No Man's Enemy," for example, he used the new, difficult language of psychology with a concentration that was almost Shakespearian; or even in an unambitious piece like "Lurcher-loving collier, black as night" he managed triumphantly to recreate a traditional lyric—its ancestor is "Mistress mine, where art thou roaming"—in terms of the contemporary, unromantic, industrial scene. His trouble was that he was too skillful; he found both the art of verse and the art of success too easy. So he was able to channel his deep neurotic disturbances into light verse—much of it, admittedly, very fine—while his contemporary knowingness, his skill with references, with slang, with the time's immediate worries, went into the production of a kind of social, occasional verse, mostly traditional in form, but highly up-to-date in idiom. His example encouraged a whole swarm of poetasters who believed, apparently, that to be modern was merely a matter of sounding modern; it had precious little to do with originality. (I would exclude from this Louis MacNeice, whose social-political verse was mostly more effective and certainly more deeply felt than Auden's own.) By the end of the 30's experimental verse was out and traditional forms, in a chic contemporary guise, were back in. That was the first negative feedback.

THE REACTION TO Auden took the form of anti-intellectualism. He was thought to be too clever and not sufficiently emotional for the extreme circumstances of the 40's. The war brought with it a taste for high, if obscure, rhetoric. The log-rolling 30's were followed by the drum-rolling 40's. The new master, of

course, was Dylan Thomas. But Thomas was not only a fine rhetorician, he also, in his early poems, had something rather original to say. Admittedly, he was under constant pressure from the literary Public Relations Officers to continue at all costs less with his poetry than with his act as the blindly inspired poet; which meant that his rhetoric eventually ran on when the reasons for it had faltered. But the talent was there, however self-destructive it eventually became. His followers, however, used his work as an excuse to kiss *all* meaning good-bye. All that mattered was that the verse should sound impressive. This was the second negative feed-back: a blockage against intelligence.

The third stage was yet another reaction: against wild, loose emotion. The name of the reaction was the Movement, and its anthology was Robert Conquest's *New Lines*. Of the nine poets to appear in this, six, at the time, were university teachers, two librarians, and one a civil servant. It was, in short, academic-administrative verse, polite, knowledgeable, efficient, polished and, in its quiet way, even intelligent. What it had to offer positively was more difficult to describe. Even the editor found he could define it only in negatives: "It submits to no great systems of theoretical constructs nor agglomerations of unconscious commands. It is free from both mystical and logical compulsions and—like the modern philosophy—is empirical in attitude to all that comes. . . . On the more technical side . . . we see the refusal to abandon a rational structure and comprehensible language. . . . It will be seen at once that these poets do not have as much in common as they would if they were a group of doctrine-saddled writers forming a definite school complete with programme and rules. What they do have in common is, perhaps, at its lowest, little more than a negative determination to avoid bad principles."

Mr. Conquest is, I think, exaggerating when he says that his poets have nothing very much in common. For example:

*Picture of lover or friend that is not either
Like you or me who, to sustain our pose,
Need wine and conversation, colour and
light;
In short, a past that no one now can share,
No matter whose your future; calm and
dry,
In sex I do not dither more than either,
Nor should I now swell to halloo the names
Of feelings that no one needs to remember:
The same few dismal properties, the same
Oppressive air of justified unease
Of our imaginations and our beds.
It seems the poet made a bad mistake.*

Perhaps the logic seems a little tenuous? The shifts a little hard to follow? The content too fine-drawn? So they should. The piece is synthetic; it contains eight of the nine *New Lines* poets. I have omitted D. J. Enright since he rarely sticks to the metrical norms on which the rest insist. Otherwise I have not cheated in compiling the poem. I have taken the poets in the order in which they appear in the anthology, without using more than two lines from any one and without changing the punctuation except, in a minor way, between quotations. Yet though the poem may not be quite comprehensible, it is perfectly unified in tone. Wouldn't the impartial reader be hard put to know where one quotation ended and another began? Wouldn't he find a considerable similarity in the quality both of the language and of the experience? A kind of unity of flatness? The pieties of the Movement were as predictable as the politics of the 30's poets. They are summed up at the beginning of Philip Larkin's "Church-going": "*Hatless, I take off/My cycle-clips in awkward reverence.*" This, in concentrated form, is the image of the postwar Welfare State Englishman: shabby and not concerned with his appearance; poor—he has a bike, not a car; gauche but full of agnostic piety; underfed, underpaid, overtaxed, hopeless, bored, wry. This is the third negative feed-back: an attempt to show that the poet is not a strange creature inspired; on the contrary, he is just

like the man next door—in fact, he probably is the man next door.

NOW, I AM WHOLLY in favor of restoring poetry to the realm of common sense. But there is always the delicate question of how common common sense should be. All three negative feed-backs work, in their different ways, to preserve the idea that life in England goes on much as it always has, give or take a few minor changes in the class system. The upper-middle-class, or Tory ideal—presented in its pure crystalline form by John Betjeman—may have given way to the predominantly lower-middle-class, or labor, ideal of the Movement and the Angries, but the concept of gentility still reigns supreme. And gentility is a belief that life is always more or less orderly, people always more or less polite, their emotions and habits more or less decent and more or less controlled; that God, in short, is more or less good.

It is a stance which is becoming increasingly precarious to maintain. That the English have succeeded so long owes a good deal to the fact that England is an island; it is, literally, insulated from the rest of the world. But since the First World War, that insulation has slowly been broken down. Robert Graves's *Goodbye to All That*, for example, shows perfectly how powerless the orthodox defenses ultimately became under extreme conditions. When the level of misery was normal, the defenses worked efficiently enough. His childhood at preparatory and public school meant loneliness, philistinism, lewdness, insensitivity, and unhappiness. These were all to be expected, and Graves duly countered them in the orthodox ways: games, toughness, asexual love, wit, and a clipped, dry, you-can't-touch-me manner. He developed, in short, a stiff upper lip. This got him through the first two years of the war, then gradually it broke. The horror of the trenches was too great. What he saw and what he went through was beyond the bounds of anything his

training had prepared him for. Physically he survived, but emotionally he could no longer properly cope. The result was a kind of shell-shock which, he says himself, stayed with him for ten years. And even then he had to exile himself from England and erect the elaborate barricade of White Goddesses and classicizing through which his genuine poetry has only slowly and painfully filtered.

In the same way, George Orwell felt he had to purge himself of his governing-class upbringing by deliberately plunging into the abjectest poverty and pain partly, at least, because what he saw in Burma gave the lie to the whole ethos in which he had been raised.

The only English writer who was able to face the deep, uncompromising forces at work in our time was D. H. Lawrence. And he was born in the working class and spent most of his life outside England; so he had almost nothing to do with middle-class gentility. "In those days," he wrote, "they were always telling me I had genius as though to console me for not having their own incomparable advantages."

BUT THESE FORCES I have invoked are beyond mere shell-shock and class guilt. They are general and concern us all. What, I suggest, has happened in the last half century is that we in England are gradually being made to realize that all our lives, even those of the most genteel and en-islanded, are influenced profoundly by forces which have nothing to do with gentility, decency, or politeness. Theologians would call these forces Evil; psychologists, perhaps, libido. Either way, they are the forces of disintegration which destroy the old standards of civilization. Their public faces are those of two world wars, of the concentration camps, of genocide, and the threat of nuclear war.

I do not wish to overdramatize the situation. War and cruelty have always existed, but those of the 20th century are different in two ways. First, mass evil (for lack of a better term) has been magnified

to match the scale of mass society. We no longer have local wars, we have world wars, which involve the civilians quite as deeply as the military. Where once, at worst, regiments of professional soldiers were wiped out, now whole cities go. Instead of the death of individuals, we have mass extermination. Instead of individual torture and sadism, we have concentration camps run scientifically as death factories. The disintegration, to put it most mildly, has reached proportions which make it increasingly difficult to ignore. Once upon a time, the English could safely believe that evil was something that happened on the Continent, or further off, in the Empire, where soldiers were paid to take care of it. To believe this now requires at best an extraordinary single-mindedness, at worst stupidity.

The second, and specifically modern difference in our attitude to the problem is this: the forceable recognition of a mass evil outside us has developed precisely parallel with psychoanalysis; that is, with our recognition of the ways in which the same forces are at work within us. One of the therapeutic purposes, for example, of Bruno Bettelheim's psychoanalytic observations when he was in Dachau and Buchenwald was to educate himself into realizing how much of what went on around him expressed what went on inside himself. Another analyst has suggested that the guilt which seems to dog the refugees who escaped from Germany may in part be due to the fact that the Nazis fulfilled the deepest and most primitive drives of the refugees themselves, killing fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, and children. Be this as it may, it is hard to live in an age of psychoanalysis and feel oneself wholly detached from the dominant public savagery. In this way, at least, the makers of horror films are more in tune with contemporary anxiety than most of the English poets.

But just as England was not affected by the concentration camps, so it has remained, on the whole, contemptuously

impervious to psychology. Primitivism is only generally acknowledged in this country when it takes a peculiarly British form: the domestic sex murder. Then the gloating is public and universal. Had Freud been born in London instead of Vienna, he would probably have finished not in psychoanalysis but in criminology.

I am not suggesting that modern English poetry, to be really modern, must be concerned with psychoanalysis or with the concentration camps or with the hydrogen bomb or with any other of the modern horrors. I am not suggesting, in fact, that it *must* be anything. For poetry that feels it has to cope with predetermined subjects ceases to be poetry and becomes propaganda. I am, however, suggesting that it drop the pretense that life, give or take a few social distinctions, is the same as ever, that gentility, decency, and all the other social totems will eventually muddle through.

What poetry needs, in brief, is a new seriousness. I would define this seriousness simply as the poet's ability and willingness to face the full range of his experience with his full intelligence, not to take the easy exits of either the conventional response or choking incoherence. Believe in it or not, psychoanalysis has left its mark on poetry. First, the writer can no longer deny with any assurance the fears and desires he does not wish to face; he knows obscurely that they are there, however skillfully he manages to elude them. Second, having acknowledged their existence, he is no longer absolved from the need to use all his intelligence and skill to make poetic sense of them. Since Freud, the late-Romantic dichotomy between emotion and intelligence has become totally meaningless.

This position had, I think, already been partially assumed by T. S. Eliot when he wrote *The Waste Land*. The poem follows, with great precision and delicacy, the movement of a psyche, not just of a society, in the process of disintegration. Eliot's talk of classicism, like his use in the

poem of literature and theology, was an elaborate and successful defense which forced impersonality on a deeply personal and painful subject. But during the later 20's and 30's in America, Eliot's technical achievements and the radical revaluation of literary tradition that went with them seemed so bewilderingly impressive that the urgently personal uses of this technique were put to were overlooked. A whole school of criticism was developed to prove technically that there was no necessary or even significant connection between art and its roots in the artist's life. During the 40's, however, when English poetry was at its nadir, there arose in America a new generation of poets, the most important of whom were Robert Lowell and John Berryman. They had assimilated the lesson of Eliot and the critical 30's: they assumed that a poet, to earn his title, had to be very skillful, very original, and very intelligent. But they were no longer concerned with Eliot's rear-guard action against the late Romantics; they were, I mean, no longer adherents of the cult of rigid impersonality. So they were able to write poetry of immense skill and intelligence which coped openly with the quick of their experience, experience sometimes on the edge of disintegration and breakdown. Robert Lowell's latest book, *Life Studies*, for example, is a large step forward in this new direction. It may contain no single poem as impressive as the "Quaker Graveyard in Nantucket," but the total impact of the book as a whole is altogether more powerful. Where once Lowell tried to externalize his disturbance theologically in Catholicism and rhetorically in certain mannerisms of language and rhythm, he is now, I think, trying to cope with them nakedly, as they arise, in all their ugliness and pain.

IT IS TO THE POINT that the two Englishmen who are most concerned to write at this kind of depth have spent the better part of their poetically formative twenties in America. I mean Ted Hughes and

Thom Gunn. So they have been less open to pressures which would flatten both their intelligence and the sharp violence of their experience into a socially more acceptable middle style. If you compare, for instance, Larkin's "At Grass" with Hughes's "A Dream of Horses," the creative advantage of being three thousand miles away from the fog of English gentility becomes peculiarly clear. "At Grass" follows:

*The eye can hardly pick them out
From the cold shade they shelter in,
Till wind distresses tail and mane;
Then one crops grass, and moves about
—The other seeming to look on—
And stands anonymous again.*

*Yet fifteen years ago, perhaps
Two dozen distances sufficed
To fable them: faint afternoons
Of Cups and Stakes and Handicaps,
Whereby their names were artficed
To inlay faded, classic Junes—*

*Silks at the start: against the sky
Numbers and parasols: outside,
Squadrons of empty cars, and heat,
And littered grass: then the long cry
Hanging unhushed till it subside
To stop-press columns on the street.*

*Do memories plague their ears like flies?
They shake their heads. Dusk brims the
shadows.
Summer by summer, all stole away,
The starting-gates, the crowds and cries—
All but the unmolesting meadows.
Almanacked, their names live; they*

*Have slipped their names, and stand at
ease
Or gallop for what must be joy,
And not a fieldglass sees them home,
Or curious stop-watch prophecies:
Only the groom, and the groom's boy,
With bridles in the evening come.*

Larkin's poem, elegant, unpretentious and rather beautiful in its mild way, is a nostalgic recreation of the Platonic (or *New Yorker*) idea of the English scene, part pastoral, part sporting. His horses

are social creatures of fashionable race meetings and high style; emotionally, they belong to the world of the ASPCA. It is a long way from Hughes's "A Dream of Horses":

*We were born grooms, in stable-straw we
sleep still,
All our wealth horse-dung and the comb-
ings of horses,
And all we can talk about is what horses
ail.*

*Out of the night that gulfed beyond the
palace-gate
There shook hooves and hooves and
hooves of horses:
Our horses battered their stalls; their eyes
jerked white.*

*And we ran out, mice in our pockets and
straw in our hair,
Into darkness that was avalanching to
horses
And a quake of hooves. Our lantern's little
orange flare*

*Made a round mask of our each sleep-
dazed face,
Bodiless, or else bodied by horses
That whinnied and bit and cannoned the
world from its place.*

*The tall palace was so white, the moon was
so round,
Everything else this plunging of horses
To the rim of our eyes that strove for the
shapes of the sound.*

*We crouched at our lantern, our bodies
drank the din,
And we longed for a death trampled by
such horses
As every grain of the earth had hooves
and mane.*

*We must have fallen like drunkards into a
dream
Of listening, lulled by the thunder of the
horses.
We awoke stiff; broad day had come.*

*Out through the gate the unprinted desert
stretched
To stone and scorpion; our stable-horses*

*Lay in their straw, in a hag-sweat, listless
and wretched.*

*Now let us, tied, be quartered by those
horses,
If but doomsday's flames be great horses,
The forever itself a circling of the hooves
of horses.*

The poem, by the standard of Hughes's best writing, is not all that good; it is less controlled than Larkin's and has a number of romantic, quasi-medieval trappings which verge on the pretentious. But it is unquestionably *about* something; it is a serious attempt to recreate and so clarify, unfalsified and in the strongest imaginative terms possible, a powerful complex of emotions and sensations. Unlike Larkin's, Hughes's horses have a violent, impending presence. But through the detail which brings them so threateningly to life, they reach back, as in a dream, into the depths of fear and sensation. Their brute world is part physical, part state of mind.

They have, of course, their literary antecedents: the strange, savage horses which terrorize Ursula Brangwen at the end of Lawrence's *The Rainbow*. But this is part of their wider significance. Dr. Leavis has come, apparently, to believe that Lawrence and Eliot represent the two warring and unreconcilable poles of modern literature. The best contemporary English verse, however, shows that their influences can be creatively reconciled. In the seriousness of what I have called the new depth poetry, the openness to experience, the psychological insight and integrity of D. H. Lawrence combine with the immense poetic skill and formal intelligence of T. S. Eliot. At its best, it is work which fulfills Coleridge's definition of the Imagination as the force which reconciles "a more than usual state of emotion with a more than usual order." If this is to be the new direction of verse, we might be in for an exceptionally fine creative period.

IN NEXT MONTH'S ISSUE

WESTERN VALUES & TOTAL WAR

A Round-Table Discussion

Sidney Hook

H. Stuart Hughes

Hans J. Morgenthau

C. P. Snow

DAVID DANZIG

THE NEW MAP OF CHRISTIANITY

FOR THE FIRST TIME in about four centuries, the wall between Catholics and Protestants, erected first on one side by the Reformation and then on the other by the counter-Reformation, has begun to be breached. Throughout the hundred-year period following the Reformation, the wall was unsuccessfully assaulted by armies fighting civil and foreign religious wars, until the forces of a burgeoning nationalism, in their own interests, decreed a religious truce. Today the religious landscape of the West is again being affected by developments within the history of European nationalism: just as the flowering of nationalism transformed the religious polity of Renaissance Europe, so its decline in the post-World War II period is working to produce a new set of relationships between Protestants and Roman Catholics.

Thus, inroads have begun to be made by each of the two major branches of Western Christianity into territory traditionally belonging exclusively to the other. For the most part these inroads are the consequence not of missionary activity, but of demographic and political factors—immigration, birth rates, and the like. For example, the division of Germany,

In his article "Christianity in a 'Post-Western' Era" (January), DAVID DANZIG discussed some of the consequences for Christianity of the decline in Western prestige and power. Here he examines the effects of the trend toward Western unity on the relations between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Mr. Danzig is program director of the American Jewish Committee.

which put the predominantly Protestant Eastern part under Communist rule, has left the Western half of the birthplace of Protestantism almost 50 per cent Catholic. Holland, which is still generally thought of as a Protestant country, is today also almost 50 per cent Catholic. So also is Canada. Australia, in part because of the recently stepped-up immigration from southern Europe, now has a Catholic minority of about 25 per cent, which is still growing. And in the United States the Catholic population has expanded from a small minority into a vigorous group of about forty million.

Such inroads by Catholicism into Protestant strongholds have not yet been matched by Protestant gains in traditionally Catholic territory. But this is to some extent offset by the fact that Catholic territory (concentrated largely in the Latin-Hispanic world) has itself declined in power and importance in relation to the technologically superior "Protestant" countries. In addition, the Protestant missionary movement has by no means been slow to seize the opportunities that have presented themselves for eating into Catholic monopolies. The main case in point is Latin America, which most Protestants once considered an untouchable area. (As late as 1910 the Anglican Church refused to join in the Edinburgh Protestant Ecumenical Council until the subject of possible missionary activity in Latin America was removed from the agenda.) But recognizing that the Church in many Latin

countries has lacked direct contact with the people—one priest to some eight thousand baptized Catholics is common, compared with one for six hundred in the United States—and that Catholicism had never penetrated the social fabric of Latin America as extensively as had been assumed, Protestantism has mounted an aggressive missionary assault on those countries since the end of the war. The result, according to Father Willard F. Jabusch, is “that Protestantism has solidly established itself in many places in Latin America.”

TO APPRECIATE the significance of all these changes, it is only necessary to remind oneself that the religious map drawn in 1648 by the princes of Europe at Westphalia was still largely intact at the end of World War II, three hundred years later. The Treaty of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years' War, which was waged for a combination of religious, national, dynastic, and mercenary reasons, and which so ravaged Central Europe that the historians estimate it killed off a full third of the German population. The famous formula of Westphalia, *cuius regio eius religio* (the religion of the country must be that of the ruler), meant that henceforth nations established as Protestant, Catholic, or both, would remain such—that, in other words, no further attempts would be made to destroy the balance of religious power then obtaining in Europe. This formula, intended as a means of preventing any future religious wars, served notice on the churches that the nation-state would no longer permit itself to be used as a secular arm of religion. On the contrary, religion was now to be subordinated to the interests of the state—as indeed had already happened in Louis XIII's France, whose first minister, Richelieu, a cardinal of the Church, had entered into alliances with various Protestant principalities against the Catholic powers in the Thirty Years' War. In short, at Westphalia, Europe chose not to be united

under the suzerainty of either Protestantism or Catholicism, and opted instead for fragmentation into a series of autonomous, absolute sovereignties.

At the same time, however, the individual nations of Europe were to use religion as a means of achieving unity within their own borders, and thus the peace of Westphalia also brought suppression and persecution to religious minorities throughout the Christian world. In Protestant countries, Catholics were persecuted; in Catholic countries, Protestants were persecuted; and Jews were persecuted in both. Hence the very nationalism which led to the fragmentation of Europe imposed religious uniformity within the confines of each state, and ultimately elevated itself to the status of a quasi-religion. Even after legal equality began in most places to be extended to dissident religious minorities during the 19th century, this equality was understood as ensuring them protection from persecution and discrimination rather than as permitting them a full exercise of influence in public affairs. Today three Western countries—Spain, Portugal, and Colombia—still discriminate legally against their religious minorities, but less flagrant attempts continue to be made in many countries to inhibit effective action by any religious group other than the majority. For instance, in Austria, “contempt of religion” and “attempts to spread irreligion” are illegal, while in Norway the law requires the majority of the cabinet to belong to the state (Lutheran) church.

Such attempts to deny or qualify religious equality might fancifully be described in this context as efforts to resist the final abrogation of the *cuius regio eius religio* provision of the Treaty of Westphalia. But whether the churches like it or not—and many of them like it very much—forces are at work in the world which are bound to create a new system of religious relationships and destroy the vestiges of the pattern set at Westphalia.

The most immediately relevant of these forces is the growth of secularism. Ameri-

cans rightly think of secularism as the enemy of religion in general, yet the whole truth is that not *all* religion loses equally when secularism gains, but mainly the dominant religion of the particular culture in question. In other words, if secularism has hurt nominal religiosity, it has also produced a social environment conducive to the welfare of religious minorities.

We can take France among the Catholic countries and Great Britain among the Protestant countries as examples. In France the power of the Church has been seriously weakened by ever greater waves of militant atheism and anti-clericalism, but neither atheism nor anti-clericalism has succeeded in really damaging the commitment of the Protestant population to its faith. In consequence, France's million Protestants, well organized and aggressive, are now able to exert an influence in public life far out of proportion to their numbers. Similarly with England and Scotland, where a Catholic minority of more than two million (as against only 120,000 in 1800) exists side by side with an established church whose large nominal membership in no sense reflects its actual power and influence.

COMMENTING on this situation as regards Protestant countries, the late Paul Hutchinson, editor of the *Christian Century*, wrote: "A striking but incontrovertible fact about European countries which have traditionally been Protestant strongholds—such countries as England, Scotland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries—is the almost complete withdrawal of organized labor from the churches and the rapid shrinking in the number of young people who show more than the most passive interest in Protestant church activities." It was Hutchinson's conclusion that "the actual working of establishment was to leave [such] countries filled with churches from which the congregations have largely vanished."

The reference to organized labor and to youth in the above quotation points to

another way in which secularism has been working to the disadvantage of religious monopoly. This has to do with the fact that dominant or established religions have tended, for obvious reasons, to back the status quo, and consequently any movement toward social reform in a given area will almost invariably be either indifferent to religion, opposed to the dominant religion, or opposed to religion in general. While European history shows innumerable instances of an established church buttressing the political and social status quo—like the Catholic Church's old preference for "the concordat of Throne and Altar"—the most obvious example at the moment is Latin America, where the Church has generally been regarded by the liberal and radical intelligentsia as a major enemy of social reform. (It should be pointed out, however, that there are signs, partly a reflection and partly a cause of the great changes now under way, which indicate that the traditional hostility of many churchmen to social reform can no longer be taken for granted. It is common knowledge, for example, that forces within the Church were important in the overthrow of Perón in Argentina and have also been active among the opposition to other Latin American dictators. The appeal made in 1959 by the South American bishops for land reform is another proof that the Church has increasingly come to realize that an intelligent fight against Communism must feature a program of economic reform. And in Europe, the economic policies advocated by most of the Catholic parties since the war represent a sharp departure from past conservatism.)

That Protestants, in countries where they are the dominant religious element, have their own problems with social reform is also evident. Indeed, the Protestant tendency to identify itself completely with the local culture wherever there is a Protestant majority actually involves a built-in support of the status quo. Moreover, race discrimination, an uncommon

phenomenon in Catholic countries—which are more prone to class discrimination—has been given sanction by important Protestant denominations in the American South, in the Union of South Africa, and elsewhere.

Protestantism, of course, has been striving to change in this respect, just as Catholicism has been trying to change in other respects, and to that degree, at least, both are ceasing to behave as monopolies. What has happened is that the position of the two wings of Christianity in the West as a whole and in the world as a whole—where they are both minorities—has begun to be more important as a determinant of policy and action than any considerations of advantage to be derived from purely local monopoly.

For if demographic factors have combined with the growth of secularism to alter the balance of religious power within individual countries and to convert all religions into actual minorities, another—and, in the last analysis, more significant—force has been having its effect on the character of Christian religious relationships on a supra-national scale. This force is the movement toward European—and ultimately Western—unity which the disillusionment with extreme nationalism and the threat of Communism have done so much to promote. So far only a few political and economic institutions of rather strictly limited scope (NATO, EEC, OECD) have been created, but a number of leading statesmen have seriously begun to envisage the possibility of “a genuine political—as well as economic—community” as the long-run goal for the West. Within Christianity, too, the vision of unity has taken hold and ecumenicism, with its emphasis on the globe rather than the nation, today has the liveliest, most vital appeal for imaginative Christians, Protestant and Catholic alike.

Whatever basis (beyond considerations of mutual defense against Communism) may be found for the creation of a supra-national Western political community, it

is of course absurd to expect that there can be a return to the medieval idea of unity under the suzerainty of religion. There is, however, a pronounced tendency in the air to appeal to Christianity as the major bond which makes all the diverse elements in the West members of a single civilization. We have heard in the past ten years a good deal of talk about the “Christian civilization” of the West, and it is not uncommon to see the cold war described as a struggle between atheism and Christianity, the implication being that democracy is the product of Christianity while totalitarianism is the logical outcome of secularism.

In line with this reasoning, a greater and greater degree of cooperation has been taking place between Catholics and Protestants, who are themselves seeking for a basis on which they can work together against the two common enemies—secularism at home and Communism abroad—and on which they can collaborate in the effort to revitalize Christianity for the purpose of making it the dominant moral and spiritual influence of the Western world. Some Christian leaders have gone so far as to envisage a reunification of all the churches, while others—like the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Geoffrey Francis Fisher, and his successor, Dr. Arthur Michael Ramsey—see a “Christian Church Commonwealth” as the ultimate goal of the dialogue between Protestantism and Catholicism. (Dr. Fisher, significantly, is reported to have said during his recent historic visit to the Pope, that the “words ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ are completely out of date.”)

ON ITS SIDE, the Catholic Church has contributed to this new spirit by a well-nigh revolutionary willingness to think of Protestantism as something more than a heretical schism. At the Catholic Eucharist Congress held in Munich last year, for example, the famed Roman ecumenicist, Otto Karner, spoke of Protestantism as the “Church of the Word” in

contrast to Catholicism, which he called the "Church of the Sacrament." Such language would have been inconceivable as little as thirty years ago. To take another example, Father George Tavard, Counselor on Christian Unity to Pope John, recently defined ecumenicism as a movement that "respects the beliefs and even the errors of others" and "admits that the question of Christian reunion . . . must be solved by a growing together in the truth on the level of the *various* Christian bodies." This comes close to recognizing the legitimacy of Protestantism as a Christian faith—something Catholics have rarely been willing to do in the past.

How does this new spirit of cooperation between Protestantism and Catholicism square with the intensified competition described above? The answer seems to be that as the West moves further away from the principle of absolute national sovereignty (with its emphasis upon religious monism) and closer to being a *de facto* community of nations, roughly on the American model of federalism, so the system of mutually recognized religious spheres of influence bred by the birth of modern nationalism (and made official at Westphalia) gives way to a condition of religious pluralism, also roughly on the American model. The essence of religious pluralism in America, according to L. C. McHugh, is not static insulation, but a peculiarly dynamic blend of cooperation and competition. It is a system whereby "a multiplicity of religious groups, exercising freedom of action under the protection of the uncommitted State, strive to impose their particular values on the general pattern of society by democratic means, thereby shaping public institutions, public policy, and the legal order in accordance with their concept of the common good and the good life of men in the temporal order." In short, Catholicism and Protestantism are now actively competing—to repeat, for the first time in three hundred years—for dominance in influencing the life of the West (con-

sidered as a single unit), while at the same time each is willing to form alliances with the other in pursuit of specific common objectives.

This situation is bound to benefit the cause of religious liberty in those few countries where it is still being denied. Whereas in the past, mistreatment of Catholics in Protestant countries, or mistreatment of Protestants in Catholic ones, was not considered the unambiguously legitimate concern of their co-religionists abroad, today any such instance of oppression immediately calls forth protests and political action. When the Jehovah's Witnesses were being harassed in Italy not long ago, American Protestants were quick to voice complaints. Similarly, American Protestants have exerted pressure on their government—though without much success—to make its alliance with Spain contingent upon the extension of equal rights to Spanish Protestants.

The part tends to follow the whole. The more the West becomes an integrated system, the more each part of it will have to behave in a "Western" fashion. Belgium and Portugal have learned that their allies will not support them in their colonial policies, because colonialism is an embarrassment to the West as a whole. In the same way, the countries still holding out against religious liberty will be under pressure to bring their domestic policies into line with the standards prevailing throughout the entire Western bloc.

MANY PEOPLE who would accept the foregoing analysis as more or less accurate have expressed serious doubts about the Catholic Church's willingness to accept religious pluralism in any country where Catholics are in the majority. Such people contend that Catholics are supporters of pluralism in America only because it has benefited the Church, and they point to Spain, Portugal, and Columbia as evidence for their view that the Church is perfectly willing to suppress

religious minorities wherever it has the power to do so. For that matter, a case has also been made against the genuineness of the Protestant enthusiasm for pluralism. While it is a commonplace of Protestant thinking to credit the principle of religious freedom to Protestant theology, some critics, like Philip Scharper, believe that "much of the acceptance by Protestants and Jews of other religious commitments is based less upon a full-bodied theology of toleration than upon a starveling philosophy of skepticism or a practical postulate of civic harmony." Other critics, more interested in pragmatic tests, have pointed to the resistance offered by prominent Protestants to John F. Kennedy's candidacy because of his Catholicism, and they have also emphasized the readiness of dominant Protestant denominations to suppress non-conformism wherever they have been in a position to enforce their will, both in the past and in the present—e.g., the laws against birth-control (which were originally put on the books of Massachusetts and Connecticut by Protestant pressure) and prohibition.

But for good historical reasons these doubts of the Protestant willingness to accept and promote religious pluralism are much less widespread than skepticism over the Catholic position, and anyone who wishes to argue that a pluralism on the American model is likely to triumph everywhere in the West is therefore obliged to take particular account of the Catholic position.

In speaking about Catholic attitudes, one must begin by acknowledging that a broad difference exists in the Catholic world (as indeed it does in the Protestant world) between what may, for want of a better term, be called the liberals—that is, those who either cherish the political and civic values of the Enlightenment or who at any rate see these values as not inimical to religious belief—and conservatives, who regard them as the expression of a war against religion. This

difference, which in recent history has taken the form of a conflict over approaches to the modern world among Catholics, has manifested itself in Protestantism as a struggle between the fundamentalists and the liberals. The conservative element of the Catholic world can very roughly be said to dominate in the Latin-Hispanic countries—at least it receives much of its support from that area—while the liberal element is strong, though by no means yet dominant, in the northern countries. (There are, of course, many outstanding exceptions to this schematic division, like Cardinal Lercaro of Bologna, in northern Italy.) This liberal element, according to a recent study by the (Protestant) World Council of Churches,* has been growing in numbers and importance within the Church and now contains among its numbers persons of prestige within the hierarchy itself—Cardinal Feltin in France and Cardinal Griffin in England, to name only two. The study goes on to say: "Roman Catholic literature representing this modern tendency has lately been so voluminous and of such quality that it would be an understatement to say that, for *one* book or article in favor of the traditional doctrine, *ten* have been published defending universal religious freedom as 'thesis'; and we should note that they have all been published with the *'nihil obstat'* of the Roman Catholic authorities." And according to Professor George H. Williams of the Harvard Divinity School, "The American experience of civil and religious liberty has penetrated to the interior of the [Roman Catholic] Church and may well bring about a comprehensive, authoritative restatement of the traditional Catholic thesis on the proper relationship between Church and State." It is by no means difficult to adduce evidence for Professor Williams's observation. There is the work of Father John Courtney Murray, who finds warrant in Catholic the-

* *Roman Catholicism and Religious Liberty*, by A. F. Carrillo de Albornoz.

ology itself (which is so often taken to be inherently incompatible with pluralism) for the principles on which pluralism is based. And many statements like the one following, made by Bishop Thomas K. Gorman of Dallas-Fort Worth, could also be cited: "We have reason to hope that the pluralistic ideal of our present society will one day triumph. Our only cause for fear is that the violent totalitarian movements of our day may triumph here and sweep all into a monolithic, undemocratic pattern, which may God forbid. We must all work together for the pluralistic way to peace, concord and justice."

IT WOULD seem, then, that the influence of the Latin-Hispanic element on Roman Catholicism is declining vis-à-vis mounting liberal pressures within the Church. Though the Latin-Hispanic peoples comprise more than a third of the total Catholic world population as against about a fifth in the pluralistic countries, the latter, as we have seen, are growing steadily in numbers and moreover live in the countries that count for most within the West. It is hardly too much to say, for instance, that the American Catholic community, with its forty million *voluntarily* affiliated members, is now, in terms of real commitment, the strongest and possibly even the largest Catholic community in the world.

All this means that we may in our time be witnessing a shift from Counter-Reformation Catholicism to what might be called "Ecumenical" Catholicism. And just as the Counter-Reformation was culturally laden with the influence of the Hispanic and Mediterranean peoples, so "Ecumenical" Catholicism is likely to be inspired by the civic and cultural outlook of the pluralistic peoples who already are furnishing much of its most active leadership.

At any rate, the division of the West into Catholic and Protestant nations is rapidly losing its old rigidity. Pluralism—in con-

trast to religious "co-existence" based upon regard for hegemony—leads to interpenetration, cooperation, and competition. As the traditionally Catholic nations and the traditionally Protestant ones change in their internal religious composition and simultaneously tend to become parts of a larger Western bloc, the two branches of Christianity tend increasingly to orient themselves to the bloc as a whole, each seeking to convert it to "its view of the good life." This is bound to sharpen their differences, both theological and ideological, but it is also bound to sharpen the desire for united action in many spheres. The one great danger in this otherwise encouraging situation is that the present trend may culminate in the development of a united Christendom held together only by opposition to Communism, and using its vast influence to inhibit rather than to further any possibility of working toward the creation of an authentic pluralism—religious and political—on a Western and finally on a world-wide scale. This would be unfortunate, for it would amount to a return by Christianity to its old, tragic partnership with secular power, the only difference being that under the conditions described above the secular power would be an international rather than a national political community.

But one may hope that this danger will be averted by a recognition within Christianity that, by its own example and by exhortation, it can help to foster the development of the only system of unity which in our day can hope to succeed—a system which brings peoples, nations, religious groups, and races together on the basis of full civic equality. This implies supporting a pluralism embracing not only the various Christian groups, but also Jews, Moslems, followers of other religions, and followers of none. And it implies supporting, in the political sphere, a similar system of diversity within unity such as has been proved viable by the historic experience of American society.

DEATH IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

IT IS OBVIOUS that the nuclear age has radically changed man's relations to nature and to his fellow men. It has enormously increased man's ability to use the forces of nature for his purposes and has thus concentrated unprecedented destructive powers in the hands of governments. That concentration of power has fundamentally altered the relations which have existed throughout history between government and people and among governments themselves. It has made popular revolution impossible, and it has made war an absurdity. Yet, less obvious and more important, the nuclear age has changed man's relations to himself. It has done so by giving death a new meaning.

Death is the great scandal in the experience of man; for death—as the destruction of the human person after a finite span of time—is the very negation of all man experiences as specifically human in his existence: the consciousness of himself and of his world, the remembrance of things past and the anticipation of things to come, a creativeness in thought and action which aspires to, and approximates, the eternal. Thus man has been compelled, for the sake of his existence as man, to bridge the gap between death and his specifically

human attributes by transcending death. He has done so in three different ways: by making himself, within narrow limits, the master of death; by denying the reality of death through the belief in the immortality of his person; by conquering the reality of death through the immortality of the world he leaves behind.

Man can make himself the master of death by putting an end to his biological existence whenever he wishes. While he cannot live as long as he wants to, he can stop living whenever he wants to. While he cannot choose life over death when his life has reached its biological limits, he can choose death over life regardless of these limits. He can commit suicide; or he can commit what Nietzsche has called “suicide with a good conscience” by seeking out death, especially at the hand of someone else. He is capable of sacrificial death. In his self-chosen death for a cause in particular, on the battlefield or elsewhere, man triumphs over death, however incompletely. He triumphs because he does not wait until his body is ready to die, but he offers his life to death when his chosen purpose demands it. Yet that triumph is incomplete because it cannot overcome the inevitability of death but only controls its coming.

Man also denies the reality of death by believing in the immortality of his person. This belief can take two different forms. It may take the form of the assumption that the finiteness of man's biological existence is but apparent and that his body will live on in another world. It can also take the form of the assumption that what is specifically human in man will survive the destruction of his body and that man's soul will live on forever, either separated from any body or

In this new bi-monthly department (which was inaugurated in our July number with a piece on the Laotian crisis entitled “Asia: The American Algeria”), HANS J. MORGENTHAU will discuss a wide variety of issues bearing on problems of foreign and domestic politics. Mr. Morgenthau is director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago and the author, among many other books, of *The Purpose of American Politics*, *Dilemmas of Politics*, and *The H-Bomb*.

reincarnated in someone else's. This belief in personal immortality, in defiance of the empirical evidence of the finiteness of man's biological existence, is of course peculiar to the religious realm. It presupposes the existence of a world which is not only inaccessible to the senses but also superior to the world of the senses in that what is truly human in man is there preserved forever.

It is a distinctive characteristic of our secular age that it has replaced the belief in the immortality of the human person with the attempt to assure the immortality of the world he leaves behind. Man can transcend the finiteness of his biological existence either in his consciousness or in objective reality by adding to that existence four different dimensions which are in one way or another independent of that finiteness. They are different dimensions of immortality. He can extend his consciousness into the past by remembering it. He can extend his consciousness into the future by anticipating it. As *homo faber*, he embeds his biological existence within technological and social artifacts which survive that existence. His imagination creates new worlds of religion, art, and reason that live after their creator.

BY THUS BESTOWING immortality upon the past, man assures himself of immortality to be granted by future generations who will remember him. As the past lives on in his historic recollection, so will he continue to live in the memory of his successors. The continuity of history gives the individual at least a chance to survive himself in the collective memory of mankind. Those who are eminent, or believe themselves to be so, aspire to posthumous fame which will enable them to live on, perhaps forever.

The ability to remember and the aspiration to be remembered call for deliberate action to assure that remembrance. The assurance of his life after death becomes one of man's main concerns here and now. Man on all levels of civilization is moved to create monuments which testify to his existence and will live after him. He founds a family and lives on in his sons, who bear his name as he bears his father's. He leaves an inheritance of visible things not to be consumed but to be preserved as tangible mementos of past generations. Over his grave

he causes a monument of stone to be erected whose durability, as it were, compensates for the impermanence of what lies beneath. Or he may even refuse to accept that impermanence altogether and have his body preserved in the likeness of life. At the very least, he will have pictures made of himself to perpetuate his physical likeness.

This concern with immortality in this world manifests itself on the highest level of consciousness in the preparation of man's fame. He lives in such a way as to make sure that his fame will survive him. All of us, from the peasant and handicraft man to the founders of churches, the architects of empires, the builders of cities, the tammers of the forces of nature, seek to leave behind the works of our wills and hands to testify to our existence. "*Roma eterna*," "the Reich of a thousand years" are but the most ambitious attempts to perpetuate man in his deeds. The tree that he has planted, the house that he has built, have been given a life likely to last longer than his own. At best, he as a person will live on in his works; at worst, he has the satisfaction of living on anonymously in what he has created.

It is, however, in the works of his imagination that man conquers the mortality of his body in the most specifically human way. The artists and poets, the philosophers and the writers, can point with different degrees of assurance to their work and say with Horace: "I have finished a monument more lasting than bronze and loftier than the Pyramids' royal pile, one that no wasting rain, no furious north wind can destroy, or the countless chain of years and the ages' flight. I shall not altogether die. . . ." In the works of his mind it is not just his physical existence, the bare fact that he once lived, that is remembered. Rather, what is remembered is the creative quality that sets him apart from all other creatures, that is peculiar to him as a man. What is remembered is not only the specifically human quality, but also and most importantly the quality in which he lives on as a unique individual, the like of whom has never existed before or since. In the works of his mind, man, the creator, survives.

Yet why are those works a "monument more lasting than bronze," and why can their creator be confident that "on and on shall I grow, ever fresh with the glory of

after time"? Because the man endowed with a creative mind knows himself to be a member in an unbroken chain emerging from the past and reaching into the future, which is made of the same stuff his mind is made of and, hence, is capable of participating in, and perpetuating, his mind's creation. He may be mortal, but humanity is not, and so he will be immortal in his works. This is the triumphant message of Horace.

Our life, then, receives one of its meanings from the meaning we give to death. What we make of life is shaped by what we make of death; for we live in the presence of the inevitability of death and we dedicate our lives to the proof of the proposition that death is not what it seems to be: the irrevocable end of our existence. We search for immortality, and the kind of immortality we seek determines the kind of life we lead.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of the possibility of nuclear death is that it radically affects the meaning of death, of immortality, of life itself. It affects that meaning by destroying most of it. Nuclear destruction is mass destruction, both of persons and of things. It signifies the simultaneous destruction of tens of millions of people, of whole families, generations, and societies, of all the things that they have inherited and created. It signifies the total destruction of whole societies by killing their members, destroying their visible achievements, and therefore reducing the survivors to barbarism. Thus nuclear destruction destroys the meaning of death by depriving it of its individuality. It destroys the meaning of immortality by making both society and history impossible. It destroys the meaning of life by throwing life back upon itself.

Sacrificial death has meaning only as the outgrowth of an individual decision which chooses death over life. The hero who risks his life or dies for a cause is bound to be one man, an identifiable individual. There is meaning in Leonidas falling at Thermopylae, in Socrates drinking the cup of hemlock, in Jesus nailed to the cross. There can be no meaning in the slaughter of the innocent, the murder of six million Jews, the prospective nuclear destruction of, say, fifty million Americans and an equal number of Russians. There is, then, a radical difference in meaning

between a man risking death by an act of will and fifty million people simultaneously reduced—by somebody switching a key thousands of miles away—to radioactive ashes, indistinguishable from the ashes of their houses, books, and animals. Horace could say, thinking of the individual soldier ready to die, "It is sweet and honorable to die for one's country." Yet Wilfred Owen, describing the effects of a gas attack in the First World War, could call Horace's famous phrase "The old Lie," and beholding a victim of modern mass destruction, could only bewail the futility of such a death and ask in despair, "Was it for this the clay grew tall? O what made fatuous sunbeams toil to break earth's sleep at all?" The death of the Horatian soldier is the assertion of man's freedom from biological necessity, a limited triumph over death. The death of Owen's soldier and of his prospective successors in the nuclear age is the negation not only of man's freedom but of his life's meaning as well.

Man gives his life and death meaning by his ability to make himself and his works remembered after his death. Patroclus dies to be avenged by Achilles. Hector dies to be mourned by Priam. Yet if Patroclus, Hector, and all those who could remember them were killed simultaneously, what would become of the meaning of Patroclus's and Hector's death? Their lives and deaths would lose their meaning. They would die, not like men but like beasts, killed in the mass, and what would be remembered would be the quantity of the killed—six million, twenty million, fifty million—not the quality of one man's death as over against another's.

Of their deeds, nothing would remain but the faint hope of remembrance in distant places. The very concept of fame would disappear, and the historians, the professional immortalizers, would have nothing to report. What had been preserved and created through the mind, will, and hands of man would be dissolved like man himself. Civilization itself would perish. Perhaps in some faraway place some evidence would be preserved of the perished civilization and of the men who created it. Nothing more than that would be left of the immortality man had once been able to achieve through the persistence of his fame and the permanence of his works.

And what would become of life itself? If our age had not replaced the belief in the immortality of the individual person with the immortality of humanity and its civilization, we could take the prospect of nuclear death in our stride. We could even afford to look forward to the day of the great slaughter as a day on which the preparatory and vain life on this earth would come to an end for most of us and the true, eternal life in another world begin. Yet a secular age, which has lost faith in individual immortality in another world and is aware of the impending doom of the world through which it tries to perpetuate itself here and now, is left without a remedy. Once it has become aware of its condition, it must despair. It is the saving grace of our age that it has not yet become aware of its condition.

We think and act as though the possibility of nuclear death had no bearing upon the meaning of life and death. In spite of what some of us know in our reason, we continue to think and act as though the possibility of nuclear death portended only a quantitative extension of the mass destruction of the past and not a qualitative transformation of the meaning of our existence. Thus we talk about defending the freedom of West Berlin as we used to talk about defending the freedom of the American colonies. Thus we talk about defending Western civilization against Communism as the ancient Greeks

used to talk about defending their civilization against the Persians. Thus we propose to die with honor rather than to live in shame.

Yet the possibility of nuclear death, by destroying the meaning of life and death, has reduced to absurd clichés the noble words of yesterday. To defend freedom and civilization is absurd when to defend them amounts to destroying them. To die with honor is absurd if nobody is left to honor the dead. The very conceptions of honor and shame require a society that knows what honor and shame mean.

IT IS THIS contrast between our consciousness and the objective conditions in which we live, the backwardness of our consciousness in view of the possibility of nuclear death, that threatens us with the actuality of nuclear death. It would indeed be the height of thoughtless optimism to assume that something so absurd as a nuclear war cannot happen because it is so absurd. An age whose objective conditions of existence have been radically transformed by the possibility of nuclear death evades the need for a radical transformation of its thought and action by thinking and acting as though nothing of radical import had happened. This refusal to adapt thought and action to radically new conditions has spelled the doom of men and civilizations before. It is likely to do so again.

FERTILITY, SOCIAL ACTION, SOCIALISM

MILTON HIMMELFARB

Population Fizzle

In the latest volume of the *American Jewish Year Book* Erich Rosenthal shows that American Jews have stood aside from the baby boom. In 1957, when the average American married or formerly-married woman of childbearing age (fifteen to forty-four) had 2.2+ children, the Catholic rate was 2.3-; the Protestant, 2.2+; and the Jewish, 1.75-. With the average woman forty-five and over having had 2.8- children, the Catholic rate was 3+; the Protestant, 2.75+; and the Jewish, 2.2+. Jewish fertility, current and completed, is therefore about 20 per cent less than the Protestant and about 25 per cent less than the Catholic.

Professor Rosenthal explains that Jews rank high in everything that makes for low birth rates: living in or near the largest cities, white-collar occupation of the husband, education of the wife, income, and rapid social and economic advance. Since Jews are similar to Presbyterians in most of these things, the two birth rates are also similar. The completed fertility of the Presbyterians is one per cent less than the Jews', and the current fertility of the Jews is 11 per cent less than the Presbyterians'. (The Presbyterians have the lowest rate of any Protestant denomination for which we have data.)

Rosenthal dismisses the old idea that there is a specifically Jewish factor at work in lowering the Jewish rate, or more generally a minority factor—discrimination heightening the need for a good education for the children, and a good education being possible only when there are few of them. It is true that the Princeton Fertility Study, trying to account for what a friend of mine calls the contraceptive virtuosity of American Jews, points to the "perceived incom-

patibility between sending children to college and having large families"; but since Presbyterians apparently perceive the incompatibility too, the Jewish case can be explained without bringing in anti-Semitism.

(I am not sure how seriously we ought to take those Jews' stated perception of an incompatibility between the number and the education of children. When people justify their behavior, they may be telling the real truth or they may be trying to fool the pollsters, or themselves. I do not know about the Presbyterians, but with the middle-class Jews of America something else is probably there, too. Economizing on luxuries would yield enough to send more children to college, but who wants to economize? Big cars and expensive vacations are fun. Besides, money is not the only cost in raising a third or fourth child. There is also the physical and emotional cost. A generation or two ago the Jews of the Western world—this is not an only-in-America matter—decided to enjoy themselves. For many Jewish women, especially, modernity has meant a kind of consumer feminism, opposed alike to the Victorians' producer feminism and to the *yiddishe mamme's* self-sacrifice ideology.)

According to Donald J. Bogue's standard *Population of the United States* (1959), American Jews are "scarcely reproducing themselves." Rosenthal cites this as well as a Census Bureau finding for 1957 that "on the basis of American fertility and mortality levels, replacement of the white population required 2,100 live births per 1,000 women, single as well as married," and he observes that "the fertility rate of 1,749 per 1,000 ever-married Jewish women of childbearing age is considerably lower." Still, he refuses to say that American Jewry will not reproduce itself. He has learned caution from the

failure of the low American forecasts of the 1930's, and he thinks that Jews have reached a point where they may start having more children. Firstly, they are still moving to the suburbs, and it is easier to bring up children in the suburban one-family house than in the city apartment house. Secondly, Americans born into comfortable circumstances have more children than those who had to work to get there. Finally, although high incomes go with few children, at the highest levels of income American families tend to grow larger again.

Sermons continue to be preached from the academy against our immoral recklessness in overcrowding the planet by engendering large families. (The academy does not like early marriages either. It is all so different from when I was in college, and everyone was worried about late marriages and small families in the educated middle class.) On the absurd assumption that people think about demographic policy when they determine how many children they will have, where does a Jew's obligation lie? Should he absent him from paternity awhile, for the good of the human race? Or should he be of good courage, and play the man for his people?

Religious Action

The (Reform) Union of American Hebrew Congregations recently came into enough money to move its Commission on Social Action to a Center for Religious Action in Washington in the fall of 1961. A few of the Union's more than 600 congregations are dissatisfied both with the move and with the Commission itself.

Essentially, the Commission is the institutional embodiment of American Reform Judaism's understanding of its duty to help establish the Kingdom of God in all that is between man and man. Seen in the light of American religious history, that mission is related to the Social Gospel of liberal Protestantism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In Reform Judaism, social action was in its most flourishing state in the early 1930's, and in the past few years has again come to the fore.

The protesters are the Washington Hebrew Congregation and Temple Emanu-El in New York, supported by a Chicago near-equivalent of Emanu-El and two Southern

congregations. They argue that the Commission's statements on controversial matters can give the wrong and dangerous impression that the Jews of America, or at least Reform Jews, are something like a political bloc; that the Union should not represent itself as speaking for all its people, since many disagree with its positions; and that in any event, the members of Reform congregations look to their religious teachers for guidance and instruction on the moral implications of social issues, rather than for specific solutions to particular social problems.

The Union answers, and nearly all its constituents seem to agree, that the Washington headquarters will change nothing in principle in the long-established program of the Commission on Social Action; that Christian bodies have for many years done the same thing without creating the impression that their members are a bloc, and without injury to those who disagree; and that prophetic Judaism must reject the prudential advice of the old deacon to the young ordinand: "You must magnify, you must glorify, but you must never, never specify." (Orthodox rabbis like the story about the president of a congregation who advised his rabbi not to preach about the Sabbath, forbidden foods, and prayer: "Just talk about Judaism," he said. In the Reform version the rabbi is warned off health insurance and racial discrimination.)

The opposition to a Washington headquarters for the Commission on Social Action is not a cloak for conservative dislike of the Commission's liberalism. (The wives of the officers and trustees of the protesting congregations have traditionally been leaders of the equally liberal and articulate National Council of Jewish Women.) Nevertheless, it is unlikely that questions would now be raised about the Commission if it were not for the new headquarters. The Southern congregations are afraid that from Washington the Commission's pronouncements on Negro rights will attract more attention than from New York; the Washington congregation, which has thought of itself as being a kind of national institution, probably looks upon the Commission in its city, the capital, as a competitor; and Emanu-El, New York's "cathedral synagogue," which has never been fervid for the

Union since the days when David Einhorn battled Isaac Mayer Wise, does not want a more prominent Union and Commission.

In a number of congregations there is also some feeling about the permanent president of the Union. He is a rabbi, in a post that seems to call for a layman, and most of his department heads are rabbis. (Reform Judaism, whose name suggests its kinship to the Protestant Reformation, can be rather more clerical than "catholic" Orthodoxy.) Moreover, in Jewish ideology and sociology their president represents something that the birthright Reformers dislike. That in the dispute over the Commission on Social Action, it is he who stands for their tradition of Reform does not mollify them at all.

The Washington congregation has issued a closely-reasoned argument against the Commission's taking a stand on specific issues, which, while it can hardly win, has merit. Take the minimum wage. The Washington people want rabbis to say that Judaism requires employers to pay their workers a living wage, not that Congress should establish the minimum at \$1.25 an hour. Why \$1.25? Why not \$1? Or \$3? Or \$5? Or \$7? Especially in that congregation there must be men with a broad and sophisticated experience in government, or public affairs generally, who realize how closely technical questions—in this instance, questions of economic analysis—are knitted together with questions of right and wrong, and how unhelpful it is to approach such problems with moralistic good will and little else. (I have heard of an authority on international affairs, in another city, whose rabbi likes to preach on disarmament.) The lawyers, economists, and authorities on international affairs are not being hypocritical or reactionary when they say that they want their rabbis to tell them about Judaism.

The argument would be irresistible if we could forget that Amos and Jeremiah may also have been told by the experts not to talk about economics and international affairs, of which they were ignorant, but about Judaism.

In the old days, when rabbis were really rabbis, one of them told a plaintiff he was right. Then, having heard the defendant, he told him *he* was right. When the rabbi's wife objected that both could not be right, he told her she was right.

Universalist Elite, Parochial Mass

The *Publication of the American Jewish Historical Society* for March had a first-rate paper by Arthur Gorenstein on the Socialist campaigns for Congressman in the Lower East Side of New York fifty years ago. (In the same number a close study by Rabbi Bertram W. Korn of the Jews and slavery in the Old South concludes that the "history of slavery would not have differed . . . if no single Jew had been resident in the South. . . . But whether so many Jews would have achieved so high a level of . . . status and recognition, without the . . . slave, is indeed dubious.")

Gorenstein explains why Morris Hillquit, a Russian Jew and a leading figure in American and even international socialism, was not elected to Congress in 1906 and 1908, while Meyer London, the later Socialist nominee, a man without much prestige beyond the East Side, was elected three times between 1914 and 1920. As a national figure, Hillquit could not accommodate himself to the demands of the East Side. For many Socialists, Hillquit lost—honorably—because the East Side refused to prefer the general goals of the American Socialist party to its own special interests. Those Socialists felt better about his defeat than about London's victory; Louis Boudin, writing in their newspaper, was unhappy about the "racial and subracial prejudices of voters. . . . The Russian Jews were appealed to because Comrade London was also a Russian Jew."

The Socialist party was against immigration, agreeing with the American Federation of Labor that the bosses were using immigrants to lower wages and fight the unions. For their part, the Jews of the East Side understood only that to stop immigration would mean to close the gate of the Russian prison on their families. Hillquit, though in his campaigns he tried to make distinctions, was identified with the Socialists' anti-immigration plank, while London was able to dissociate himself from that plank because his record on the East Side made it impossible for his enemies to persuade the people that he lacked sympathy with them.

Besides immigration, the East Siders were worried about their reputation and their security. General Bingham, the police commissioner of New York, had said that half the criminals in the city were Russian Jews,

and Julia Richman, a school superintendent on the East Side for whom a high school was later named, wanted to deport immigrants who violated the pushcart ordinance. In Hillquit's speeches the East Side was painted as a repulsive example of the suffering and the social disorganization caused by capitalism. For the East Siders, that made him the Socialist Bingham. They also remembered, if only because his opponents kept reminding them, that he had changed his name (from Hilkowitz) and that his opposition to nationalist prejudice was so pure that he had refused to take part in their giant parade of protest against the Russian pogroms in 1905, organized by Judah Magnes. The voters agreed with the anti-Hillquit press that if he were elected, the Jews of the United States, and particularly those of the East Side, would have no representative or protector in Congress.

The man who defeated Hillquit was Henry M. Goldfogle, a Tammany Congressman. Goldfogle denounced Russian pogroms and Russian discrimination against Jewish holders of American passports. More generally, he let the East Siders see that they had a representative and defender.

They knew what they were doing when they chose Goldfogle over Hillquit and Tammany over Hillquit's self-righteous, abstract, insensitive socialism. Tammany was corrupt, but it respected people's needs. (There is a remarkable similarity here between the Socialists and the Progressive Republicans of Richard Hofstadter's *Age of Reform*.) The Socialists were against immigration because organized labor was against it, while their rhetoric was that they were struggling for a world in which the disappearance of capitalism would make mass migration unnecessary. When in the 1920's the old free immigration was outlawed, that was mostly a victory for the Ku Klux Klan spirit abroad in the land (not least in the Brahmin class), but labor

and the Socialists had done their part. The Jews, fighting to keep immigration going because their own families needed it, were also fighting for a decent and generous principle. More than fifty years later, the Socialists remain less attractive than the Tammany voters they called parochial and given to nationalist prejudice.

After finishing Gorenstein's paper, I picked up the *New Leader* for July 3-10 and read "Eichmann and Jewish Identity," by my friend Paul Jacobs. It is not one of the better things he has written, but it has its value. Jacobs is a younger member of that generation of radicals whom so many participants in the COMMENTARY symposium in April looked back to with respect and affection. His article registers, among other things, the discomfort aroused in him by his five-week attendance at Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem and the questions it made him ask himself.

Why did the radicals disregard or play down Nazism's persecution and murder of Jews? Why was it so important for them to insist that Nazism was merely capitalism *in extremis*? (In 1940 a splinter from a Trotskyite splinter produced a pamphlet which demonstrated, marxicologically, that the Battle of Britain, then being waged over burning London, was a put-up job by the British and German branches of world capitalism to fool the proletariat.)

Ordinary Jews were anti-Nazi because they understood that Hitler was out to murder Jews, and they were actively for his defeat because they understood that such a man and such a system must be bad for everybody. Then and later, they did what they could for the Nazis' victims.

They were the children of the East Side Tammany voters, and the radical intellectuals were the children of the Hillquit Socialists. Again, the parochials' self-interest and the awareness it bred had more worth and truth than the pretensions of the elite.

I TOYNBEE'S EPISTLE TO THE JEWS

Jacob B. Agus

JACOB B. AGUS is rabbi of Beth El, a Conservative congregation in Baltimore. Ordained by the Rabbinical School of Yeshiva University, he also holds a doctorate from Harvard in the philosophy of religion, and has written widely on Jewish philosophy and history. Rabbi Agus began corresponding some years ago with Toynbee on the view of Judaism presented in *A Study of History*, and this correspondence forms the basis for two chapters of Toynbee's new book, *Reconsiderations* (Oxford University Press, 740 pp. \$10.00). In accepting our invitation to comment on the significance of Toynbee's new analysis of Judaism, Rabbi Agus wrote: "I wish to state that to absorb the lessons of Toynbee's analysis is by no means tantamount to an acceptance of all his proposals." A detailed exposition of his own views on the questions raised in the present article will appear in his forthcoming book, *The Meaning of Jewish History*.

SOME TIME AGO it became known that Professor Arnold Toynbee was at work on a kind of postscript volume to his *A Study of History*, in which he was attempting to rethink some of his earlier theories and judgments in the light of the criticisms advanced against them. Jews, of course, had their own special interest in the appearance of this volume, for Toynbee's views of Judaism as expressed in his mammoth history aroused in the Jewish community the most violent response to an intellectual controversy within memory. Now, there is something remarkable in a scholar of Professor Toynbee's eminence submitting his work of so many years to a public reappraisal of this kind, and less than two decades after it began to appear. *Reconsiderations* is a suitably remarkable document. In it, while

clearly reaffirming his general position, Toynbee carefully summarizes and considers all the attacks made upon him, confesses his ignorance of certain areas of experience, and describes the course of his intellectual growth in order that proper allowance be made for his personal bias.

What, then, is the substance of his revision concerning the nature and role of Judaism? Three aspects of his views on this subject brought down on his head the understandable fury of the Jewish community. First, there was his characterization of the Jewish people as a "fossil of Syriac civilization." Second, there were his frequent references to "Judaic zealotry" and his attributing to the inheritance from Judaism the fanatical zeal with which the Christian church suppressed the remnants of classical philosophy and attempted to destroy all dissenters. (Medieval anti-Semitism thus simply became a Christian application of an originally Jewish attitude.) And third, there was his bitter condemnation of the Zionist movement and the State of Israel as examples of the vicious disease of nationalism, bringing Jews to commit atrocities upon Arabs in some sense morally equivalent to the atrocities committed upon them.

Contemporary Jews, undergoing as a group the agony of survival after the European holocaust, were neither in the mood nor in the position to suffer these charges coolly. To be the fossil of an ancient regional civilization, "fulfilled" in the advent of Christianity, meant not only to lose one's distinctiveness, but with it, the only reason for a national existence that had cost untold lives, suffering, and struggle. And to be, as it were, held responsible for those very strains in Western civilization that have time and again erupted into persecution of their fathers and brothers, impelled many Jewish writers to regard Toynbee as an outright, if highly sophisticated, anti-Semite. Perhaps these outbursts of anguish contributed as much as some well-reasoned critiques to the decision on the part of Toynbee to undertake a basic revaluation

of his views; in any case, in addition to revising and refining these views, he has become far more personally involved, more ardent, in their espousal. His enthusiasm is now more fervent and his condemnation more bitter. He now thinks of the Jewish religion stripped of nonessentials as the hope of the world, while he is convinced that Jewish nationalism is almost certain to cause a resurgence of anti-Semitism.

In a lecture to the British section of the World Jewish Congress delivered in 1959 and entitled "Is There a Jewish Future in the Diaspora?" Toynbee concluded by saying: ". . . the future of Judaism is to convert the world. It is an extraordinary thing that twice in history the Jews have allowed outsiders to run away with their religion, and spread it over the world. . . . Does not the real future of the Jews and Judaism lie in spreading Judaism, in its authentic form, over the whole world?"

In this statement lies the main result of Toynbee's reconsideration of Judaism.

IT WILL NO DOUBT be thought by many people that Toynbee's transformation of Judaism from an obsolete remnant of a dead civilization into a "higher religion" whose mission is "to convert the world" is only a concession to the criticism leveled against him, but such is not the case. It represents rather the organic evolution of his major insight into Judaism, stripped bare of the impositions on his work of inherited intellectual traditions. The scattered scornful references to Judaism in his earlier volumes are the combined echoes of other historians, of the great philosophers of the history of Western Europe—of Voltaire, Gibbon, the German Romantics. The Jews have always fared badly in the writing of Western history. Fundamentalist Christian scholars asserted that the vital essence of Judaism had been fulfilled in Christianity, thus leaving Jewry an empty shell. Rationalist historians like Voltaire and Gibbon, on the other hand, regarded the Christian religion as a blight on civilization and condemned the Jews for foisting it upon the Western world. The German Romantics, rebelling against both medieval Christianity and Anglo-French rationalism, and elaborating an "organismic" theory of national

existence, found in the Jewish refusal to conform to their notion of a natural life-cycle for peoples something at the least degenerate, and at the most Satanic. And in the eyes of socialists—the young Marx as well as several French schools of socialist thought—the Jewish spirit was embodied in the scheming, exploitative enterprise of the bourgeoisie.

Certainly, one can find in Toynbee's writings the influence of most, if not all, the philosophers of history who preceded him: the idea that Judaism had encountered and missed its greatest opportunity in the person of Jesus is, of course, a Fundamentalist Christian one; the concept of "Judaic zealotry" derives from Gibbon. With the German Romantics (and particularly with Spengler, whose *Weltanschauung* Toynbee has always consciously opposed) his relations are more complicated, for he regards them as the intellectual progenitors of Nazism. As he himself tells us in *Reconsiderations*, his approach was worked out partly under the influence of, and partly in reaction against, Spengler.

Toynbee's own viewpoint is Biblical, which is to say prophetic. His fundamental assumption is that civilization arises out of the disturbance of the status quo: "In the Old Testament, challenge and response is indeed the master motif; and it is this motif, running through it all, that gives the Old Testament the unity it has." The capacity of a society to respond creatively to a new challenge derives from the power of what he calls "etherialization"—lifting the problem from the physical and social realm to the psychological and ethical one. It amounts to "the transfer of the field of action from the outer to the inner world, and the displacement of quantitative criteria of success by qualitative criteria."

The rhythm of progress is taken up, then, according to Toynbee, so long as the *mimesis* of the people is directed to the "creative minority" of the present rather than being fixed upon the heroes of the past. During the Biblical period, the prophets were indeed the "creative minority" of the Jewish people. They reinterpreted and transformed the faith and life-patterns of the Israelites, articulating the implications of ethical monotheism, and cautioning the people against the sin of self-glorifica-

tion—what Toynbee has called “the idolization of the ephemeral self.”

When he began his massive survey of civilizations, Toynbee assumed along with Gibbon that a “higher religion” was the “chrysalis” or incubating stage between civilizations, as medieval Christianity was the mediating stage between classical and Western civilizations. The goal of history, however, became for him one of attaining “progress toward sainthood.” Reliance on power, physical and political, he regards as the sign of decay. A civilization begins to decline when its “creative” minority transforms itself into a “dominant” one. The “grandeur” that was Rome he treats as merely an appendage of the Hellenic world. On this view, Judaism, representing the transformation of an ethnic civilization into a religious culture, points the way to the future course of mankind.

Thus the future of mankind depends on the inhibition of the nationalist mentality. Among other things, the virulent anti-Semitism of the last century and a half in Europe is essentially due to the growth of nationalism. Hence Toynbee's bitter condemnation of the Zionist movement and of its creation, the State of Israel—in his view, the reaction “*alla Franca*” of the Jews to anti-Semitism, which only furthers the evil impetus of ethnicism.

SENSITIVE JEWS, confronting as they must all the millennia of a peculiar ethnic experience, have an almost aching need to see the Jewish people in the perspective of world history. Perhaps that is the reason they fastened so intently onto Toynbee's work. In any case, it explains why, while finding his analysis of pre-Christian Jewish history on the whole satisfactory, they were so outraged by his use of the term “fossil” to characterize Diaspora Judaism. Though he had, in the later volumes of *A Study of History*, found the communal patterns evolved by Jews for maintaining their identity in dispersion to be a model for civilized nations in our own post-nationalistic era, he had failed to connect those patterns with any underlying *purpose* for Jewish survival. In this present volume he has come to take account of a continuing prophetic impetus in Jewish life, through the Middle Ages and into the

modern world. He finds now that by challenging the claim of the regnant faith, whether in Christian or Moslem lands, to exclusive validity, Judaism has served as a focal point for liberalism. Jews have been ubiquitous “protestants” in European history, upsetting the complacency of Christian dogmatists.

Though he sees the future course of history as an advance from nationalism to supra-national humanism—the Enlightenment, contrary to Zionist ideology, was not a failure but simply an as-yet-uncompleted process—the shift will not take place without occasional dangerous intensifications of nationalist feeling. With these intensifications we may expect new outbursts of anti-Semitism, for anti-Semitism is the edge of nationalism turned inward, directed against “the stranger within the gate.”

Hence Toynbee's call for Jews to bring masses of converts to “the religion of Deutero-Isaiah”; hence, too, his repeatedly expressed fear that the State of Israel, particularly in its present precarious position, will bring about a complete substitution of Jewish nationalism for Jewish religious purpose, and will thereby reverse the trend toward integrating the Jews into Western society set off by the Emancipation. He believes that the physical interests of Anglo-American Jewry call for a maximum of concentration upon the religious content of Judaism and a reduction of its nationalistic entanglements to the vanishing point.

Toynbee is an advocate of “assimilation”—but not the usual type: “. . . there are two ways in which a community's distinctive national identity may disappear: the Israelite way and the Roman. The Ten Tribes lost their identity through being assimilated by peoples into whose countries they had been deported; the Romans gave up theirs by incorporating in their community the peoples whose countries they had united with their own. The two ways are antithetical in several senses. The Ten Tribes' way is passive, involuntary and inglorious, and it is natural that the Jews should be on their guard against meeting the fate of their lost kinsmen. On the other hand, the Roman way is active, deliberate and noble, and the renunciation of communal identity in its national form does not

involve the loss of communal identity itself, when 'an ancient civilization has been transmuted into a universal religion!'"

This plea for Diaspora Jewry to resume the task of converting the world to "the religion of Deutero-Isaiah" is not as radical as it may seem to many people. A similar notion informs the classic philosophy of Reform Judaism as expressed both by Abraham Geiger in Germany and Kaufman Kohler in America when they speak of the Jewish "mission" to fulfill the vision of the prophets. What is it then—now that the dust of passion and resentment stirred up among Jews by Toynbee's work is happily beginning to settle—that the Jewish community has to learn from this volume and its author? Seeing oneself in the perspective of world history entails, particularly for Jews, a good deal more than finding an occasion for self-gratulation on the crucial role one has played in it. Above all, it entails the obligation to understand one's involvement in the general condition. Such an obligation is especially salutary for Jews, who tend, because their history has been unparalleled, to believe that they have been permanently exempted from the laws of history. For being reminded of the nemesis that pursues a people when it regards itself as special, unique, or "set apart," they may be grateful to Toynbee. And they may also be grateful for being reminded that within Judaism, prophecy is the most fruitful, the most enduring tradition. A people is indeed "fossilized" when for the sake of its ethnic character or religious ritual it shuts off the source of its creative vitality—which, for the Jewish people, has always been the spirit of prophecy.

Finally, Toynbee cautions us, it will only be at great peril to themselves and to the world that Jews ignore the forces of history as they act on the relation between the Diaspora and Israel. For these forces are inevitably pulling the two communities farther apart—Diaspora Jewry into greater and greater integration with the surrounding culture, and Israel into the Middle Eastern world. For Israel in particular it would be fatal to resist this trend of events. As Ernst Simon stated in an article in *Ha'aretz* [March 23, 1961]: "Before the geo-political region to which our state belongs there is set only one choice: whether to reach a

settlement of peace and partnership on the basis of bi-nationalism (or multi-nationalism) or whether to continue in a state of perpetual war, cold or hot, the results of which are by no means certain."

Historic currents can, of course, be resisted. Israel *can* resist incorporation in the Middle East and cling to the vision of itself as the future home of all or nearly all the Jews. The Jews of America *can* tighten their ranks and form a "closed" even if progressively shrinking society centering around Israel. But then, Israel will not find peace, and the Jews of the Diaspora will court the frustration of perpetual isolation. Such a course might lead, after centuries upon centuries of meaningful survival, to the disaster of inanition—and it is this lesson above all that one carries away from a consideration of Toynbee's new epistle to the Jews.

* * *

II THE N. Y. DAILY NEWS

Murray Kempton

THE NEW YORK *Daily News*, shadow though it be, is for some of us the closest available instrument for an immediate reflection of the real life of our society. But to judge by John Chapman's recently published history*—a piece of goods cheesy enough to be taken for a desperate *Daily Mirror* rewrite of a first-edition story in the *News*—the paper must have an uncommonly and unfairly low self-estimate and be sustained not by institutional pride but by the individual pride of anonymous artisans. In America, insurance companies commission histories of themselves as bearers of culture and social progress. Now, under the signature of its drama critic and dean of its school of the humanities, the *Daily News* has given us the history of a newspaper as counting house. The result is a book which in style, movement, and indifference to the subject could hardly pass the *News's* own copy desk, whose standards for entertainment are the highest in journalism.

* *Tell It to Sweeney—An Informal History of the New York Daily News* (Doubleday, 288 pp., \$4.95).

The affection many of us have for the *News* may once have been conceived to shock and defy; by now it has become a commonplace. Jack Kerouac—presumably referring to the *News*'s habit of allotting its page 4 to those domestic disasters which end bloodlessly but nonetheless squalidly in the courts—said on television a few years ago that the *News* was his favorite newspaper because it was like Dostoevsky. In the hyperbolic style typical of the *News* cult, one might also say that it is like *Madame Bovary* (which, Mary McCarthy remarked not long ago, is the key novel about the American woman). The *News* thus has as one function the annual incarnation of 150 Emma Bovarys and 150 Father Karamazovs. This is a proper compliment to the paper's position in our national chronicle, but also a description of its limits. For there are, after all, more rewarding artistic experiences than to read *Madame Bovary* three times a week; Emma is a classic figure but as dull in repetition as Roman sculpture. And even *The Brothers Karamazov* would be insupportable in steady doses if it were about no more than the way a brute treated his wives.

Even so, as social chronicle, this sort of thing is at least as necessary as the self-serving declarations of public men which the *Times* prints every day as historical documents. There is a certain merit, to be sure, in the *Times*'s rule of printing only what it conceives as fit to print (although one rather wishes that fewer outright lies fell within that compass). Still, the rule has the virtue of declaring the inviolability, if not of truth, at least of the private world. The *Times* protects privacy while the *News* invades it. There is a commendable delicacy in the *Times*'s attitude, but it does involve a sacrifice of art—since the difference between the private and the public world is the difference between the novel and the memoir of a statesman. A certain advantage of impulse, if not of manners, therefore remains with the *News*. The *Times* attempts to describe the public world unfortunately too often in the language the public world uses to protect itself. The *News* violates the private world. It is thus local where the *Times* is global; its goal is entertainment where the *Times*'s goal is information. The *News*, being intimate and local, suffers from

cynicism where the *Times*, being impersonal and cosmic, suffers from innocence. The *Times* reveres institutions because they are institutions; the *News* distrusts them for no better reason. The *Times* is informed by a bias that American society is operated by persons whose intentions, being good, are generally productive of good consequences. To the *News* no human intentions are good; society seems to it to be operated by various conspiracies of self-interest.

My personal conception is that journalism, in its most bearable form, is the composition of inadequate but not consciously dishonest novels about living men. By these standards, the *News*'s sights are hardly lower than those of the *Times* and, for me at least, indisputably closer to reality.

A VOTARY ONCE ASKED Ignazio Silone why he never tried a novel about his experience as a political refugee in Zurich in the 30's. Silone answered that no one can write a novel about something which happened to him after he was twelve years old. The *Times* demands just that of its foreign correspondents, and they are therefore to be excused that so much of what they tell us is mere paper. *News* reporters do not usually leave home; they do as badly as the rest of us when they do. The *News*, thanks to some guardian angel, does not often send them on assignments requiring the collection of paper as a substitute for reality. (There is one lamentable exception: the *News* has a tendency to disinter "long-suppressed historical documents" indicating treason in high places; in this case, presumably, the itch for scandal outweighs its usually commendable caution about the real weight of paper.) In general, the *News* does not cherish the young reporter who is waiting for a Nieman Fellowship. It anchors him to a neighborhood.

The advantage of anchoring a man to one place—and that place familiar to the reader—is seen nowhere better than in the example of Dick Young, a *News* sportswriter who concentrates most fruitfully on baseball. Young is a man confined to a game for boys, but, in this particular confinement, a man undergoes a rather rigid test, since baseball has a historical continuity which politics can never have; Max Carey and Nelson Fox being brothers where John F. Kennedy and Warren G. Harding are mere

strangers. So sports can be comprehended. Yet Dick Young is the only sportswriter currently functioning who assumes that his readers live in the world he covers and are therefore capable of comprehending its reality. He is, for that reason, our last unromantic sportswriter. When he writes about Walter O'Malley, proprietor of the Los Angeles Dodgers, he is describing the history of American capitalism, a long slide from the ideal of craft to the goal of distribution. Red Smith of the *Herald Tribune* is delightful, but next to Young he has as much relation to the reality of the industry he is assigned to report as the works of William Alexander Percy have to the reality of Mississippi.

On those rare occasions when a *News* reporter is sent afield, it is to places to which he is capable of interior response. In 1954, James Desmond went to Mississippi to cover the matter of Emmett Till, a thirteen-year-old Chicago Negro who had been murdered for whistling at a white woman. The Till case had the heightened agony which always gives every visitor to Mississippi the feeling that Mr. Faulkner writes from old newspaper clips. Desmond brought incredible passion to the case, and though his work on it remains generally forgotten—having not been generally noticed—it is among the highest reaches of what passed for journalism in the 50's. Since the Till case, the *News*, having found nothing else so simple as the murder of a child, has been cursory in its attention to the South. In this neglect, it has at least preserved its batting average.

This sense that some of its readers still live in a world that can be comprehended may be the root of the *News's* peculiar underground code of integrity. His headline and his first few paragraphs may have to be fantasy, but the *News* writer seems unable to stop his typewriter without intruding one paragraph of reality. The paragraph is usually the third from the bottom.

Most summers in New York an Irish boy boy is killed by a Puerto Rican. The *News* headline of custom describes the victim as a choirboy; the story begins by citing his father's report that he was a model of decorum, telling his beads on 93rd Street west of Amsterdam at three o'clock in the morning. The *News* sustains this ritual right down

to the penultimate stages. Then, quite without warning, there will be a paragraph from an anonymous source identifying the victim as a member of an Irish gang which had been beating up every Puerto Rican it found in the neighborhood. He had been caught alone and outnumbered and certainly got much worse than he deserved, but he was all the same a foul little hoodlum. The source of this moment of truth is, I suspect, usually the cop on the beat. But the impulse behind its insertion is the one really important minimal duty to the self of the journalist, which is to remind the few people who know that he is neither dupe nor liar.

MUCH OF WHAT the *News* is can be traced to the character of its founder, Joseph Patterson. Chapman's recollections of Patterson are generally cursory and sound like the oblations of a priest in an empty church from whose windows the virgin enthroned looks down upon a world without faith. There is one reminiscence which does, however, indicate Patterson's essential gift. In 1924 Mr. Chapman was commissioned to do a Broadway column, a function of immense responsibility, since it involved competition with Mr. Walter Winchell of the other big New York tabloid, the *Mirror*. Patterson's night city editor came up with the notion of a massive assault on the enemy:

"If Chapman doesn't want to go digging for gossip," he suggested, "at least he can write it. Why don't we get the reporters to turn in items to him and pay them a dollar or two per item? That way we could blanket the town."

"No," said Patterson, "we'll ruin one man at a time."

No journalist can ask more from a publisher. The *News* reporter can at least hope that his gift, small though it is, will be protected until it can be destroyed for some useful purpose.

Mr. Chapman also makes a desultory effort to explain why Patterson, who began as a populist socialist, ended cursing Franklin D. Roosevelt. He does not, even to the extent he tries, render the founder his due as reflection of the common man. Patterson was a socialist in the teens of this century because he—the son of meatpackers—could believe that meatpackers consciously poison

meat. It was entirely consistent for him to believe that Franklin D. Roosevelt plotted Pearl Harbor. Both are theories of conspiracy and valuable for mass journalism, because the common man has a dim sense that he is being had by unknown forces.

In fidelity to his assignment to describe the *News* as a piece of merchandise, Chapman presents us a Patterson who cared mainly about what the public wanted. This demeans Patterson's gifts. Chapman, a child of the 20's, seems to have forgotten that on her deathbed Lydia Pinkham called for two bottles of her compound. The great creative merchandisers believe in the product; only their heirs are cynical about it.

The one really interesting chapter in Chapman's dreary chronicle of weights and measures is his account of the survey of New York's East Side the *News* undertook in 1922 to prove that its readers made good customers for advertisers. It is, as reportage, a more accurate picture of the American reality than any work of social protest could be. Patterson understood that the aspiration of the poor was not to destroy but to consume.

The *News* has come since rather to dislike the poor, for it feels them by now to be failures. It is forty years old and a model of upward mobility. Its original audience was the poor; the *News* and most of its audience having risen together, the *News* might be expected to blame the exceptions.

Nonetheless, the poor keep to the *News*, and occasionally, against its conscious will,

it rewards them with almost poetic gestures of understanding. These small acts outweigh many sins. I should say that, next to the *Post*—which has the advantage of conscious effort—the *News* serves the poor better than any newspaper in the city. For instance: the dreadful days of August are usually the occasion for as dreadful efforts by city editors to treat the consequent misery as though it were a subject for wit. But once I remember the *News* went to a slum and took for its front page a picture of a mother carrying her child out to a fire escape where he might lie down with a chance, if not a serious hope, for air.

But all this elevates the *News* to a point well above reason. I have been writing, after all, only about a newspaper. Perhaps Mr. Chapman's bored chronicle of circulation figures is a service to proportion. His effort to follow dead cartoonists and discharged managing editors down to their last days is a useful reminder of the transient quality of newsprint. It is comforting to know from him how small are the aspirations of journalism's practitioners; all these men fade away to desks in California with no visible regret. It would be making too much of the whole business if a newspaperman departed announcing that his fires were out and that he was hammering a cold anvil.

MURRAY KEMPTON, the well-known *New York Post* columnist, is the author of *Part of Our Time*. His review of William Buckley's *Up from Liberalism* appeared in our February 1960 number.

LETTERS FROM READERS

Defense and Deterrence

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Aside from the obvious objective merits of "The Strategy of Deterrence" [H. Stuart Hughes, March], I was especially pleased with its sober, judicious consideration of the issues as contrasted with the attitude taken by some other reviewers of my book, *On Thermonuclear War*.

I do believe that the final solution has to be some sort of international authority; in fact, I make the explicit point on page 6 of my book that even a bad world government may be preferable to an uncontrolled arms race. I also believe that if we could keep the current order stable for a century or so, we are quite likely to back into such a world government. The problem is that it seems to be unlikely, under current conditions, that we will maintain stability for anything like one hundred years. As a matter of fact, I find it difficult to believe that we will reach the year 2,000 or even 1975 without some kind of blow-up or major crisis. However, these estimates are so uncertain, they depend so much on one's personal biases, that attempts to improve stability along the route of arms control seem to me of the utmost importance. Improbable as it seems to both Mr. Hughes and myself, arms control may buy us the time that is needed.

I do not really find it impossible to imagine a world in which each side carefully nurtures weapon systems which it will never use. There have been other human institutions even more ridiculous which fulfill important needs. In fact, if stability is achieved, the whole picture would not be dissimilar from the potlatch ceremonies of the California Indians. I'd be delighted to see a situation where dumping \$100 billion a year worth of goods in the ocean would be the price tag for preserving, if only temporarily, international order. The potlatch war may offend our sensibilities, but it still seems to be the ideal war.

I would also like to comment on Mr. Hughes's questions—"Have the Russians really thought up such stratagems? Or are our military theorists perhaps suggesting to them ideas for cheating they might never

have come to on their own?"—with some other questions. How could any responsible negotiator not spend time trying to think out stratagems? How can one negotiate the control of surprise attack without studying and discussing surprise attack? Or the control of cheating on a test suspension without explaining how to do such cheating? At any rate, we must not only consider ideas that the Russians may be thinking of now, but also those ideas which they would think of if at some later date they decided that they might want to cheat.

While I quite agree that little will be accomplished without an act of faith, one may still be unwilling to accept less than the best schemes that can be devised, even if the schemes finally chosen do not seem good enough to satisfy the most suspicious. I, at least, prefer relatively small acts of faith with the consequences moderately well-controlled if the act of faith goes badly. As for the possibility of a real act of renunciation, such as accommodation up to and including the point of surrender, I would be willing to envisage that also under some conceivable circumstances. But it is difficult for me to believe that the consequences are likely to be other than awful. The Soviets would then have the responsibility for working out on their own, and without any checks, a worldwide arms control system. The alternative, a totally disarmed world, I personally believe is the most unstable of all situations.

We need an international authority with arms to challenge all who would upset the order by violence. And if such an international authority were set up unilaterally by the Soviets, it would likely end as one of the most oppressive governments in history. This is not an estimate that the Soviets are wicked, but an estimate of uncontrolled government anywhere. And a world government which can depend less upon internal pressures to maintain unity than any national government in history seems to me as likely to be pushed in the direction of oppression as any national government has ever been—unless there are important and reliable checks built into the system.

Therefore, when I suggest that a bad

world government is better than the current arms race, I don't mean to indicate there are no limits on how bad a government I'd be willing to accept now. Of course, if the arms race gets worse, my limits will change.

The important question is not whether to give credence to Soviet professions of faith, but rather to ask ourselves how can we get a postwar or pre-war world organized which is really stable to all of the challenges it will have to meet. This takes more than a few Soviets and Americans trusting each other. I suspect it cannot be set up by a simple act of faith. It is more likely to be achieved as a result of violence or at least real pressure on the part of somebody; and even if an international order can be set up reasonably peacefully, I would guess it is much more likely to be set as the result of negotiation and blackmail than as the result of an act of faith.

I would also agree that Mr. Hughes's picture of negotiating a peace after a thermonuclear war, even a small one, and going back to normal is unreasonable. In fact, this seems like the most probable route to a world government—that is, through a war or a crisis.

Lastly, I do not really believe that anything like "boundless grief and madness" would result from even a very destructive thermonuclear war. It may seem very calous, but such an attitude is less likely to be the result of the overnight destruction of thermonuclear war, in which most survivors do not experience the direct rigors of the war, than from the drawn-out suffering and hopelessness of a conventional war or the plague.

I would like to congratulate Mr. Hughes again on what I think of as one of the best "review" articles on the current defense literature I have read.

HERMAN KAHN

The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

H. Stuart Hughes's article illuminated the subject with a very rare flash of sanity.

One aspect of the situation which he raised but did not elaborate upon is contained in the attitude expressed by his quotation from Herman Kahn. Hughes wrote: "A child, [Kahn] says, could tell the difference between ten and sixty million casualties, yet 'few adults seem . . . able to do this. . .'" A child, or a technically brilliant RAND Corporation strategist, would see, and solve, a purely mathematical

problem. An adult with a sensitive moral conscience, however, realizes the enormity of destroying ten million lives, and cannot conceivably accept it. Killing an additional fifty million human beings can hardly be *more* unacceptable. Hence there is actually no difference at all.

Are our values, or all that America stands for, so much superior to Soviet Russia's that we would willingly torture and kill ten million people in their defense? The answer, I believe, is that the moment we are willing to accept such a price we no longer can be said to hold superior values, or indeed any humane values at all. On the other hand, assuming the very worst—that we give up our deterrent power and that Russia then chooses to "conquer" us—isn't it probable that the moral force of 180 million Americans who have been willing to accept humiliation and defeat rather than massive destruction of human life would eventually prove irresistible?

Any course of action currently open to us is a gamble, but the one Mr. Hughes favors seems one in which the odds are overwhelmingly on the side of humanity. . . .

RACHELLE MARSHALL

Portola Valley, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am in entire agreement with Mr. H. Stuart Hughes when he advocates negotiated disarmament as the lesser of two risks. But in discussing Herman Kahn's book Mr. Hughes concedes more than it is really necessary to concede. *On Thermonuclear War* is hardly a successor to Clausewitz. Its aura of sophistication ought not to conceal the exceedingly primitive manner in which it arrives at its conclusions. Thus (as Mr. Robert Paul Wolff pointed out in a review of the book in the *New Republic*), when Kahn attempts to calculate the probable effects of a thermonuclear attack on the United States, he considers each of the various factors entering into such calculations—deaths from radiation, damage to the economy, etc.—individually, without for a moment considering them in relation to each other. When he estimates deaths from radiation, he forgets to take into account the damage to hospitals and medical facilities in general which a nuclear attack would involve. When he considers the prospects for restoring public morale in the wake of the attack, he leaves out of account the extent to which morale-building facilities would have been paralyzed and the morale-builders themselves demoralized.

And of course, as Mr. Hughes himself points out, when Kahn considers the length of time it would take for "B" country to rebuild "A" country, he ignores the fact that the two "countries" are economically interdependent.

Such lapses hardly characterize a thoughtful appraisal of the possibility of surviving a nuclear attack. . . .

CHRISTOPHER LASCH

Roosevelt University
Chicago, Illinois

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

H. Stuart Hughes's article presents the pessimistic posture of many American liberal intellectuals. It is optimistic as regards the possibility of reaching accord with the Russians (actually a "that's-all-we-can-hope-for-anyway" attitude) and pessimistic as regards engaging in political and economic competition with the Russians. . . . At the core of liberal pessimism is a general unwillingness to accept the fact that America is a world power engaged in a world wide power struggle and to accept responsibility for directing that struggle. . . .

Conspicuous by its absence in Hughes's dissent to Kahn is any discussion of the appropriate means for conducting political and economic opposition to those aspects of Communism which are repugnant to anyone who cherishes the democratic heritage. By the same token, Kahn's image of "Real Estate America" says nothing about meeting the threat to democratic values posed by Communist expansion in the rest of the world. In fact, it seems evident that Kahn is an utter defeatist concerning the possibility of political competition with the Russians. Hence his advice to start digging in. . . .

If we were frank in our acceptance of conflict, perhaps we could learn to work through conflict to understanding and mutual respect. . . .

JOHN MARTINSON

New York City

American Fiction

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Philip Roth's essay ["Writing American Fiction," March] forced me to recall another by Philip Rahv, written some twenty years ago. Rahv suggested that [unlike the American novelist] the European writer . . . has always been confronted by more experience than he could reasonably hope to handle, experience so contradictory and circumstantial that he despaired to find some order in

it, much less some moral significance. Now Roth's description of the Grimes case makes the same claims for American reality and for the American writer: that there is experience aplenty to write about, but also that most of it can only anger the moral sense and frustrate the imagination. I think not. The moral of the Grimes affair, it seems to me, is that, yes, American life is stupefying and infuriating, no cause for optimism, "bouncy" or otherwise. But . . . Mr. Roth only makes it clear that at such a time, it takes someone of surpassing sanity and intelligence and detachment to hold out for the brute fact that two girls are dead while the lunatic circus of publicity capers around that fact to our endless distraction and even, God help us, to our amusement. . . .

After such knowledge as the Grimes case offers to the creative imagination, it becomes clear that the writer who dares to handle this much of American experience will have to have not only Ralph Ellison's wariness and distrust, but his capacity for high comedy—for that mode of comic insight (one finds it occasionally in Faulkner and Fitzgerald and Nathanael West as well) which allows for the appalling paradoxes of American life but does not forgive them or those who create them. . . .

But whatever manner the American novelist chooses, it seems to me that he is now more than ever obliged to assume the task his European colleagues have been more regularly attempting—that of recovering in his fiction the sense of at least a rudimentary standard of judgment and morality against which his own national experience may be tested. . . . The events surrounding a murder in 20th-century Chicago are no easier or harder to dramatize than those which surround a murder in 19th-century St. Petersburg.

HERBERT R. HABER

Clark University
Worcester, Mass.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Philip Roth seems to have lost track of the very title of the article he submitted: "Writing American *Fiction*" (emphasis mine). . . .

Mr. Roth would do well to read Vladimir Nabokov's concept of fiction . . . that the *good* writer creates his own world—a world which has and must have validity in its own terms. That this fictional world may involve realistic characters in circumstances which the reader can equate with the "real world" does not at all invalidate the concept. I for

one am content to let newspapers and works of non-fiction . . . do the reporting for the everyday world.

CAROL LIPIS

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Has Mr. Roth never heard of the simple affirmation of life, the sheer joy of mere existence expressed by most poets—certainly, I think, by Mr. Bellow in the scene where Henderson, in the arctic, runs around the plane with the boy in his arms? . . . It may, of course, be true that with an extraordinarily gifted writer like Mr. Bellow one is made to feel this affirmation with great intensity, whereas the less skillful practitioner degenerates into mawkishness. . . .

CONSTANCE H. POSTER

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

By now it is almost a critical axiom that when one writer comments on the work of another, generally more is revealed about the fictional concerns of the commentator than of the subject. That Philip Roth proves to be no exception on this score cannot be held against him. . . . Yet surely much of his comment about the writers he discusses is based on the notion that they are not writing the kind of books he thinks they should be writing. If American reality is as meaningless and crooked and unreal as I think it is, he seems to be saying, how can any writer be pleased with it?

This kind of attitude is, critically, as sterile as it is unfair. As an instance, it can lead Roth to say of a writer like Malamud, largely because he is not preoccupied with specific sociological detail, with the furnishings of time, place, and class, as Roth himself is, that Malamud's work represents but another instance of the writer's withdrawal from American reality. Yet what does this come down to, since Roth concedes Malamud has not "spurned life or an examination of the difficulties of being human"? If such examination is and should be the central concern of literature, then the source of Roth's complaint must be that it is the *manner* of the examination which Roth finds unsatisfactory. That is his privilege, but it is both arbitrary and a little wrong-headed. Fiction as metaphor has a powerful tradition in American literature, and often represents, rather than a withdrawal from, an engagement with reality in a more profound way. One wonders how Roth, were he a contemporary, would have regarded

Hawthorne's work, or even Melville's. Certainly it does not seem likely he would have considered them to embody the genius whose absence he deplores in our own time.

This is perhaps at the heart of what I find more disturbing about Roth's remarks (and about those of a good many other commentators on contemporary American life) than his criticism of any particular writer; a parochialism, an absence of perspective, both psychological and historical, so extensive that Roth can only speak of American life as though there has been no humanity before, and no prior society. His recoil is bound to be excessive.

As a writer I hold no particular brief for present-day American life. . . . When Roth speaks of how Edmund Wilson, after reading *Life* magazine, feels he does not belong to the country depicted there, like Roth, I know what Wilson means. But I must confess to feeling exactly the same way on reading the story with which Roth opens his article. What I am getting at is that Roth, like *Life* magazine, has begun to deal in public images—not with reality, but with public and surface aspects of American or any other life, expanded and exaggerated—and has passed them off as a substitute for life as the normal citizen knows and experiences it in the privacy of his own blood and soul. . . . This is all right for *Life*, but dangerous for writers.

EUGENE ZILLER

Brooklyn, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Philip Roth complains that it grows harder every day to write fiction in America because the things that happen down the block are often, even as facts, almost inconceivable. I find his argument curiously naive. . . . Indeed, Mr. Roth belies himself at the outset, because he begins his lament by telling us an incredible story, and proves that it is possible to get it across. . . .

It is astonishing to me that a serious artist can say, as Mr. Roth does, that fiction is *becoming* impossible. Fiction has always been impossible. This is the challenge to the artist. His achievement is put against the scale of the impossible. I rather think that it is not the art of fiction which is in trouble, but only certain kinds of fiction. . . . I am surprised that he does not mention Wright Morris, who has given us *four* novels within the decade, each of which, I think, fulfills admirably the conditions of making our reality credible. . . .

Mr. Roth concludes by expressing annoy-

ance and worry over a recent phenomenon he calls affirmation, typified by a bouncy style, a yea-saying he thinks has no right, given the present historical situation, to be. He finds it self-absorbed, false in tone, hollow, and unjustified by current events. This is shallow criticism. The truth is that there is a steady, deep, and powerful stream in American literature, exemplified by works celebrating the self and the remaking of the self in joy and elation, even euphoria; this stream is as integral to our reality as the "No, In Thunder!" Its joyousness and laughter flow perhaps from the spring of Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman, through Frost and Henry Miller . . . and now crop up in Gold and Bellow. . . .

In short, I think Mr. Roth has turned the matter inside out. If one must face reality, it is just as true, as Emerson would have put it, that reality must face the self. . . .

JASCHA KESSLER

Hamilton College
Clinton, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Why does Philip Roth . . . ignore the best work of the authors he discusses to cavil at their lesser works? Why, for example, does he wholly ignore Herbert Gold's best book, *The Man Who Was Not With It*? Or Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, *Deer Park*, and *Barbary Shore*? . . . Why does he fail to mention Saul Bellow's *The Victim* and limit his comment on *Augie March* to some condescending notes on style (never alluding to the content) while he discusses *Henderson, the Rain King* at length? . . .

Isn't the answer simply that Mr. Roth's whole point is untenable when applied to the best of America's recent novels? Rather than voluntarily withdrawing interest from the social and political phenomena of our time—as Mr. Roth claims—our best contemporary writers have expressed, frequently in a kind of metaphor, the deepest terror and longings of our age. . . .

Though one would little suspect it from Roth's apparent preoccupation with the "grander political and social phenomena of our time," his own fiction is much more limited, seeming to revolve only upon the axis of American Jewishness, good or bad, faith or fraud. . . . All too often, Mr. Roth sacrifices "moral responsibility" for an exploitation of moral ambiguities: a sacrifice of humanity for irony. . . .

GERALD SCHOENFELD

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Of Philip Roth one can only say, "Listen to him! He's discovering America!"

Yes, it's all true, what he says about our time and our community. He discovers the world—almost as if, seeing an apple fall in Newark, he discovers the law of gravitation.

Where has he been all these millennia? Hasn't he heard about Sodom and Gomorrah, or listened to Isaiah and Jeremiah? Where was he during the dreadful days in the house of Agamemnon? Doesn't he know what life was really like in the Golden Age of Pericles or under the brilliant cloak of the Renaissance?

He suffers from the innocence of historical illiteracy. There is only *now*; history has no meaning and time does not exist.

But the essence of fiction is development, unfolding, change in the realm of time. Fictional characters (like real ones) can be understood only if their uniqueness is combined with a measure of universality. And by the relativity that underlies aesthetic, as well as physical, phenomena, this universality is located not only in space, but also in time—in the past of the characters, of the writer and the reader, in the past of the world. . . .

If Roth finds no reasons for affirmation, and perhaps no subject as a writer, it may be because he confuses the community with the world, just as he confuses now with eternity, and himself with Columbus.

JOSEPH MINDEL

Larchmont, New York

MR. ROTH writes:

I cannot argue with the good sense Mr. Haber makes as to what the task is for the contemporary American writer, *given* the contemporary American experience. That I, as a writer, should say—to use Mr. Haber's phrase—that much of the experience "can only anger the moral sense and frustrate the imagination," and that Mr. Haber, as a literary critic, should remind me that at such times one must have "surpassing sanity and intelligence and detachment" is as it should be. I did not intend, finally, to claim that the events surrounding a murder in 20th-century Chicago are harder to dramatize than those which surrounded a murder in 19th-century St. Petersburg. Our task is no *more* arduous than Dostoevsky's; but again, as Mr. Haber points out, it is no less arduous: the purpose of my essay was to make some suggestions as to how and why it is arduous today, and particularly so for the writer whose concerns are social and

whose talent and instinct lead him to write in the mode of realism.

Though I have not "read" Vladimir Nabokov's "concept of fiction" and cannot vouch for the accuracy of Miss Lipis's phrasing of it, I am nevertheless quite familiar with the cliché that says that "the *good* writer creates his own world"—though I suspect Miss Lipis, slightly, of sneaking that emphatic *good* in there just to burn me up. Aristotle said: "The epic, tragedy, comedy, dithyrambic poetry, most music on the flute and on the lyre—all these are, in principle, imitations."

Are we evened-up now on authorities? I do not see that the information Miss Lipis bears has anything to do with the subject of my essay.

As for Miss Poster. What kind of question is, "Has Mr. Roth never heard of the simple affirmation of life, the sheer joy of mere existence expressed by most poets. . . ?" I love joy, especially sheer joy. My point as regards *Henderson*, however, is that the joy Bellow finds there he does not find in the world of Asa Leventhal or Tommy Wilhelm or even Augie March, but in an Africa that makes no claim whatsoever to being *real*. That's all.

In reply to Mr. Ziller:

(1) My point was not that certain writers are not writing the kind of books I think they *should* be writing, but that, simply, they are writing the kind they *are* writing. I do not believe there was anything in my essay to indicate that I had "a complaint" against Malamud. My concluding remark about Malamud was, in fact, just this: ". . . that he does not—or has not yet—found the contemporary scene a proper or sufficient backdrop for his tales of heartlessness and heartache, of suffering and regeneration." It is the backdrop that I spoke of as insufficient, not the writer. Furthermore, I was not asking Malamud or any other writer to share whatever concern for "time, place, and class" I may have displayed in certain stories of my own. Rather I intended to examine the relationship between our experience and our art, and perhaps to come up with some reasons to explain the discomfort so many contemporary writers feel—myself included—with realism, and with satire too, where one sometimes winds up doing less than one intended. My discussion of Malamud, my words about Bellow's *Henderson*, had primarily to do with the examination I undertook in the essay of "certain literary signs, certain obsessions and innovations and concerns, to be found in the

novels of our best writers, supporting the notion that the world we have been given, the society and the community, has ceased to be as suitable or as manageable a subject for the novelist as it once may have been." I was not disapproving of what Mr. Ziller refers to as the "powerful tradition" of "fiction as metaphor." I was, first, seeking out its most recent manifestations, and second, evaluating certain of these works as I saw fit. As for Melville and Hawthorne, if I had been a contemporary, I would probably not have been so holy about them then as Mr. Ziller chooses to be now.

(2) I did not "deplore" the absence of genius in our times. Instead I noted that my claim that American writers had suffered a loss of subject might well be "an attempt [by me] to place most of the responsibility outside the writer for what may finally be nothing more than the absence of genius in our times. . . ." I was then, in all seriousness, calling the thesis of my essay into question. It is not humble, I know, to draw attention to one's own humility. It is what one is reduced to, however, when one is made out to be an ass.

(3) I do not see that the "public aspects" of American life are any less "real"—having to do with reality—than the private aspects. They only *strike* one, as my recounting of the Grimes girls' story struck Mr. Ziller, as "expanded and exaggerated." The life that Mr. Ziller's "normal citizen" experiences "in the privacy of his own blood and soul" is, after all, what goes on outside himself. Is the implication here that the "normal citizen" sees only "normal" events, "normal" people, has only "normal" feelings? Or that there are separate categories of life, public and private? I am not convinced that the horror that went on in Chicago—the murder of the Grimes girls, the murder of decorum and feeling—is any less important to me, ultimately, than my own marriage or my slipped disc.

I shall make an effort to forgive Mr. Kessler his rhetoric—"Fiction has always been impossible. This is the challenge to the artist"—if he will go easy on my naivety. I do not know if I want to forgive him what I think to be a certain misrepresentation of what I happened to have said. I did not write that "yea-saying . . . has no right, given the present historical situation." I said that certain affirmative responses, such as Styron's in *Set This House on Fire* and Bellow's in *Henderson*, interested me in that in the one the self was celebrated as it was "excluded from society" and in the other

"as it was exercised and admired in a fantastic one." I contrasted Eugene Henderson and Cass Kinsolving with the hero of Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, who, when forced into a position in which he is isolated from the culture and the community, does not see any particular reason for joy or celebration or contentment. I also said that certain euphoric writings (in particular I discussed some of the work of Herbert Gold) did not convince me of either their joy or their elation; elation seemed to me here not to be a response but an attitude—a pose. That there is "a deep and powerful stream in American literature . . . celebrating the self [and] integral to our reality" seems to me no real criticism of my essay, which set out, as I have already said, to trace this tradition into the present, and to present some hypothesis to help explain its appearance in our fiction now. That I happen to have reservations about certain of these works cannot be dismissed by pointing to the great names of the past. I know about Whitman too, and about Thoreau, but the work of neither seems to me to justify for a moment the willful and mannered euphoria that I think of as a limitation in the work of Herbert Gold. The existence of Robert Frost, Henry Miller, and Ralph Waldo Emerson, makes *Henderson, the Rain King* nothing more or less than what it is.

I do not believe I can convince Mr. Schoenfeld of anything, and won't try.

My dear Mr. Mindel:

Okay—where were *you* during the dreadful days in the house of Agamemnon? Let's stand up and be counted.

Containment in Asia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Hans J. Morgenthau's piece "Asia: the American Algeria" [July] should be read along with his article in the *New Leader* of July 3, which directed itself more broadly to the Kennedy administration's foreign policy. In that critique, he suggested the need for "liquidation of over-extended commitments" and added: "That is to say, the United States, if it does not want to risk war in defense of indefensible and at best non-essential positions, must retreat from these positions." With these sentences in mind, the reason for Professor Morgenthau's strained analogy of Asia and Algeria becomes clearer. . . .

French "illusions" about Algeria are not comparable with American "illusions" about Asia because Algeria is a French colony

whose people have been at war with France for seven years to obtain their independence from colonialism. That vast land mass called free Asia, as India has learned to her sorrow, is engaged in a two-fold struggle—having achieved independence, to create viable economies and, at the same time, to resist Communist China's imperialist thrust. . . . Algerian independence has the support of her Mahgreb neighbors and virtually the entire Arab world. . . . Yet if France had ever sought to invest Algeria with all possible military might, France might have broken the rebellion as an implacable Portugal is now doing in Angola. I am suggesting here that French retreat in Algeria was not written in the stars, but was due to public morale and a concern for the national exchequer.

Perhaps I am devoting too much space to debating an analogy, but its implicit syllogism is disturbing: A nationalist rebellion like that in Algeria cannot be quelled by "military means";

French withdrawal from Algeria is now being negotiated with the rebel leaders;

Therefore, since American activity in Asia has been primarily military, American withdrawal from Asia must also be negotiated.

While there have been rebellions in South Vietnam and Korea, they were, says Morgenthau, directed against an existing regime, and not Communist-inspired and directed. . . . [But] President Kennedy is my source that as of last May, 4,000 civil officers had been assassinated in one year by Viet Minh infiltrators. . . . In other words, there is a war of external aggression going on in South Vietnam, not a rebellion. Diem has attempted to initiate some land reforms. Supposing these reforms were as successful as they have been in Japan and Formosa, would such a triumph necessarily persuade the Viet Minh to stop assassinations and bomb-throwing?

I would not dispute Professor Morgenthau's criticisms of our aid program in Laos. They are deserved. But if we are to withdraw from the "indefensible" in Asia, it would be intelligent to stop foreign aid and forfeit a part of the world immediately, since, without U.S. military support, a reformed aid program would have as much chance for survival as a lamasery in Tibet. . . .

Professor Morgenthau concedes that the otherwise futile policy of "military containment" in Asia has "worked" in Korea and "for the time being" in the Formosa straits. He does not say why it has "worked" or why a containment (I prefer the word "defense" to "containment") policy outside of Europe

is "self-defeating in that it is a powerful factor in the expansion of what it intends to contain." . . . However, he implies that containment has worked because "what contains China is its own weakness." When China becomes stronger, as he predicts, then, unless the administration "reconcile[s] itself to further territorial losses to the Communists, it will be compelled to embark upon a policy of military intervention which can only have inconclusive results at best." Professor Morgenthau does not define what these "inconclusive results" might be; if they could mean the still continuing existence of these Asian states for a bit longer and, perhaps, under better direction and democratic will . . . wouldn't it be worth a try in this uncertain world? . . .

Nothing is more futile than to make science out of tendentious prediction. But with Laos gone, South Vietnam gone, Thailand gone, would India find itself immune from so clamorous and determined a neighbor? Or the rest of Asia? . . .

If it were only Laos we were talking about, the unilateral definition of "non-essential" would have some authenticity, and a sound Machiavellian could recommend the banishment of Laos from our overextended perimeter. If one could be certain that it is only West Berlin that Khrushchev seeks, the bright suggestion that we give it to him and build another and greater Berlin might be quite sound. Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia would . . . symbolize the rest of mankind's redemption. If we could only be sure.

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

New York City

MR. MORGENTHAU writes:

The *tertium comparationis* in my analogy between French illusions about Algeria and American illusions about Asia is the misunderstanding of the problem and the attempt to settle it by military means. If we were to approach the problem of Asia with the same realism which President de Gaulle has finally been trying to bring to bear upon Algeria, we would note that China can be contained in the long run only at risks to the United States out of proportion to the interests at stake and through military commitments which exceed our capabilities. France learned this lesson in the course of a ruinous war and at the price of its democratic institutions. Are we going to learn our lesson through reflection, or must we suffer disaster abroad and at home in order to learn it?

This was the only moral I drew from the analogy.

The Hasidim — an Analogy

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In "The Dead Hasidim: Part II" [May], Herbert Weiner writes: "The sharing of bread and wine could not be much different in appearance from the actual last supper of Jesus and his disciples. . . ." It seems to me that there is still a stronger analogy in the fact that Rabbi Nachman hinted "he was that *Tsaddik*, the 'Moses-Messiah,'" and said, "he must suffer great humiliations and must be able to accept these humiliations in silence." Reading these sentences, I saw in my mind's eye the first Judeo-Christian community before Paul.

HENRI BIRNBAUM

New York City

Music at Lincoln Center

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In your May issue there appeared a highly critical evaluation of Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Inc. ["Lincoln Center—Planning for Music."]

The author, one Joan Peyser, is, of course, entitled to her opinions, but, in fairness to the intelligence of your readers, it must be pointed out that the article is filled with misstatement of fact, misleading innuendo, quotations out of context, and misquotations. While I would not presume to ask you for the space that would be required to correct all these errors, permit me, please, to comment on a few which directly concern the Juilliard School.

To begin with, the author does not even know which institutions are constituent members of Lincoln Center and mistakenly expands the list.

In reference to the move and merger of New York City's High School of Music and Art and High School of Performing Arts to an area adjacent to the Center, the surprising assertion is made that the principals of these schools only learned of the proposed merger from the press. I made the proposal for the merger from the stage of the High School of Music and Art, having been introduced by the principal of that school. I also met with the principal of the High School of Performing Arts and a group of its faculty and parents to discuss the matter. In fact, I asked both principals if I might have the privilege of using their names in the press release that was issued. Wide publicity was given to this merger by the *New York Times* and other publications.

The author states repeatedly that Juilliard was invited to join Lincoln Center only after another educational institution had declined a similar invitation. This is contrary to the facts. No school but Juilliard was ever invited to join Lincoln Center. Literally hundreds of persons were consulted by Lincoln Center during its formative period, in order to obtain the best thinking and advice. Independent artists and others associated with universities and conservatories were naturally among those consulted on education. The fact that a university music department was not chosen is no reflection on the worth of such a department, but rather that its purposes differ from those of the conservatory. In short, the roles are complementary and in no sense competitive.

There are few paragraphs in the article which do not require correction. The instances cited above suffice, I trust, to illustrate the specious premise on which opinions have been set forth in so cavalier a manner. Surely a project of the magnitude of Lincoln Center, which has enlisted the dedicated energies of some of our most distinguished men of affairs, as well as outstanding artists and educators, is entitled to an evaluation in your pages which is not only factually correct, but commensurate with the seriousness of purpose which characterizes your excellent publication.

WILLIAM SCHUMAN
President

Juilliard School of Music
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It has come to my attention that Joan Peyser's article has caused some activity among certain musicians and educators concerned with Lincoln Center.

As a recent graduate of the Juilliard School and winner of the School's highest award in 1959, I wish to thank COMMENTARY for printing Miss Peyser's article. . . . I hope that it led to more open questioning of the goals and the actual achievements of Lincoln Center. . . .

HOWARD LEBOW

West New York, N.J.

MISS PEYSER writes:

Mr. Schuman is specific about three points.

The first is that I expanded the list of institutions in Lincoln Center; unfortunately he does not identify which should have been

omitted. The problem here lies in one's frame of reference. Mine was based on location, design, and approach, whereas his, I believe, is based on a particular and complex financial plan. Therefore, I listed not only "constituent members," but everything that is to be incorporated into the musical activities of Lincoln Center—such as the \$7 million Lincoln Square High School which bears a name associated with Lincoln Center, will be designed by architects (Pietro Belluschi & Catalano and Westermann) for Lincoln Center, and will be directly adjacent to Juilliard, which is in Lincoln Center. It will remain, of course, a public school.

Mr. Schuman's second point concerns my criticism of the lack of communication and consultation between Lincoln Center officials and people working in the individual organizations—in this case, the principals of the two high schools involved in the project referred to above. Mr. Schuman indicates that the criticism is invalid because he proposed the merger and move of both schools on the stage of one of them. He did—in December 1958. My conversations with both men took place at the beginning of 1961. Between these dates neither school had received notification of any plans, considerations, or decisions from official sources. In order to obtain definite information I contacted the Board of Education, and Dr. Bernard Donovan informed me that the merger was a fact. Shortly after my conversation with him, on February 23, 1961, the Board of Education announced that both schools would be merged in a multimillion-dollar show-case high school.

Mr. Schuman's third point is that "no school but Juilliard was ever invited to join Lincoln Center." He is wrong; Columbia was invited. The correspondence between Lincoln Center and Columbia is on file at the university and establishes, without a doubt, all of the facts relating to the invitation contained in the article.

It is, of course, an unfortunate fact that "distinguished men of affairs" are responsible for mishandling a project that might have immeasurably aided music, drama, and dance in this country. Lincoln Center has not only involved the use of people's money, but the destruction of people's homes. Surely one must criticize a "culture symbol" that presents a gleaming, glistening, opulent exterior, and an inner life devoid of warmth and beauty and vitality.

THE THEATER OF KENNETH TYNAN*

John Gross

FIVE HUNDRED PAGES of collected Tynan, decked with a sumptuousness normally reserved for the Living Thoughts of major philosophers and the memoirs of field marshals: even the faithful must quail a little, confronted with the wisdom of the master in such bulk. Tynan's gifts as a journalist are well known to readers of the *London Observer* and the *New Yorker*, but one wondered whether the snap, crackle, and pop of weekly reviewing was going to turn soggy served up in some cases ten years after the event: would Tynan prove durable as well as dazzling? The answer, emphatically and unreservedly, is yes. I can't imagine reading any other theater critic of the present at such length, or with such pleasure.

Tynan's verve and intelligence have kept his week-by-week jottings fresh; whether they can be said to cohere into a distinct pattern of development is more open to doubt. That we are meant to trace such a pattern, the author makes quite clear. Ten years ago, he tells us, he was in love with the theater of "fantasy and shock," of technical brilliance and heroic acting. But today, under the "threat and pressure" of world events, Tynan has swung round to the view that the theater is "a branch of sociology as well as a means of self-expression. . . . All drama is, in the widest sense of the word, political." References to Cocteau fade out, quotations from Christopher Caudwell creep in. This, then, is the progress which *Curtains* is supposed to chart: from aestheticism to commitment, from bull-fighting to Brecht, from feathers to iron.

Such is the official self-portrait—but it is not altogether the one which emerges

from these suave pages. For a start, though Tynan's convictions may have changed, his tone remains remarkably consistent. First and last, his writing belongs to a fairly recognizable English tradition, the line of the orchidaceous wit and the intellectual dandy. His talents are for reckless phrase-making and inspired gossip, for exquisite mimicry and bland paradox, for coruscating—as he probably says somewhere—on thin ice. Rarer gifts than a humdrum sense of political reality, but they hardly make him a reliable guide to the "threat and pressure" of the contemporary world. Commitment, one can't help thinking, should be made of sterner stuff.

But style isn't everything, and beneath the glittering surface changes have undeniably been taking place. Perhaps no one has ever pirouetted as elegantly toward the barricades as Tynan, but it is toward the barricades that he has in fact moved. The real question is whether he has gained a new and deeper insight into the way in which social forces shape a work of art, or merely shifted his enthusiasms. We know that he is committed to commitment, but apart from a general distaste for commercialism and the more glaring Tory prejudices, does he give any signs of holding deeply to a social philosophy or using it to illuminate his understanding of the drama?

If one penetrates beyond the slogans, the results are meager. A theater reviewer struggling to keep a deadline doesn't have time for much more than snap judgments; even so, the absence of any sort of analysis in some of the most crucial reviews in this collection is very striking. Take, for example, the account of *Look Back in Anger*—not an unfair example, I think, since the play was the spearhead of the anti-establishment renaissance on the London stage

* A review of *Curtains*, by Kenneth Tynan (Atheneum, 542 pp., \$7.95).

which Tynan celebrates. Making every allowance for the fact that Tynan was engaged in propaganda on behalf of a discovery, it would be hard to imagine anything more superficial than his glib acceptance of Jimmy Porter as the voice of post-war youth "as it really is": "I agree that *Look Back in Anger* is likely to remain a minority taste. What matters is the size of the minority. I estimate it at roughly 6,733,000 . . . the number of people in this country between the ages of twenty and thirty."

Since Mr. Tynan is at such pains to stress Jimmy's virtual monopoly of the progressive virtues ("one can't imagine him listening with a straight face to speeches about our inalienable right to flog Cypriot schoolboys"), I doubt whether I could convert him to my own view, which is that the play deals with a situation so private and bizarre as to be scarcely political at all, and that Jimmy is not so much a descendant of John Stuart Mill as a severe case of aim-inhibited sadism masquerading as social comment. At any rate, the one thing which Osborne's play, political or not, can't be called is "an oasis of reality" (Tynan's phrase, and not from the original review, either, but from a piece giving his sober second thoughts). The oasis is a mirage: the Porter establishment reflects young England at home about as faithfully as the Peggotys in their boat represent the average early Victorian household. Not that Osborne's success is without political significance, of course; but Tynan, the lover of "shock and fantasy," talks as though he has been persuaded to accept a dream-world as direct observation.

Still, a man has to use the materials which come to hand, and Tynan is scarcely to blame if he has been born in a comparatively barren period, deprived of the opportunities which some of his predecessors enjoyed. Where Shaw could pin his theories onto an Ibsen, Tynan has to make do with an Osborne. But at least he can claim to have found his Wagner in Bertolt Brecht (there are some curious parallels between the two cults, incidentally, and the Brechtians are rapidly threatening to become the perfect Wagnerites of our generation, complete with a Cosima to guard the shrine). Brecht's spirit pervades Tynan's recent work; the index to the present book lists

more references to him than to any other dramatist except Shakespeare. Now of all the major European playwrights, Brecht must be the most slippery and ambiguous, and the most in need of intelligent criticism to sort out the confusions and conflicts. That there are conflicts Tynan has shown himself aware, if only by recommending Martin Esslin's excellent study; but when it comes to discussing the actual works, he slips back into taking Brecht at his own valuation and shies away from the duplicity which lies at the heart of Brecht's achievement. Thus, when he comes to *Galileo*, he prefers to dwell on the riotous priest-baiting carnival rather than the play's treatment of the scientific spirit. His dramatic instincts are sound, but he won't draw the conclusion that Brecht was more interested in tossing cardinals in blankets than in intellectual honesty, that his genius thrived on cunning, swagger, anarchism. Perhaps one day Mr. Tynan will ask himself whether there isn't a large common element between what he feels about the creator of *Adzak* and Macheath and his admiration for James Cagney, to whom he devotes one of his liveliest essays.

A THEATER critic must at all costs avoid the insipid, and his calling more or less obliges him to strike exaggerated attitudes: moderation and restraint have never been counted among the great dramatic virtues. Again, anyone who has tried his hand at regularly reviewing run-of-the-mill plays or novels will know how one is reduced to clutching desperately at any straw of talent, if one doesn't want to appear a stony-hearted monster whom nothing will please. If Tynan's bursts of enthusiasm are sometimes unreasonable, they must be seen against a background of French windows, Shaftesbury Avenue dowagers, and a thousand lost golf balls. One acknowledges the hazards of the trade and extends benefit of clergy, then, but the fact still remains that by any standards Tynan is a hero-worshiper. Not for nothing was his first book called *He That Plays the King*—and I wish, incidentally, that he'd rounded out the picture by including some extracts from that book in *Curtains*. Published over ten years ago, it includes a remarkable series of evocations of the major performances

which Tynan saw in London between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one; it also contains some flights of stage-struck silliness which, if one hadn't known, one would have guessed were the work of a much younger man. I recall, for instance, a gaudy eulogy of a mildly notorious barfly of the period in terms which would seem rather excessive applied to a combination of Molière and Oscar Wilde. And there are times when new Brecht tends to be old barfly writ large: a much bigger hero, but one to whom the same kind of adulation is being offered up. Not the whole story, needless to say; but while in theory we must "love life and learn to bring it into art," and there's any amount of talk about defining moral and intellectual positions, in practice Tynan's heroes can get away with murder, provided they carry it out with enough panache.

It's TEMPTING, no doubt, to account for Tynan's recent history in terms of the intellectual reawakening of the English left which followed Suez, and to relate his work to the mountains of critical controversy which have labored to bring forth—well, Arnold Wesker. The trouble is that, while the New Left has a good many positive achievements to its credit, what may seem a monolith from the distance is in fact a collection of pebbles of widely differing shapes and colors. It's hard to say anything which is equally applicable to all the various splinter groups, and, in any case, Tynan stands well to one side; his warmth and curiosity, for instance, save him from lapsing into the stodginess and Sunday-school moralizing which afflict so much of the current English debate on mass culture. All the same, he suffers from not having a more bracing climate in which to air his theories, and in particular from a tendency among the latest crop of English radicals to underline the irresponsibility of the yogi and gloss over the despotism of the commissar. Such a mood is induced less by a positive swing toward Marxism than by sheer impatience with the international deadlock which has all but paralyzed Western socialism: Stalin is in his grave and we've paid our debts to the 30's, so the lessons of the past quarter of a century can be shelved. Tynan may be a democrat by temperament, but he often

indulges in this kind of wishful thinking, and he seems depressingly undisturbed by authoritarianism when it comes from the left. One wishes that he'd sometimes stop taking democracy for granted, and defend freedom as eloquently as he attacks economic injustice and social decay.

Not that his social criticism is all that well-placed or perceptive. He is adept at side-stepping issues when they happen to be dull ones (who isn't?—but at least we should try to be honest about it), and he has a fatal tendency to underrate the opposition. He seems haunted, for instance, by Somerset Maugham's one-word dismissal of the young angries as "scum," as though a piece of octogenarian peevishness summarized all possible objections. An outstanding talent for parody betrays Tynan into presenting his villains as boobies whom nobody could take seriously for five seconds. He can be brilliantly funny guying upper-class whimsy, or suburban coziness, or blimpish bluster; he carves into the banalities of drawing-room comedy with immense relish—but it's easy meat. A successful theater critic must of necessity be a connoisseur of the second-rate, and a comprehensive collection of his reviews is in part bound to have the appeal of a vast *sottisier*; but after a time he runs the risk of being taken in by his own caricatures. Again and again Tynan is lured into oversimplifying the issue. Take, for example, his account of lunch with a young man "who has risen in a very short time to one of the highest executive posts in American journalism," and who looks forward to nuclear war with comparative equanimity. It's a shrewd sketch of a certain kind of well-fed apocalyptic jauntiness, and one hopes that it succeeded in disturbing those of Tynan's readers who hold similar views. The only trouble is that the piece ends in mid-air, without giving any indication that there might be other choices apart from total disarmament or total madness.

The times are not particularly propitious for a writer of Tynan's stamp. Artistically he is an epicure and a cosmopolitan, at a time when English writing has taken on many of the characteristics of immigrant literature: a rough directness, a bias toward the documentary, an indifference to the language, a certain heaviness. In such an

era he often appears, to reverse his own phrase for the tramp in *Waiting for Godot*, a chess player in a universe of checkers, and it is hardly surprising if he frequently plays down his own complicated reactions and succumbs to the black-and-white slogans of others. (His incursions into actual politics are schoolboyish: he only draws up petitions for Castros, never for unglamorous Betancourts.) As a result, he presents an odd mixture of gullibility and hard-headedness, soap-box militancy and sharp critical insight. It would be good to see Tynan's undoubted powers extended beyond the limits of a brief review, not least because he would be compelled to thrash out some of his contradictions, if not to resolve them. A critic is under no obligation to be a systematic thinker, but it can hardly hurt him to be made aware of his own inconsistencies.

THE POETRY OF FAITH

GREAT WESTERN MYSTICS: THEIR LASTING SIGNIFICANCE. By DAVID BAUMGARDT. *Columbia University Press.* 99 pp. \$3.00.
NINE GATES TO THE CHASSIDIC MYSTERIES. By JIRI LANGER. Translated by Stephen Jolly. *David McKay.* 266 pp. \$3.95.

Reviewed by ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER

GREAT WESTERN MYSTICS: *Their Lasting Significance* contains three lectures presented by Professor David Baumgardt at Columbia University in November 1960, under the sponsorship of the Matchette Foundation. David Baumgardt is Ordentlicher Professor Emeritus of the University of Berlin, has been Visiting Professor at Columbia University, and is the author of a number of books, among them *Spinoza Und Mendelssohn*. James Gutman, in his foreword, indicates that this new book was issued on the occasion of Dr. Baumgardt's seventieth birthday.

The lectures, exclusive of notes, take up sixty-six pages in all, and while it may be easy to write a lengthy volume, or even several volumes, on a minor theme, to attempt a survey of the major Western mystics and their theories from the pre-Christian era through the medieval and Renaissance periods in three brief lectures is a task bordering on the impossible, even for a

specialist in mysticism. (Perhaps it could be accomplished by those Cabbalists who tapped wine from the wall and created pigeons by invoking holy names.) A more thorough presentation of the subject would no doubt have been more interesting and useful to the reader. As it is, there is room only for very scanty sketches and hints.

Professor Baumgardt is unquestionably a master of his material: there is a wealth of knowledge and scholarship in the short text and the thirty-four pages of notes. Especially admirable is his discussion of the Zohar, the bible of the Cabbalists, and its commentaries. The Zohar, which was traditionally thought to be the work of Simon Ben Johai, was actually compiled by Moses de Leon at the end of the 13th century. One cannot speak of the Zohar and Cabbala without mentioning Hayyim Vital's *Tree of Life* and Vital's master, Isaac Luria, the prophetic leader of a circle of Cabbalists of Safed in northern Palestine. Dr. Baumgardt was able to devote only a few pages to the Cabbala, but they contain all the essentials of that esoteric system.

The first lecture is entitled "What Is Mysticism?" and the author rightly concludes, in answer to this question, that there can be no clear definition of the term. How, for example, draw the line between mysticism and religion or philosophy; or how distinguish mysticism definitively from poetry or even folklore? Poetry and mysticism have many characteristics in common; tradition plays a crucial part in both, and neither can ever really become obsolete. The 19th-century mystic feels himself related to the ancient gnostics. As it is in time, so it is in space: much of what can be said about the nature of Western mysticism also holds true for the mysticism of the Middle or Far East. The author concludes that mysticism should be looked upon as a part of world poetry, a special sort of poetry bound up with faith—written out of the mystic's belief and evoking such belief in the reader.

Because mysticism cannot be clearly defined, the author chose—unfortunately, I think—not to include the realm of psychic phenomena in his definition. Professor Rhine of Duke University and the other psychic researchers throughout the world—who are trying to build parapsychology into a science based on facts and statistics—might be non-

plussed by finding themselves termed mystics; nevertheless the stuff of their science lends itself to inclusion in the mystical.

One might go further and say that all science—as well as poetry—suffers when it is separated from the mystical. The efforts of science to divorce itself completely from its mystic roots must lead in the end to superficiality and sterility. It is the dreams of the alchemist that are being realized through the chemistry of the atomic age. The physics of today approaches, more and more, metaphysics. Even a discipline as rigorous as mathematics operates in the irrational and transcendental. The development of science inevitably leads to mysticism—for, no matter what the field of rational inquiry, the borders of human reason are soon reached. This is the very point at which science, mysticism, and poetry meet and merge. It is not strange, then, that Dr. Baumgardt should find elements of mystical thought even in those philosophers whom we consider to have been rationalists. Here in itself lies a fascinating field for further exploration.

NINE GATES TO THE CHASSIDIC MYSTERIES presents a specific illustration of one of the schools of mysticism touched upon in Dr. Baumgardt's book. Hasidism is a mystic system which draws on Jewish tradition—the Bible, the Talmud, the Midrash, and especially the Cabbala. But Hasidism is unique in the great importance it assigns to the role of the *Tsaddik*, the holy man, the leader who helps his disciples to overcome the temptations of the evil spirit and to reach a high rung on the ladder of saintliness. The Bible and Talmud also extol the *Tsaddik* and his followers, but Hasidism has built a way of life around this relationship. Each group of Hasidim used to choose its own *Tsaddik*, and would often quarrel with the other *Tsaddikim* and their disciples. Hasidic courts were maintained, where the *Tsaddik* would eat at the table with his followers, distributing to them crumbs from his plate and reciting his teachings to their eager ears. Before the Hasidim took their leave, they would give to the rabbi a sheet of paper upon which they had written down their needs, material as well as spiritual, and some money for interceding for them in heaven. A particular wonder-rabbi's follow-

ers would often address each other in the familiar "thou," and while in the rabbi's court, they lived a communal life. The Hasidim placed great value on experiencing joy, and they did not look askance at the *aqua vitae* which helps create it. From Israel Baal Shem, the founder of Hasidism, who lived in the 18th century, many Hasidic dynasties branched off, each with its peculiar style and manners. Some of the wonder-rabbis became exceedingly rich, like Reb Mendelevitebsker and Israel of Rizhin, and their courts were conducted royally. Reb Israel of Rizhin is said to have ridden in a coach with silver wheels. Reb Mendelevitebsker (or perhaps it was Reb Mendelev Rimenover) pinched snuff from a golden case. Other Hasidic rabbis lived in poverty and practiced asceticism. As Hasidism developed further, the rabbi's chair became hereditary—strange as this was to Jewish tradition—and thus the movement was transmuted into what might be called a mystic monarchy.

Jiri Langer, the author of the *Nine Gates*, came to Hasidism from an unlikely milieu. As his brother, Frantisek Langer, a physician and Czech writer, points out in the foreword, Jiri grew up in a partly assimilated home in Prague. He and a friend became interested in Jewishness, began to study Hebrew, and became ardently religious. In 1913, at the age of nineteen, he departed with his friend for Belz, Galicia, the seat of a large Hasidic court renowned for its austerity. Belz is surrounded by steppes and marshes. Three-quarters of the year the village flounders in deep mud. The rabbi of this court at the time, Yissochor Ber Rokach, was an ill-tempered man. He used to shower curses upon his Hasidim and their wives, and would whip his sash at those who blocked his path, to clear the way before him. But the Hasidim believed that his curses were, in reality, blessings. Jiri Langer did not come to Belz for a mere visit: he became a "sitter" in the court. The poverty and filth of that kind of life can barely be described. When World War I broke out, the court of Belz was moved to Hungary. Jiri's brother, who now was a military physician, helped Jiri free himself from military service in the Austrian army and Jiri remained in exile four years with the Rabbi of Belz, learning the Galician Yiddish and becoming one of

the intimates of the court. After the war, however, he returned to Prague. He was still pious, but he took off his Hasidic gabardine and his tall velvet hat, and began to lead the life of an "enlightened Orthodox."

It is difficult for a reader of his book to determine the extent of the author's involvement with Hasidism in his later years. This reviewer's impression is that he looked upon the Hasidic teachings and the numerous miracles recounted in the book as a kind of folklore. He remained an admirer of Hasidism, but as an outsider, no longer one of the sect. After returning from Belz, he began to pursue a literary career, writing a number of books and articles in Czech and in Hebrew. The *Nine Gates* was published in Czech in 1937 under the title *Devět Bran*. With the advent of the Nazis, his brother, who was then in Paris, helped him to settle in Palestine. Jiri was a good friend of Franz Kafka and in Palestine he made the acquaintance of Max Brod. He died there on March 12, 1943.

THE TITLE *Nine Gates to the Chassidic Mysteries* perhaps creates the impression that this book leads the reader progressively, gate after gate, into the mysteries of Hasidism, but such is not the case. *Nine Gates* is a collection of short biographies of a number of *Tsaddikim*, their sayings and parables, but mainly the stories of miracles which their followers said they had worked. Some of the sayings and miracles Jiri had heard directly from the mouths of the Hasidim, but most of them he took from Hasidic texts or from works on Hasidism written by scholars like Samuel Horodezky, Abraham Kahana, Martin Buber, Hillel Zeitlin, and a number of others. One looks in vain for some chronological order in the presentation of these chapters. Like a true Hasid, Jiri Langer is little concerned with time. He moves calmly back and forth among epochs and dynasties. What matter when things happened? The important thing is that the Jews had many *Tsaddikim* who gave Hasidic interpretations to the words of the Torah and who worked astonishing miracles. Jiri Langer assumes the style and tone of the faithful and naive writers of Hasidic tales such as Israel Ben Simchah, author of the *Ten Lights*. This gives a peculiar flavor of familiarity and authenticity to the work. The reader need not

make his way through scholarly introductions, sociological theories, historical analyses. He enters straight into the gates of Hasidism and it is not important if he begins at the first gate or at the fifth. Jiri Langer guides him through the Hasidic courts (which are now ashes), sits him down on a bench with the other Hasidim, and bids him listen to their stories.

The *Nine Gates* is thus not primarily for those whose approach to Hasidism is detached and analytical, although it would even be interesting to them. It is a book for the reader who wants to breathe Hasidic air. The author gives an occasional explanation of the sort that may be necessary to the uninitiated, but this he does briefly, in passing. One is not surprised that this volume (like Dr. Baumgardt's) lacks an index. It is a book to be read more for an impression and a mood than for a systematic study of Hasidism. Here, for example, is a story about Rebbe Reb Shmelke:

One night, after being awake for several days, he bowed his head and fell asleep. When he awoke after a short while, he noticed that his candle had gone out. Being afraid lest he might have to interrupt his study for a while, he went out of the little attic room, to the roof of the house, still half asleep, with the extinguished candle in hand. Lo! As he reached the roof, an unknown hand gave him a light. Rebbe Reb Shmelke lighted his candle, and without giving a thought to the donor of the light and the other unusual circumstances, returned to his book.

A moment later, however, it occurred to him that something unusual had happened. Who was it who had offered him a light? Nobody could reach from the ground to the roof, and there was no ladder.

Then the holy Rebbe Reb Shmelke prayed to God, and it was revealed to him that the interruption of his studies had been felt in Heaven as a grievous loss, so the prophet Elijah had been sent down to bring him a light.

When the holy Rebbe Reb Shmelke heard this, he wept. Afterwards, he fasted many days because he, who was so unworthy, had caused the prophet so much inconvenience on his behalf.

Like the Rebbe Reb Shmelke, the reader of the *Nine Gates* is given the light without realizing from whence it comes.

GOING MODERN

THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY. Edited by CYRIL E. BLACK. *Harvard University Press*. 695 pp. \$9.75.

Reviewed by ELISHA GREIFER

IT WOULD DO Karl Marx's heart good to discover how much American scholarship and journalism is being devoted to the change from what used to be called "feudalism" to whatever it is that follows. Terms for the *before* and the *after* have multiplied. Once upon a time there existed, and in some places there still exists, the old regime, the *ancien régime*, rural society, traditional society, the pre-modern world, the agricultural economy, underdeveloped countries, the non-Western world. These were fated to be replaced by developed countries, modern society, modern civilization, the market economy, industrial society, urban life, Western ways. Popular magazines, on the other hand, feature the change itself rather than either of the two stages: we are in a revolutionary era, an age of transition, a world in upheaval. The scholars, meanwhile, speak of economic growth or development, and cultural or social change.

Much of the older scholarship on the whole process of "going modern" was European, and was largely concerned with Europe. But Americans gradually entered the discussion via American portals. A few of them questioned why America was so exceptional among Western societies, and decided that it was because the *ancien régime* had never existed here. More recently, Americans have wondered why Middle Easterners, Southeast Asians, and Latin Americans behave the way they do; and now there are books and articles, new courses in a variety of academic departments, study centers, and the quarterly *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (in its ninth year). Clearly the subject has arrived.

What can be said in general terms about the social and cultural changes that accompany (follow, are related to, caused by, or themselves enhance) economic development? One would say now that economic development can take place in almost any sort of society and in almost any fashion—in a revolutionary upsurge, without revolution;

via private enterprise, via state socialism; with planning, without extensive planning. One would also say that the social and cultural results of economic development will not be identical: more freedom, less freedom; more equality, less equality; destruction of traditional religion, preservation of traditions; more democracy, less democracy. Within these possibilities sociologists look for probable uniformities, such as the shrinking family and the need for greater literacy in an industrial civilization. But one no longer feels pushed toward doctrinaire pronouncements on inevitable relationships between economic system and social system. Anything can happen, and almost everything seems to be happening.

The older writers tended toward polemics on socialism. Marx, who was undeniably a Marxist, set the pattern, and the German sociologists who followed him seem always to have had an eye mainly on correcting his "socialistic" analyses of social change. A generation ago, Karl Mannheim, using his "sociology of knowledge," hoisted Marxism with its own petard by treating it as just another cultural product of industrialization. (Adam Ulam's recent treatment of Marxism, *The Unfinished Revolution*, saw this body of thought similarly, as the product of a changing society—a "disease of the transition," according to W. W. Rostow.) The nice thing about disposing of Marx so neatly or of ignoring him in the first place is that one can abandon the polemical trappings and get on with the underlying work.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY cannot be praised too highly, for it gets on with the work. The bulk of the book consists of a variety of short working papers, some thirty of them, written by specialists in no way bound by any one approach. Some of the essays, such as the one on population changes, are factual, while others—like the one titled "Some Principal Characteristics of Industrial Societies"—are theoretical; many deal with the familiar political subjects ("The Political Police"), a few with more off-beat topics ("The Strong-Woman Motif"). In general, there are half a dozen essays each on aspects of law and politics; social stratification; education, scholarship, and religion; family, youth, and human welfare; and personal and social values—de-

signed "to raise questions rather than settle them." The book, in short, is for those who want to know what's been happening in Russia, not for those who want a neat classification.

The editor, Professor Cyril E. Black, consequently permits himself to draw only a few tentative conclusions on Russian modernization. It has followed more or less universal patterns, he believes. Deviations are due either to unique historical traditions—the predominant role of the state, or the country's backwardness, defensiveness, and patriotism; or to contingent circumstances—the specific terms under which the serfs were emancipated, the interruption by World War I of pre-war economic growth and social developments, Lenin's skill, and the provisional government's lack of it. Among modernizing societies, Black sees the Russian pattern resembling somewhat that of Turkey, Iran, Japan, and China. They are "societies with a tradition of vigorous, independent, and relatively centralized governments; modernizing at first defensively but in due course aggressively, and to a marked degree at the initiative of the state; borrowing wholesale from the West, but with a characteristic ambivalent attitude toward Western values and influences."

This pattern of modernization is by no means applicable to all countries. It is distinct not only from that of the West but also from that of the newer states of Asia and Africa.

Quite naturally, a recurrent theme in the book concerns the activities of the state in promoting social change. More specifically, the question is whether Russia's totalitarianism might gradually come to mellow. Thus, Merle Fainsod, the *rapporteur* of the section on law and politics, is critical of those contributions which do not sufficiently emphasize the distinction between Soviet totalitarianism and the "merely" authoritarian rule of the Czars. Fainsod grants that Stalin's decision in 1928 to overcome Russian backwardness through rapid industrialization and collectivization powerfully "strengthened" the existing totalitarian "component." But he asks: "What happens when economic backwardness is at last overcome. . . ?" Two other Harvard *rapporteurs*, Alex Inkeles (stratification) and Raymond Bauer (family, youth, and human

welfare), raise the question of whether industrial society's tendency toward equality of opportunity (I translate from Inkeles's "homogenization of life chances") and toward the welfare state will erode totalitarian controls.

The answer is anybody's guess. We just do not know enough yet about the life cycle of totalitarianism. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy died violent deaths and provide no basis for comparison. There is, in any case, every prudent reason to assume the worst—that totalitarianism creates a "permanent revolution" which will not mellow significantly. Whatever the answer, the thaw in Soviet life since Stalin's death in 1953 in no wise wipes out the Soviet totalitarianism identified with the Stalinist formula of forced industrialization. "The somewhat easier way of life and the relatively relaxed methods of government that have marked Khrushchev's administration," Professor Black reminds us, are not the result "of any fundamental change in the philosophy of modernization."

AFTER THE DEATH CAMPS

DAWN. By ELIE WIESEL. Translated from the French by Frances Frenaye. *Hill and Wang*. 90 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by IRVING FELDMAN

READERS OF COMMENTARY may recall Mr. Wiesel's *Night*, his heart-rending account of his years in Auschwitz and Buchenwald. In retelling so nakedly the horror, humiliation, and guilt of his concentration camp life, Mr. Wiesel's memoir seems to humble itself before the facts of this experience as before a divinity, the only divinity to survive Buchenwald with him. To faithfully set down what happened was not for Mr. Wiesel, one feels, to give testimony—it was to record a holy scripture. And what did this god of the concentration camp utter? He said, I died, and I am the death-in-life of a degradation and guilt so great they are no longer conceivable, personal, but have become a total desolation; to have forgotten so easily the wreaths of crematory smoke that were my mother and sisters, to have seen a son kill his father in order to tear a bit of bread from his mouth, to have seen an-

other run on to leave his straggling father to the snow or an SS bullet, to have vowed never to betray my father and then to have felt relieved by his death, and, at the liberation, to have thought only of food and not of revenge—this is to die. Even a mere reader of *Night* must feel himself robbed of the earth, set adrift in some nowhere out in the vacant spaces, must feel that he died and that there is no door anywhere through which he might be admitted to life.

Elisha, the narrator of Mr. Wiesel's short novel, *Dawn*—the second volume in a projected trilogy—is an eighteen-year-old with a past, or rather, hiatus, similar to that described in *Night*. Recruited into an Israeli terrorist group, he is charged with executing an English officer taken hostage against the prospective hanging of a captured terrorist. And the novel consists of Elisha's twilight-to-dawn deathwatch during which what is at stake for him in becoming a murderer is examined. Such a situation immediately suggests the existentialist genre, and so Mr. Wiesel has chosen to cast his novel. Unhappily, for the genre is dated, and, more important, its drama of self-confrontation is at odds both with Elisha's meditative quality and with his predicament. The essence of this genre is the double act, the first a fall and the second its redemption. In the terms of the genre, the first act is mere behavior (the will overcome by the world) which is rescued in the second or "true" act, where the will frees itself by consciously affirming the consequences. The character does not act into his acts—he awakes to them as to *faits accomplis*—but only into the situation they have provoked. So here in *Dawn*, Elisha's voice is detonalized by his *Stranger*-like "for some reasons" and, like other existentialist murderers, he pulls the trigger only because the gun is in his hand. But all this seems mannered, for it hardly fits with Elisha's intense brooding over the act he will commit. Again, partly because the novel has said it all already, the moral rescue does not take place, the execution does not become a datum for interpretation, it is an end, a further dying for Elisha.

Though there is much that is excellent here—honest, sensitive, densely and finely wrought—*Dawn* is seldom moving. Rather, in its paralysis of tone, its unrelieved somberness, its funereal pace, abstractness, heavily

stressed tension, it is agonizingly obsessive. I doubt that this derives from a fault of talent or an impatience with making fictions. If Elisha is not a character but the locus of a problem, if his Israeli comrades are mere cardboard and the English officer is made a stock figure and denied any sort of sensuous or moral effulgence in his final meeting with Elisha, it is because the scripture-recording intention, present here as in *Night*, conflicts with the sociability, liveliness, and affirmation inherent in the making of fictions and in artistic form itself. The refrain attached to Elisha is, "Poor boy, poor boy." This is no ordinary self-pity, but one so profound that it is a mourning for one's own death—a mourning so intense that self-pity would represent a first step toward life. Elisha says of himself, "I had died and come back to the earth, dead," and the ghosts of the dead with whom Elisha lives are almost the only thing in *Dawn* that Mr. Wiesel touches lightly, lovingly. He makes no attempt to portray Elisha as an "eighteen-year-old," but then, as a character in *The Idiot* notes, the dead are without age.

Now, this desolation of mourning is alien to the general moral problem insistently posed in the novel: that of Jewish quietism and moral aspiration faced with the task of wresting a haven for itself. Elisha has little political awareness or idealism: he joins the terrorist group because he is "a living graveyard," because he "had no more friends to lose." Elisha's specific tragedy, then, does not reside in his violation of the Sixth Commandment, nor in his break with traditional Jewish passivity; his tragedy is that the "Messianic world" of the terrorist group, "where not a single act was wasted or a single glance lost," betrays him into a final confirmation of his guilt. The fatherly English officer he executes is not the surrogate of a *rite de passage*—he is closer to the betrayed fathers of *Night*—and Elisha shoots him not, in the conventional mode, in the neck, but through the heart. The desolation is complete: "I have killed Elisha," he says, and his ghosts, those "millions of spiritual creatures," depart. No *Meshulah* can now emerge to answer Elisha's palpitant expectancy; this last life that whispered within him has been silenced, and he must remain a "question mark." A dawn rises

the color of stagnant water. Soon there

was only a tattered fragment of darkness, hanging in midair, the other side of the window. Fear caught my throat. The tattered fragment of the darkness had a face. Looking at it, I understood the reason for my fear. The face was my own.

If the idea of universal guilt has any serious content it is that supplied by *Night* and *Dawn*: total devastation, universal orphanhood. But this cannot be chosen or induced—and who could want to pay such a price in order to rescue this notion from glibness and sentimentality? Nevertheless, the case of Elisha reads like an enlargement of our own nihilism. For him—and so it is in *Night*—“God died at Auschwitz.” And “if God is dead, then all is permitted”; here we must add, *but nothing is desired*, for the good and desire imply one another. The adolescent Wiesel liberated from Buchenwald is only hungry, and Elisha is less confused about values than simply wantless. The effect of such wantlessness is, finally, to render all moral issues irrelevant.

INSIDE THE VOID

FIRSTHAND REPORT. By SHERMAN ADAMS.
Harper. 481 pp. \$5.95.

Reviewed by JOSEPH KRAFT

FROM THE FAR OUTSIDE, American politics looks like a struggle between the two parties. From the middle distance, skirmishing between executive and legislature seems to predominate. But from the White House itself, the overwhelming impression is of conflict between the President and the rest of his administration. That tension forms the explicit theme of the most sophisticated and up-to-date account of the Presidency—Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*. It also provides the implicit theme and the underlying drama of Sherman Adams's engrossing memoir of the Eisenhower years.

Harmony prevailed only on the issue of fiscal orthodoxy and the balanced budget. “Eisenhower was more deeply concerned with economics than most people realized.” Like his Secretaries of the Treasury, his Budget Directors, and his leaders in the Congress, he believed “that national security depended pre-eminently upon a sound economy.” He was “determined to keep

down the costs of government,” and to “fight inflation.” “He once told the cabinet that if he was able to do nothing as President except balance the budget he would feel that his time in the White House had been well spent.” After four years of steady effort, he succeeded: “a feat,” Adams says, that was “one of his greatest as President.”

But on the basic issues of war and peace, the President was at odds with his chief advisers in State and at the Pentagon. An ingenuous good will, tinged with sentimental pacifism, characterized his approach to foreign policy. He was “always hopefully seeking world peace.” He “felt there could be no peace without disarmament,” and on that issue “he spent long hours of discussion,” “kept insisting on concrete proposals,” “never lost heart.” But “Eisenhower's approach to foreign problems was more conciliatory than Dulles's.” “The hard and uncompromising line that the United States government took toward Soviet Russia and Red China was more a Dulles line than an Eisenhower one.” With regard to disarmament, Dulles saw it only as “something in the nebulous future.” He “did not believe that disarmament could become a reality . . .”

Moreover, the Secretary was as fierce in fighting for his prerogatives within the government as in trading insults with Chou En-lai. “The Secretary . . . wanted no one to come between him and Eisenhower,” and he “saw to it that nobody but himself talked with Eisenhower about major decisions.” He eyed with jealous suspicion such potential intruders into the foreign policy field as Harold Stassen, Nelson Rockefeller, Lewis Straus, and C. D. Jackson. When the President suffered his heart attack in Denver, Dulles suggested that Adams set up shop in the Rockies. “In insisting upon having me with Eisenhower,” Adams writes, “Dulles was once again vigilantly protecting his own position as the maker of foreign policy. He wanted to make sure that nobody [presumably he was worried about the President's brother, Milton] would get between the President and himself with suggestions for changing the foreign program.” So tight was Dulles's control over foreign policy that at one point the President exulted because the Secretary always consulted *him* before making major moves. It is hardly surprising

in these circumstances that the President had to look back on his work for disarmament "with a definite sense of disappointment."

In dealing with the Pentagon, Eisenhower sought to put the lid on what he was in time to call "the military-industrial complex." "He was always fearful that excessive military spending might weaken the nation internally." He was "much less sympathetic to the grandiose schemes and ambitious plans of the Pentagon than his predecessors had been," for he "had his own ideas about what was needed for national defense." These did not include a limited war capability: "If you want to be coldly logical," he once said, according to Adams, "the money being spent for ground forces could be used to better advantage on new highways for facilitating the evacuation of large cities in case of any enemy attack." Neither did he take a generous view of the strategic implications of space. "He remarked that he would rather have one good Redstone nuclear-armed missile than a rocket that could hit the moon, for we had no enemies on the moon." Year after year Eisenhower did battle with the military chiefs on the budget. He fell out with Ridgway, with Taylor, with Lemay, with Twining, with Radford. But in the struggle, his Secretary of Defense repeatedly proved a weak reed. To Charles Wilson he once felt obliged to say: "You people never seem to learn whom you are supposed to be protecting. Not the generals, but the American people."

EISENHOWER HIMSELF is for Adams an object of sincere reverence. He speaks of him as "the greatest force for peace in the world," and "the greatest single force holding the alliance together." But the effect of such praise is only to deepen the central mystery of the Eisenhower cult: how so many experienced and purposeful men could come to worship a figure supported by feet so manifestly made of clay? For from Adams's pages it is clear that the bitter failures of the administration were the failures of the President. There arises from these pages a figure indifferent, beyond the barest homilies, to the business of government.

Eisenhower was "not much of a reader." He "disliked using the telephone." "He paid little attention to papers that continually be-

labored him . . . and seldom read the Washington papers." "He rarely carried an argument to the point of getting tough." "He was always hopeful that if he could get his work cleared away early in the day, he might find time . . . on the golf course." "He gave each cabinet member and agency director complete responsibility for his department, and almost never intervened in the selection of their assistants and key personnel." "He preferred to leave the operation of the political machinery to the professionals." "The weekly meetings of the party Congressional leaders in the White House [were] an ordeal. . . ." "Eisenhower was exasperated by the time that was spent on the patronage wrangles." "He told Nixon, and others including myself, that he was well aware that somebody had to do the hard infighting, and that he had no objections to it as long as no one expected him to do it."

The enormous void left by Eisenhower was largely filled by Adams. His job was "scrubbing the administrative and political back stairs." In great affairs of state he was clearly over his head; it is a sure mark of this failing that he allows the historical value of his book to be marred by imprecision on dates relating to important transactions. But he was a tireless worker (250 phone calls on an average day). He had a sense of proportion on all political matters ("I assumed all along that Nixon would again be the Vice-Presidential candidate"), and he was loyal as few men are: "Whatever I did or said, publicly or privately, was strictly in support of the President's position as I understood it." About his dismissal as a result of the Goldfine case there persists bitter irony. For if there is a single quality that shines through the works and words of Sherman Adams it is straightforwardness. His book is devoid of the special pleading and softening of detail that mark the exculpator. He gives a full account of the Goldfine case. He indicates that it was at his behest that Eisenhower struck a favorable reference to General Marshall from a Milwaukee speech delivered in Senator McCarthy's presence. He takes upon his own shoulders responsibility for misjudging Orval Faubus.

Candor may not be the queen of the virtues. But it counts for something—notably in a profession where the usual standard

evokes the memory of Pilate in Anatole France's novel, *The Procurator of Judea*, who, when asked many years afterward about the crucifixion, replied: "Jesus Christ? I don't remember him."

A JEWISH HUMANIST

AHAD HA-AM—ASHER GINZBERG. By LEON SIMON. *Jewish Publication Society*. 348 pp. \$4.50.

Reviewed by EZRA SPICEHANDLER

IN 1955 THERE APPEARED in Hebrew a definitive study of Ahad Ha-Am's career written by Sir Leon Simon and the late Joseph Heller. Dividing their work into two distinct sections, Sir Leon wrote the biography while Professor Heller undertook to explore Ahad Ha-Am's thought. It is to be regretted that in this English version of the Hebrew volume, the Jewish Publication Society saw fit not to include Professor Joseph Heller's contribution but only that of Leon Simon. Professor Heller, with great acumen and scholarship, had succeeded in giving system to the rather random collection of essays and aphorisms which form Ahad Ha-Am's literary legacy. But this, the publishers decided, was "unlikely to interest the general body of English readers of Jewish books." A pity. The liberal, pragmatist approach has again come to the fore in intellectual criticism, as against the recent anti-humanist, existentialist vogue. Jewish readers—some of whom, at least, ought not to be protected from the headier stuff of Jewish thought—might be ready, in the present intellectual climate, to take a new look at the humanism of men like Simon Dubnow and Ahad Ha-Am; for all its secularism, that humanism possesses the virtues of clarity and intellectual honesty which earn for it the right to be taken seriously.

We may, nevertheless, be very thankful for the English volume that is before us. It is an expanded version of Sir Leon's original biographical sketch, a forthright and lucid character study of Ahad Ha-Am, the man, by a pupil and disciple, one eminently qualified for the task he undertook. After all, it was to Simon that Ahad Ha-Am wrote: "You are the only friend I acquired dur-

ing my fourteen-year sojourn in London."

This biography of a complex and fascinating Jewish intellectual has the added interest of being a document which testifies to the degree to which the forces of acculturation work even on the personality of one who is as committed a Zionist and Hebraist as Sir Leon. His whole approach in appraising Ahad Ha-Am's life—balanced, fair-minded, judicious—is very British indeed.

No less praise can be given—and this the ordinary reader must find gratifying—to the skillful way Sir Leon camouflages his careful scholarship as he pursues his subject. Footnotes are not used, but the student of Ahad Ha-Am will discover that no source material has been ignored. Everything is adroitly employed—the six volumes of personal letters which Ahad Ha-Am collected shortly before his death, the occasional fragments of biography which he composed, and even the not very accessible private memoirs of his sister.

THE PROBLEM Ahad Ha-Am posed, "the problem of Judaism" he called it, is still on the Jewish agenda. How can a Jew remain a Jew in an essentially secularized world? How, living on the fringes of a Gentile world, can we retain our integrity and avoid turning our intellects into a device to escape our Jewish responsibility? How genuine is our relation with Western culture? Are we simply trying to save our Jewish necks at the price of our Jewish souls? And, finally, what significance does Judaism have for the skeptic and agnostic? Ahad Ha-Am answers all these questions by giving a secularist, humanist reading of Jewish history, relying heavily on French sociology and English utilitarianism. He argues that even in the early stages of Judaism the animating force was not religion but the people, and if the traditional view of God has now lost its meaning for millions of Jews, the ethics and values of Judaism retain their validity. Judaism is the expression of the goals, ideals, and symbols of a spiritual people. If religion can no longer serve to rally all Jews, a Jewish state—or at least a cultural center in Palestine—can serve: not only as the focal point for Jewish enthusiasm, but as a place of concentration for an authentic Jewish culture to continue to evolve. The acculturated Western Jew, living in two worlds, is at home in neither. Only as he is reinforced by

his own authentic culture can the modern Jew confront the Gentile world honestly and as an equal—neither a cultural parasite nor a victim of protective ghettoization.

These answers of Ahad Ha-Am cannot resolve all of our present dilemmas. The reality of modern Israel can hardly conform to Ahad Ha-Am's projected utopian cultural center. For one thing, in an age of jets, it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of maintaining an authentic culture in splendid geographical isolation. Most of us would nevertheless agree that whatever Jewish creativity survives will probably do so in Israel, and the relation of Diaspora Jews to Israel has to be cultural rather than political. Nor can we today be as certain as Ahad Ha-Am of the positive value of an ethical nationalism. It is questionable whether the mystique of a morality grounded in religion can maintain itself either in ethical nationalism or in humanism as such. These often lead to chauvinism, or to a vague relativism. Yet it would be desirable to channel the national pride engendered by the establishment of Israel into ethical and humanist directions. While Ahad Ha-Am undoubtedly underestimated the appeal of religion to liberated Westernized Jews, few could deny the validity of his critical remarks about the state of our Jewish religiosity. They still are closer to the truth than our official religious leadership would care to admit.

IT MAY COME as a surprise to some that Ahad Ha-Am's uncompromising positivist convictions were in conflict with his natural conservatism—a conservatism expressed in an almost filial deference toward Jewish traditions. And Sir Leon gives a poignant picture of that conflict, personified in the hate-love which marked Ahad Ha-Am's relation to his father. The portrait of the stern father as the image of Jewish religious authoritarianism, familiar in 20th-century Hebrew fiction, is shatteringly real in the biography of Ahad Ha-Am. The father had little sympathy for the son's ambitions and consistently belittled his abilities. The conflict in Ahad Ha-Am worked at the very roots of his system. It explains a good deal not only of his ideological development but also of the psychological deterrents which inhibited his personal life. Introspective, self-critical, and skeptical regarding his own abilities,

**A tormented victim
of the Nazi camps
who buries his humanity
in the heartless role
of**

The Pawnbroker

BY EDWARD LEWIS WALLANT

author of *The Human Season*
awarded the Harry and Ethel Daroff Memorial
Fiction Award for the best Jewish novel of 1960

In a powerful, complex, brooding novel, Mr. Wallant probes the struggle of a refugee to avoid human commitment as he traffics with the prostitutes, drunks and drug addicts who cross the threshold of his Harlem pawnshop. **\$4.50**



At all bookstores
**HARCOURT, BRACE
& WORLD, INC.**
750 Third Avenue, New York 17

**What kinds of
Americans join the
Communist Party —
and why?**

The Social Basis of American Communism

BY NATHAN GLAZER

author of *American Judaism* and
co-author of *The Lonely Crowd*

This carefully researched exploration of the changing patterns of Communist inducement and American response dissects the membership of the American Communist Party from its beginnings to the mid 1950's — by race, by economic class, by national origin. **\$5.50**

Ahad Ha-Am became a leader of men. "A high seriousness and a sense of responsibility" compelled him to speak out forcefully and clearly about the problems of his day. For all his devotion to the Zionist ideal, he saw the pitfalls of nationalist enthusiasms leading to the distortions of expediency. His thinking retains a relevance for contemporary Jews; and contemporary Jewish journalism could use a little more of his high-minded criticism and uncompromising honesty.

LEGAL NEUTRALISM

PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW. By HERBERT WECHSLER. *Harvard University Press*. 171 pp. \$4.25.

Reviewed by C. PETER MAGRATH

THIS VOLUME IS TO BE commended for rescuing four important essays by one of the eminent figures in American constitutional law from the obscurity of the professional journals. Though the essays were written over the past fifteen years, they nevertheless remain timely and instructive, proceeding as they do from Professor Wechsler's central concern "with our national efforts to govern our polity by fundamental law." "Nuremberg Trial Issues"—profitable reading in view of the Eichmann trial—defends Nuremberg as "essentially just and constructive"; "Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution" evaluates the contribution of a great judge; "The Political Safeguards of Federalism" emphasizes the extent to which the Constitution, particularly through the role it reserves to the states in selecting the federal government's elected officials, has influenced our political life.

It is, however, Wechsler's most recent effort, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," which will attract most attention—and controversy. The impact of "Neutral Principles" is such that it had scarcely appeared in print before two noted Yale law professors, Louis H. Pollack and Charles L. Black, Jr., rushed to publish their separate dissents.

The primary purpose of Wechsler's essay is to develop a standard of adjudication which he would have both judges and critics use in reaching and evaluating

Supreme Court decisions. He describes this standard as one of "neutral principles," having considered and rejected such alternative adjectives as "impartial," "disinterested," "impersonal," and "general," because they lack the "overtones" conveyed by "neutral." These overtones, he teasingly admits, are "somewhat enigmatic," but finds this no real deficiency, saying, "this is an enigmatic subject."

In any case, it seems clear that Wechsler wants the Court to come to its decisions according to principles which would apply equally well in every comparable situation and which would not take into account the ensuing result. An instance of such neutrality is the Court's having enunciated the principle of federal power over interstate commerce and then having applied it impartially—citing it as justification for both the pro-labor Wagner Act and the pro-business Taft-Hartley Act. Wechsler's hope, therefore, is for constitutional adjudication that proceeds according to a "genuinely principled" process, "resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."

But how relevant is this principle when applied to the concrete legal problems that come before the Court? Wechsler meets the question directly by applying his concept of neutrality to some of the modern Court's most significant decisions, i.e., those upholding the rights of Negroes to vote in Southern primaries, to own houses in spite of restrictive racial covenants, and to attend integrated public schools. His verdict: while he thoroughly approves of these results, the decisions fail to rest on "neutral principles that satisfy the mind." Wechsler's problem with the first two, the white primary case of 1944 and the restrictive covenant case of 1948, is a consequence of earlier Supreme Court rulings. Ever since the Reconstruction period, the Court had generally construed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as only preventing racial discrimination by states; actions of private individuals have been held to be beyond federal control. Thus public authorities may not exclude Negroes from jury service or deny them the right to vote, but there is nothing to prevent white

Southerners from denying Negroes equal access to their theaters, restaurants, and stores (not to mention the use of all sorts of subtle pressures to bar Negroes from voting or serving on juries). Under this theory, the Supreme Court had held that the Democratic party in the Southern states was merely a "private club" and therefore free to keep Negroes out of its primaries. Then, in 1944, the Court, overruling an earlier decision, declared that since primary elections were an integral part of the federally-protected election process, political parties which excluded persons from their primaries because of race were engaging, in effect, in action prohibited to the states. Similarly in the restrictive covenant case, until which it had been widely assumed that homeowners could make—and enforce—private agreements designed to prevent property from falling into the hands of minority groups, the Court announced a new concept of state action. It recognized individual freedom to enter into agreements not to transfer property to racial minorities, but declared judicial enforcement of such contracts to be forbidden state action.

To WECHSLER these conclusions rely on disingenuous interpretations of state action; hence the two decisions are simply "*ad hoc* determinations of their narrow problems, yielding no neutral principles for their extension or support." The primary case, for example, strikes at private discrimination—that is, "party organization upon racial lines"—which is not constitutionally proscribed. However, this line of reasoning, to borrow Wechsler's expression, "fails to satisfy the mind." The primary in the South is the election. Furthermore, neutrality inheres in the Court's decision: neither whites *nor* Negroes are to be denied, either by overt or covert state action, the right to cast a meaningful ballot. So also with the housing covenant case: its principle prevents Negroes and whites, both equally, from asking courts to enforce their discriminatory agreements. Yet for Wechsler there is an insoluble contradiction in the Supreme Court's imputation of state discrimination to court actions that enforce covenants which, admittedly, individuals are free to make. But, following Professor Louis Pollack, law imposes "public force" upon

**"The best book
about education
I have ever read."**

— EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG
in *Commentary*

THE SCHOOLS

By MARTIN MAYER

"For my money — and the academic pundits can raise their eyebrows — this is the best book on American education I have read in the past ten years. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of our American discussion of education, it is a clear beacon of pure light."

— HARRY D. GIDEONSE,
President of Brooklyn College

\$4.95. Get it at your bookstore, or from
HARPER & BROTHERS, 49 E. 33 St., N.Y. 16

Faces the problems and
potentials of establishing
a new school —

A Handbook for Independent School Operation

Edited by William Johnson. Considers every conceivable issue facing the head of a new school, his associates, and the founders, including, How to Get Your School Underway, administration, curriculum, business management, public relations, extracurricular activities, and boarding facilities. Contributors are heads of outstanding independent schools throughout the U.S. \$5.50

At all bookstores, or from

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.
120 Alexander St., Princeton, N.J.

men. When discriminatory arrangements of public consequence prevail because enforced by state courts, then state action has occurred. If the choice is whether or not a white homeowner should be able to rely on a court to give force to his prejudices—thereby denying a Negro freedom to live where he chooses—why should the state throw its weight on the side of he who would discriminate?

Wechsler is also dismayed by the reasoning in the school segregation decision, which places him with a host of Northern scholars and legal writers. Rarely, if ever, have those who applauded a momentous decision been so anxious to dissociate themselves from its supporting opinion. (A comparable reaction would have been for Jefferson Davis to rise gravely in the United States Senate, expose the fallacies of the *Dred Scott* opinion, and then warmly endorse its pro-slavery conclusions.) True, part of their criticism is the product of hindsight, born of the deep South's successful resistance to the decrees. There is force nonetheless in the contention that for the Court to rest its decision on the "fact" that segregation is inherently unequal, is to expose the decision to challenge by other "facts," and to neglect more persuasive arguments: the patently discriminatory intent of the segregation statutes, the presumed invalidity of laws making racial classifications, and the sophistry of earlier decisions upholding segregation (which argued, for instance, that "the assumption that the enforced segregation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" inheres solely in the construction Negroes "choose" to put upon segregation laws).

However, these more cogent grounds still fail to satisfy Wechsler's quest for neutrality. As he sees it, the crucial issue in the segregation case is "freedom of association." Segregation, he grants, denies Negroes freedom to associate with whites. By the same token, "integration forces an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant." So, given a situation where the choice is one between denying association to those who desire it or imposing it on those who dislike it, he then asks: "Is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the

claims for association should prevail?" His answer is, no.

With all due respect, this reasoning is untenable. Association versus non-association is not the choice. Rather, the choice is whether or not Negroes and whites are to receive equal treatment under the law in the enjoyment of state-sponsored facilities. Whites for whom school integration is distasteful remain free to practice non-association by attending private schools. Where the state establishes a system of compulsory public education, true neutrality decrees it be open equally to all.

The difficulty with Professor Wechsler's "neutral principles" is their generality. Few, except those who dismiss law as mere will, can disagree that Supreme Court adjudication is most persuasive when grounded in principled, impartial, and consistent reasoning. Certainly, the judge or critic who upholds Congressional power to investigate business abuses and would deny its use to investigate alleged subversion is impaled on a logical dilemma created by his own inconsistency. But what, precisely, are "neutral principles"? They are not, Wechsler makes clear in an introduction written after the first reaction to his thesis, principles devoid of values. Is not the crucial part of the concept, then, the values that are to be applied neutrally, as, for example, in the school litigation where to Wechsler (but not to me) the operative values involve the right to association and non-association? This being the case, Professor Wechsler is likely to find that his thought-provoking piece produces much agreement "in principle" (who, after all, wishes to avow a commitment to biased principles?), but little consensus on specific decisions.

A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: A HISTORY. By H. STUART HUGHES. *Prentice-Hall*. 502 pp. \$10.00.

Reviewed by GEORGE LICHTHEIM

IT SEEMS TO HAVE BECOME the prerogative of American historians to see Europe as a whole. There was a time when the British—then standing a little outside Europe—could take a synoptic view of the Contin-

ent to which they half-belonged; Acton is the greatest example. But those days are gone, and the modern British historian is poised between conscious insularity and resigned acceptance of his country's new role as an aspiring member of the West European community. It now falls to American writers to portray the Old Continent, mainspring of so many wars and revolutions, as it attempts to settle down in the nuclear age. Though in doing so they are inevitably obliged to allot a good deal of space to the growing impact upon European affairs of what de Gaulle is fond of calling "that daughter of Europe—the United States."

A strong sense of this relationship is not among the least merits of Professor Hughes's new work, which attempts to trace in bold outline the record of the past half-century. One may question the feasibility of the enterprise, but given the initial assumption that it is possible to cover some fifty years of history—political, military, economic, cultural—in five hundred pages, it is difficult to see how anyone could have done better single-handed. A distinguished historian, Professor Hughes is also the fortunate possessor of a felicitous style, and when these qualifications are combined with an unusual breadth of interests and a far-ranging intellectual curiosity, there results something very different from the ordinary academic compendium. The student population will doubtless draw the greatest immediate benefit from his lucid exposition of European political history since the First World War, but the general reader interested in the movement of ideas, and the progress of the arts and sciences, has not been forgotten; for good measure there are photographs, not only of political and military figures, but of thinkers and men of letters: Lenin, Trotsky, Hitler, and Mussolini, but likewise, Freud, Gide, Thomas Mann, and Jean-Paul Sartre. The reader is never permitted to forget that Europe is (or at any rate was) a distinctive cultural whole.

Politics and war nonetheless predominate. This is as it should be, for the two wars of 1914–18 and 1939–45 over shadowed the whole era and transformed Europe, as they did not transform America. Mr. Hughes rightly treats the 1914–18 war as

Sail away to Europe ... start your trip to Israel on CUNARD'S Vacation Island

Step aboard for a luxurious seagoing Cunard holiday across the Atlantic! After the pleasures of your voyage, thrill to the sights of all-Europe. Convenient connections to Israel offer opportunities to visit London or Paris en route!

Splendid meals, flawless service •
Dances, parties, sports, games
• Special attention to dietary
needs • Facilities for worship
aboard ship.

CRUISES IN EVERY SEASON

Caronia Mediterranean Cruises

October 3, '61, May 1, '62

Caronia South Pacific—

Far East Cruise

Jan. 27, '62

Mauretania Mediterranean Cruise

Feb. 3, '62


*4 Mauretania Sunshine Cruises
to the Caribbean*

Dec. '61 through April '62

SEE YOUR TRAVEL AGENT

Getting there is half the fun! Go

CUNARD



CUNARD LINE

25 Broadway, N. Y. 4 • BO 9-5300

441 Park Ave., N.Y. 22 • PL 5-4300

the decisive break with the past, and the 1939-45 slaughter as its more or less inevitable sequel. It was in 1914 that Europe went over the brink and brought the liberal 19th century to a close. Why and how this happened is discussed at some length, and the military operations are given sufficient weight to make it plain how shattering was their impact upon a Europe which by 1914 had almost come to believe that civilization was secure. Here the reviewer is obliged to take issue with the author over what is perhaps after all not a major point: Mr. Hughes believes that the outbreak of war in 1914 took most people by surprise. What really surprised them was the character of the explosion. That Russia and Austria, France and Germany, Germany and England, would come to blows, was very generally taken for granted by informed Europeans in the decade preceding the conflict, and by many who were not informed. What few people had expected was a cataclysm which would blow the old Europe to smithereens. The unforeseen factor lay in the sudden release of technical forces stored up during the preceding half-century. This was less true of the 1939-45 massacre, which in some respects even failed to come up to the advance billing. The British, for example, were pleasantly surprised when the German bombings turned out to be less devastating than had been feared. The belief that London could be reduced to ashes in a matter of days—however idiotic it seemed in retrospect—unquestionably was an element in the panic which accompanied, and to some extent produced, the Munich surrender in 1938.

WHEN THE TWO WARS—for some reason still described as World Wars, though much of the world was not concerned—were over, Europe had lost its old commanding position, and was inclined to take a back seat in the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is Mr. Hughes's second major theme, and while he does his best to integrate it with the analysis of European affairs proper, he has not quite escaped the fate that dogs all writers on this subject: an excessive preoccupation with the cold war and the balance of power as it looks to Americans in 1961. Thus in his final chapters the reader is told a good

deal about NATO, and even about relatively minor matters—such as the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in 1955, or the so-called Rapacki Plan for arms control in Central Europe—which belong more properly to a study of international relations. He also attempts to bring the record up to date on Algeria—a hopeless undertaking. Some of this could with advantage have been sacrificed to a more general consideration of Europe's problems in mid-century. There is something admirable about the author's relentless tracking of even such recondite matters as Portugal's colonial policy—and this *before* the birds had come home to roost!—but it seems a pity to waste space on matters that any competent political scientist can handle. And was it really necessary to tell the story of the Suez escapade in 1956 all over again?

Here and there, the European reader is brought up short against a difference in outlook which transcends political alignments. Mr. Hughes is a liberal; so are a good many people in England, but not many could summon the detachment with which he observes, apropos of the Suez debacle: "In Britain, the imperialists were concentrated in the Conservative Party." The fact is that the whole of Britain has for centuries been profoundly "imperialist," in the sense of viewing the world through the idiosyncratic medium of a ruling-power mentality. No one will ever know what it means to the Tories that Britain is no longer a Great Power—they are not in the habit of parading their broken hearts in public—but to suppose that these sentiments are confined to a small minority is to deceive oneself. Suez was popular with the immense bulk of the electorate, and nowhere was resentment at America's attitude more bitter and long-lasting than among the workers. Even three years after the event, the memory of Gaitskell's courageous but unpopular stand against the enterprise was an important factor in losing his party the election in 1959. This is the kind of thing liberals like Professor Hughes are apt to overlook. His tendency to join in the fashionable overestimate of Mendès-France is another case in point. To read him one would almost think that the French parliamentary regime, with its constant crises, was a great loss to the world when it finally gave up

ZIM to israel

שנה טיבה תכתוב

May all your fondest wishes
come true... for you and your
dear ones and for all of Israel.

S.S. Isreal, S.S. Zion sail from New York every third week... S.S. Theodor Herzl and S.S. Jerusalem (in season) sail from Mediterranean ports weekly.

- Completely air-conditioned
- Stabilizer-equipped for smooth sailing
- Strictly kosher food
- Cheerful atmosphere of Israel

Consult your travel agent



צִים
ZIM Lines

OWNER'S REP.: AMERICAN ISRAELI SHIPPING CO., INC.
42 BROADWAY, NEW YORK 4, N. Y. DI 4-7600

the ghost in 1958. Yet France is currently being modernized very effectively under the presidency of an elderly autocrat who is sufficiently up-to-date to have grasped that parliamentary government is on the way out, though democracy is not. The concurrent retreat from empire in Africa is something no parliamentary regime could possibly have managed. Mr. Hughes does not quite know what to make of de Gaulle, and on the whole tends to regard him as an impressive but anachronistic figure. He is mistaken; de Gaulle is modern, while his opponents on the right *and* left are stuck in the past.

This leads to a consideration which is central to the theme of this work, as it was already prominent in Mr. Hughes's earlier studies in European intellectual history. The decline of liberalism since 1914 has made it difficult for American and European historians to find a common wave length, since in the United States it is still possible to treat this phenomenon as a temporary aberration, while to most West Europeans—and of course to everyone in Central and

Eastern Europe—it has become the norm. In the "Little Europe" of the countries popularly known as "the Six," the two great mass movements are conservatism on the one hand, and various types of socialism or social democracy on the other. (Incidentally, Mr. Hughes understates the case when he suggests that the German Social Democrats have now got rid of their Marxist inheritance: what they have done is to repudiate socialism, which is something rather different.) In other words, the choice for a West European today lies, broadly speaking, between the Catholic Church and what in America would be regarded as the radical left. Liberalism exists chiefly as a memory, though "private enterprise" goes on. Even in Britain and Scandinavia this polarization has gone too far for the comfort of the surviving liberals, though in cultural matters liberal influences predominate at the higher levels. The resultant intellectual and political climate differs sharply from that of the United States, and this is why American spokesmen frequently strike Europeans as old-fashioned.

As an example one may cite the fact that even the most conservative European governments now regard central planning, and public ownership of basic industries, as quite proper instruments of policy. Mr. Hughes makes rather too much of the delayed impact of Keynes, and not enough of the postwar wave of nationalizations (as a result of which France now has a bigger state-controlled sector than Britain). American influence is felt chiefly in the spheres of consumer goods and popular entertainment. When it comes to matters like planning for full employment, or long-range government programs for stepping up national output, most Europeans privately feel that even Mr. Kennedy's America is still busy catching up with the most urgent needs of the age. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the influential stratum of government officials, economists, and technocrats, which has come to the forefront with the economic revival of Western Europe in recent years. It has not escaped the notice of these people that the pace of development has been fastest where there has been effective public planning. The old agrarian Europe still goes on—Mr. Hughes makes the important point that down to 1914 it had not really been touched by the industrial revolution—but the basic decisions are now made by men who know they must keep up with Khrushchev's Seven Year Plan. They may not call themselves socialists in public, but they are planners—and the key posts tend to get into their hands: in Gaullist France and Christian-Democratic Germany and Italy as well as elsewhere.

But enough of these tedious matters. In addition to straight political history, *Contemporary Europe* offers the reader a more tempting delight: a learned and urbane discussion of literary, scientific, and philosophical trends over the past half century. Two brief (alas) chapters are devoted to the cultural upheaval of the 1920's and the intellectual reconstruction in progress since 1945. The author of *Consciousness and Society* could hardly have done less (and might conceivably have done more, had his publisher been more generous with space). It takes both wide learning and unusual courage to attempt a survey of philosophy, psychology, science, literature,

and the arts in Europe during this chaotic period, but Professor Hughes braves the dangers and on the whole comes through unscathed. Readers of his earlier penetrating study of European thought since 1890 will not be surprised to find him firmly in control of the major intellectual currents—from Durkheim and Croce to Freud and Max Weber—and sensitively aware of European literature from Mann and Proust to Joyce, Lawrence, and the last faint whispers of the Bloomsbury set. But who would have suspected a sober Harvard historian of so much intimate understanding of twelve-tone music, expressionist painting, surrealist drama, and even the ballet? This reviewer's only regret is that by comparison with literature and the theater, little room is given to films. Mr. Hughes's almost Jamesian sensibility has a free run in these chapters, which could with advantage have been expanded. They also help to underscore the point that to an American viewing the scene from across the Atlantic, England is simply another country of Western Europe: a moral the British public is now belatedly, and rather reluctantly, trying to assimilate.

DOES EUROPE AS A WHOLE seem exhausted to a trans-Atlantic observer? It is difficult to tell from Mr. Hughes's summing-up, but one would guess that he is skeptical of the Continent's chances for a lasting recovery of creative energy. In an aside on the long-term effects of the two wars he makes the interesting point that while in 1914–18 the aristocracy suffered the heaviest losses, in 1939–45 it was the turn of the intellectuals. He is perhaps overly generous in attributing to the Jews a role which in fact they exercised only in Central Europe: in France and England their contribution, though respectable, was (and is) not comparable to what it was in Germany and Austria during the liberal era. Conversely, the resistance and the concentration camps, while they decimated the intellectual elite in France and Italy, also proved a tremendous stimulus which became noticeable after 1945 in the sudden new vitality of creative thought and art in these countries. In contrast, Western Germany has steadily sunk into somnolent provincialism, while Britain—which relatively speaking suffered few

ONE MOTHER TELLS ANOTHER



"Mom, I'll bring the fish for the holidays"

"Mom, you prepare the rest of the meal and I'll bring Mother's All Whitefish Gefilte Fish. You know, darling, Mother's packs real wholesome, homemade flavor right into the jar. Yes, Mom, we'll spend a wonderful Holiday together." KOSHER © PAREVE

Mother's[®]

ALL WHITEFISH GEFILTE FISH

Write for free Gefilte Fish recipe folder: "Delicious Daily Dining."

FROM THE SPOTLESS KITCHENS OF MOTHER'S FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Dept. M5, NEWARK 5, N.J.

ANY BOOK

No matter how old or how long out-of-print located by expert staff. "Name the book — we'll find it." Fiction or non-fiction. All authors, subjects. Free search — courteous service — no obligation to buy.

BOOKS-ON-FILE, Dept. COM
Union City, New Jersey

Your Book Published!

If we think your manuscript has unusual possibilities, we will offer you a straight royalty or partial subsidy basis. Send manuscript for free editorial report or write for Brochure CC.

Pageant Press, 101 Fifth Ave., New York 3, N.Y.

7th BIG PRINTING

A NATION OF SHEEP

by William J. Lederer
co-author of
THE UGLY AMERICAN
All America is reading it!

"Every American ought to read it."
— N. Y. Times

\$3.95 • NORTON

actual losses through war—has maintained a high level of Establishment culture at the cost of stifling most attempts at originality. In this respect the Labor government of 1945–51 was a considerable disappointment: all it contributed to the national ethos was a cult of decent mediocrity. Anglican Conservatism, for all its traditional links with the official culture, seems equally uninspired. One can scarcely conceive a British counterpart of André Malraux's current role across the Channel.

Mr. Hughes concludes on a note which may cause more than one reviewer to stir uneasily in his armchair: he believes that while the Old Men of European conservatism are true to the Atlantic alliance, the younger generation is increasingly attracted to the neutralist left, which has behind it "the longing to break free from the overwhelming nightmare of universal nuclear destruction." Here he may be overrating the significance of what is still a local British phenomenon: there is little evidence that Aldermaston Marchers are beginning

to form on the Continent. Moreover, neutralism—should it ever become a really serious slogan—could very well be coupled with a desire to possess nuclear arms of one's own: as indeed is already to some extent the case in France. "Armed neutrality" in the event of a clash between the giants of East and West seems more likely to become an attractive program than pacifism with its somewhat simple-minded faith in the efficacy of moral appeals. Should Europe ever be seriously tempted to "contract out" of the global struggle, it will presumably try to do so behind a nuclear shield of its own manufacture. The youthful idealists who currently obtain so much indulgent publicity will then turn out—as usual—to have served the ends of cynical statesmen with an acute sense of what is possible in a turbulent and dangerous world. But that is for the future. As matters stand, the Atlantic alliance still has a chance, and one must be glad that its cause can find intellectual expression at the level of Mr. Hughes's distinguished work.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

JOHN GROSS, an English critic, reviewed Martin Green's *A Mirror for Anglo-Saxons* in July.

ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER's new collection of fiction, *The Spinoza of Market Street*, is to be published this month.

ELISHA GREIFER, a new contributor, teaches in the political science department at Vassar.

IRVING FELDMAN's volume of poems, *Works and Days*, is shortly to be published by Atlantic-Little Brown.

JOSEPH KRAFT contributed "The Decline of the New York Democrats" to our July 1960 issue.

EZRA SPICEHANDLER is professor of Modern Hebrew Literature at Hebrew Union College.

C. PETER MAGRATH has recently joined the department of political science at Brown.

GEORGE LICHTHEIM's *Marxism* was recently published by Praeger.

a mark of respect

Riverside
MEMORIAL CHAPEL, INC.

FUNERAL DIRECTORS

Charles Rosenthal

Edward Rosenthal

Morton Rosenthal


Carl Grossberg

Maxwell W. Passerman

Lee J. Filer

Lawrence Grossberg

NEW YORK • BROOKLYN • BRONX • WESTCHESTER • LONG ISLAND • MIAMI



At New Year Gatherings...


the most cherished whisky

To mayvinum, the character of this great whisky from Canada is unmistakable. They speak of Seagram's V.O. in terms of "true lightness of body...surprising brilliance of flavor...distilling advanced to a very fine art." Seagram's started distilling over 100 years ago. Seagram's skill is without peer. This fact is expressed in V.O.—and the favor it has found throughout the world.

Known by the company it keeps

Imported in the bottle from Canada. Seagram's V.O. Canadian Whisky—a blend of selected whiskies. Six years old. 86.8 proof. Seagram-Distillers Company, New York City.

SEAGRAM'S
IMPORTED



Unleaded AMOCO

Whether you command a new car with its soul-stirring invitation to get up and go . . . or a car that's been your partner for a year or more . . . you can be certain *any* car gets up and goes *best*—with new unleaded AMOCO Super-Premium. AMOCO delivers a new high in anti-knock performance—and top gasoline mileage. *And remember . . . the difference in gasolines is crystal clear*—AMOCO contains no lead. That means longer life for spark plugs, valves and mufflers. Start going steady with unleaded AMOCO Super-Premium today.

unleashes
full-range
anti-knock
performance




© 1961 AMERICAN OIL COMPANY



NEW

AMOCO

THE ONLY
UNLEADED
SUPER-PREMIUM



ANOTHER BENEFIT OF *THE BIG STEP*  AT YOUR AMERICAN DEALER'S

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED